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SUMMARY 
 
This thesis examines the impact of the recent introduction of public opinion polling on 
the quality of elections in sub-Saharan Africa to understand why it has contributed to 
greater transparency and representativeness in some context and not in others. It 
makes a unique contribution to the literature in documenting the emergence of the 
public opinion polling industry on the continent and in developing a theoretical 
framework for understanding the influence of polling on elite perceptions and 
behaviour during electoral periods. The thesis situates the proliferation of polling in 
sub-Saharan Africa within the historical and contemporary debates on the relative 
merits and drawbacks of public opinion research in democratic politics and elections, 
while exploring the theoretical link between public opinion polling and the expansion 
of transparency and representation by elites. The framework developed here posits 
opinion polling as a new, modern form of political participation to which elites must 
adapt, creating opportunities for either expansion or contraction of political space 
around elections. In this model, elites’ perceptions of shifts in political competition 
play a critical role in shaping both the degree of change within the electoral process 
and the direction, whether toward greater or reduced transparency and 
responsiveness, of that change. The thesis employs a mixed method approach, using 
content analysis of print media and key informant interviews to inform detailed case 
studies of electoral campaigns in Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria, and Uganda. Consistent with 
the model, the case study chapters present historical narratives that capture 
significant examples drawn over multiple elections from each of the four countries in 
which public opinion polling and elite perceptions of political competition have 
instigated changes in political behaviour, ultimately contributing to improvement or 
deterioration in the quality of elections.  
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Chapter 1.  Introducing Polls, Elites, and Elections 
“Only fools, pure theorists, or apprentices fail to take public opinion into 
account”- Jacques Necker, Minister of Finance to Louis XVI 
In June 2012, Kenya’s President Mwai Kibaki signed into law the ‘Publication of 
Electoral Opinion Polls Bill’, designed specifically to outlaw the publication of opinion 
polls within the last five days of an election. It marked the culmination of an extended 
effort within the country’s legislature alternately to ban or to regulate public opinion 
polling in the country.1 Kenya is not alone in its attempts to curb the proliferation of 
opinion research around elections. Even in established democracies outside of Africa, 
the trend toward restricting or banning opinion polling has been strengthening.2 
In each case, the rationale given was potential fallibility, real or perceived, in public 
opinion polling and the consequences the release of this information would have on 
electoral politics. This is far from the impact that polling’s proponents envisioned when 
introducing public opinion polling into sub-Saharan African politics. Polling in these 
contexts generally was designed to improve the quality of elections by channelling 
politicians’ competitive tendencies into more transparent and representative electoral 
strategies, all situated within a broader remit of ‘democratisation.’ The intrusion of 
reality upon each of these ideological conceptions has rendered sub-Saharan Africa as 
                                                          
 
1 In September 2011, the Kenyan parliament rejected efforts by a small group of MPs to severely curtail 
the growing presence of opinion polls in the country. The MPs were seeking to amend the 2011 Election 
Bill to make it an offence for anyone who conducts an opinion poll or publishes the results of an opinion 
poll at any time within nine months of an election to pay a £15,000 fine or face a possible three year 
prison term(The Star, 19 September 2011). 
2
 Prior to the April/May 2011 elections in India, its Chief Election Commissioner S Y Quraishi went on 
record numerous times advocating a complete ban on conducting and publishing opinion polls before 
elections to complement the existing ban on the release of exit poll data until all polling stations had 
closed on the final day of voting (Times of India, 13 February 2011). Political commentators in both 
Canada and Australia have also recently called for the revival or introduction of bans or restrictions on 
opinion polling. Countries in Europe such as Italy, France, and Belgium already impose a ban on the 
publication of polls in the days before an election. 
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the next locus of the on-going debate as to the merits and deficiencies of public 
opinion research in democratic politics. 
Yet, for all the rhetoric surrounding it, the rapid emergence of an industry of political 
pollsters across a number of countries remains an understudied area of Africa’s 
experience with democratic elections. As public opinion polls have become embedded 
within the political processes of these countries, they have become capable of shaping 
the perceptions and the behaviours of politicians and other principal electoral actors. 
This influence, however, has been neither as uniform nor as malignant as those 
campaigning for their restriction have claimed. Nor has the adoption of polling 
unleashed a pervasive push for political liberalization in those countries where it has 
been implemented. The story of public opinion polling in sub-Saharan Africa is 
characterized both by ambivalence and by passion, by transparency and by deception, 
and by responsiveness and by manipulation. This variation in outcomes is intriguing 
and merits further investigation to understand to what extent is public opinion polling 
influencing the political dynamics of elections in sub-Saharan Africa and what explains 
the variation in that influence across cases? 
The introduction of public opinion polling into sub-Saharan Africa over the past 15 
years has forced its politicians, media, and pollsters onto a steep learning curve to 
accommodate this indispensable tool of the modern political campaign. Indeed, its 
emergence as a potential source of both information and influence for citizens and 
their leaders points to an increasingly sophisticated political system. Yet, opinion 
polling’s increasing prominence in the electoral processes of several influential African 
democracies has gone largely unstudied in the political literature of the continent. 
This thesis addresses that gap by examining the impact of the recent introduction of 
public opinion polling on the quality of elections in sub-Saharan Africa. It makes a 
unique contribution to the literature in documenting the emergence of the public 
opinion polling industry on the continent and in developing a theoretical framework 
for understanding the influence of polling on elite perceptions and behaviour during 
electoral periods. The thesis situates the proliferation of polling in sub-Saharan Africa 
within the historical and contemporary debates on the relative merits and drawbacks 
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of public opinion research in democratic politics and elections, while exploring the 
theoretical link between public opinion polling, political elites, and the quality of 
elections in sub-Saharan Africa. 
I argue that public opinion polling should not be considered only in its abstract form or 
in isolation. Rather, it should be examined within the political context in which it is 
operating. This means engaging with the realities of political change and electoral 
politics in the African countries now adopting opinion polling. The framework 
developed here posits opinion polling as a new, modern form of political participation 
to which the political elite must adapt, creating opportunities for either expansion or 
contraction of political space around elections. In this model, elites’ perceptions of 
shifts in competition play a critical role in shaping both the degree of change within the 
electoral process and the direction, whether toward greater or reduced transparency 
and responsiveness. Using detailed case studies from Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria, and 
Uganda, this thesis demonstrates that public opinion polling is influencing elite 
perceptions and that on the basis of this influence elites have instigated changes in 
political behaviour, ultimately contributing to improvement or deterioration in the 
quality of elections. 
1.1 Why Study Opinion Polling in sub-Saharan Africa? 
Public opinion research has been slower to catch on in Africa than in other continents, 
perhaps due to a lack of demand for the kinds of market research that enables 
research organisations to sustain themselves. One of the first comprehensive public 
opinion surveys to be sustained in Africa was launched under the auspices of Michigan 
State University, the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) in Ghana, and the 
Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa) in 1999. Labelled Afrobarometer in 
deference to its predecessors, the Eurobarometer and Latinobarometro, it built upon 
previous small scale opinion surveys done at country level in an attempt to develop a 
cross-national database of public opinion in Africa, as well as catalyse the emergence 
of further national capacity for polling (Bratton et al., 2005).  
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Focusing initially on democracy and democratic perceptions, the Afrobarometer has 
since expanded its topics of interests to include political opinion polling in the run-up 
to elections and other topical surveys based on current events in the countries where 
the network has a presence. Afrobarometer’s cross-national approach lends credence 
to its stance of non-partisanship in domestic political debates, but this does not mean 
that its polls have not attracted controversy. In spite of this, the survey network seems 
to be moving from strength to strength. Afrobarometer continues to expand its 
operations to cover more countries on the continent and to address more and more 
specific issues in its surveys based on funding from major donors like the Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) and the Mo Ibrahim 
Foundation. 
At the country level, the progress toward scientific public opinion polling has been 
decidedly less smooth but no less relentless. Media outlets, particularly those in 
Anglophone Africa, have discovered the charms of opinion polling as a driver of 
circulation numbers around election periods. As a result, the past 10–15 years have 
seen a precipitous rise in the number of organisations engaged in opinion polling in 
Africa and in the coverage these studies receive in the press. 
A review of opinion polling in the Kenya context, found that “opinion polls have 
become a familiar and also seemingly indispensable feature of political campaigns” 
(Wolf and Ireri, 2010: 2) and that “polls are now acknowledged to be one of the most 
scientific and systematic communication links between governments and the 
governed.” (Ibid: 7) Moreover, they conclude that “polls have stimulated the general 
public’s interest in political and policy issues and have also played a role in informing 
more objective public debate on key issues. The general public appreciates and value 
their new found voice — they need not wait for five years to express their views on 
social, political and economic issues” (Ibid: 2,8). 
Kwasi Ansu-Kyeremeh in reviewing the Ghanaian experience with opinion polling in 
the 1996 elections found an industry lacking in methodological rigour but nevertheless 
universally considered key to party campaign strategy. This rapid uptake should not be 
surprising, Ansu-Kyeremeh argues, as “should polling become part of the Ghanaian 
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democratic culture, this would not be another extension of Western democratic values 
or mere internationalization. It would be a continuity of an attribute of indigenous 
African democratic tradition whereby leaders pay attention to public opinion using 
various measuring strategies” (Ansu-Kyeremeh, 1999: 72). 
In the context of this thesis, public opinion polling encompasses any attempt made, 
whether for public or private consumption, to measure public opinion in a scientific 
fashion.3 Opinion polls commissioned by political parties are equally relevant to those 
commissioned by media houses and international donors. Indeed, the variation in how 
elites react to polls produced privately or publicly is a key finding of this research, 
revealing the importance of perceptions in the politics of sub-Saharan Africa. 
The blossoming of the opinion polling industry both in scientific and commercial terms 
underscores that the impact of political polling on democratic process is not just of 
theoretical relevance but of practical relevance as well. It has become a big money 
occupation in Kenya and other African countries, underpinned by funds coming not 
just from political candidates but also from external donors. The International 
Republican Institute (IRI), with funding from USAID and the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), have also grown their reach in recent years to 
launch public opinion polls explicitly linked to important national elections around 
Africa and other transitional democracies. IRI contends that: “Public opinion research 
is a crucial instrument in IRI’s efforts to make political parties more responsive to 
voters, assist elected officials at all levels of government in improving their service to 
citizens, and foster greater participation by under-represented groups and by citizens 
generally in the political process” (IRI, 2012). UNDP views opinion research as an 
invaluable means of measuring the state of democracy within a country, gauging 
citizen’s views on institutions, governance, and other issues to determine how 
successful certain democracy promoting interventions have been. 
                                                          
 
3
 This does not automatically presume that the polling methodology is rigorous, just that one exists and 
the numbers were not simply manufactured. As the case studies reveal, opinion polling can be 
influential whether it is rigorous or not, as long as it has the appearance of accuracy. The novelty of 
opinion polling means that this imprecision becomes part of the political game. 
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And the trend is not limited to international funders. Opinion polling organisations 
have mushroomed in certain parts of Africa, particularly East Africa, Ghana, and 
Nigeria, driven by a growing demand among the news media, politicians, and donors 
for ever more timely information around elections. Companies like Synovate in Kenya 
and NOI Polls in Nigeria have been able to develop their businesses rapidly over the 
past six years as African elections have become headline news. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, 
current Minister of Finance for Nigeria and founder of NOI Polls asserts: "Economic 
reform and democracy can only be consolidated and strengthened if citizens have a 
platform to express their preferences and desires on issues that affect their lives" (NOI 
Polls, 2012). Likewise, former managing director of Synovate, George Waititu, also 
praises the merits of opinion polling: “opinion polls should be allowed to flourish as it 
allows citizens to express their opinions on matters relating to governance and other 
fundamental issues” (The Star, 13 May 2011). 
Public opinion polling in sub-Saharan Africa is only likely to expand. Both politicians 
and the media, two prominent actors in all countries’ electoral processes, have 
embraced it, in spite of its flaws and its detractors. For all its weaknesses, it has gained 
a foothold in the collective consciousness of many democratic societies, including an 
increasing number of transitional and emerging democracies in developing countries. 
Just as the industry of opinion polling has evolved over the decades it has been active 
in Western democracies, it is likely to change and adapt to meet the needs of new 
consumers of political information. There is a need to better understand how opinion 
polling is being produced, disseminated, and interpreted by these societies in order to 
grasp the extent to which opinion polling is influencing elections and attempts to 
consolidate democracies in these countries. 
1.2 The Centrality of Political Elites in sub-Saharan Africa 
The decision to focus the attention of this research on the role of elites reflects a 
recent move back to placing elites at the centre of political agency and analysis. 
Previously, a number of late nineteenth and early twentieth century political theorists, 
argued that power relationships among and between competing elites were central to 
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understanding the form and function of political regimes.4 The term ‘elites’ gained 
particular prominence in the sociology literature of the 1960s and 1970s, but, by 
consequence, it lost some of its definitional clarity and utility (Scott, 2008). Its 
presence in the development literature suffered a similar decline as theories and 
perceptions changed (Daloz, 2003). The last decade, however, has seen something of a 
resurgence in the use of ‘elites’ as scholars have refocused on the role of agency and 
politics in development (Moore and Hossain, 2005; Leftwich and Hogg, 2007). 
Moore and Hossain define elites as: “the people who make or shape the main political 
and economic decisions: ministers and legislators; owners and controllers of TV and 
radio stations and major business enterprises and activities; large property owners; 
upper-level public servants; senior members of the armed forces, police and 
intelligence services; editors of major newspapers; publicly prominent intellectuals, 
lawyers and doctors; and — more variably — influential socialites and heads of large 
trades unions, religious establishments and movements, universities and development 
NGOs … In most developing countries, governing elites tend to be especially powerful” 
(Moore and Hossain, 2002: 1). As the focus of this thesis is elections, it stands to 
reason that the actors most worthy of study are those with the greatest hand in the 
game. I begin with the assumption that for opinion polling to make an impact on the 
quality of elections, it must first influence the decision-making processes of the 
political elite. Upon establishing the presence of that influence, this thesis argues that 
the perceptions within this group of shifts in political competition is what ultimately 
shapes the impact of public opinion polling on the transparency and 
representativeness of elections in sub-Saharan Africa. 
This has particular relevance in sub-Saharan Africa, where many countries have 
adopted the constitutional and legal framework of ‘democracy,’ with its corresponding 
institutions such as executives and legislatures, but politics remains largely the remit of 
the minority elite operating from urban centres, offering little opportunity for debate 
and expression of opposition viewpoints. Indeed, the growing ubiquity of elections in 
                                                          
 
4
 See Gramsci (1929-1935), Mosca (1923), Michels (1911) and Pareto (1901). 
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Africa, since the early 1990s, has yielded contrasting interpretations of the continent’s 
electoral prospects. One school of thought suggests that liberalisation is only a matter 
of time as elites and political institutions evolve to fit more accepted norms and 
existing clientelist relations become more formalised (Lindberg, 2006; van de Walle, 
2006). At the other end of the spectrum, there are those who argue that African 
politics, its elites, and its institutions are fundamentally different from other political 
systems and should be analysed as they are rather than as what they might become 
(Carothers, 2002; Chabal and Daloz, 1999).  
Much of this is contingent on elite strategies and behaviours. On one side, the 
pessimistic approach suggests that existing elites are simply adapting to changing 
contexts, adjusting only in an attempt to secure new sources of economic and political 
power. Those more hopeful for the prospects of political liberalisation suggest that 
there is growing pressure, both internationally and from within countries, on elites to 
transform themselves, to become more transparent and representative in their 
behaviour around elections. It is through these elite lenses that I propose to examine 
the impact of the introduction of public opinion polling in sub-Saharan Africa.  
Douglas Foyle makes the case for using elites as an intervening variable in his study of 
public opinion and American politics. He finds that even where opinion polling cannot 
be directly linked to policy or behavioural outcomes, where polling is prevalent it 
becomes intrinsically bound up with elite decision-making. Whether these decisions 
ultimately are better or worse for democracy and national interest is debatable, but 
the case of influence is clear (Foyle, 1997). Indeed, the context of elite politics provides 
an ideal environment to test the power of opinion polling’s influence over electoral 
politics. Though centred around the formal processes of democracy — like elections — 
opinion polling also taps into the informality of democratic politics, supplying 
information that can just as easily form the basis of a backroom deal as it can a public 
proclamation of policy direction.  
The decision to focus exclusively on the relationship between polling and elites also 
has a methodological justification in as much as it limits the thesis’s exposure to some 
of the more contentious debates regarding the influence of public opinion polling, 
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namely its impact on voter behaviour. These issues are discussed in the literature 
review in Chapter 2 as they have a bearing on the way in which opinion polling is 
perceived, but evidence of any relationship between polling and voter behaviour 
features only through the mediating variable of elite perceptions. What is relevant to 
this research is whether elites believe that polling influences voter behaviour rather 
than whether such a relationship actually exists. 
For the purposes of this thesis, public opinion polls are important in that they “provide 
political elites with the intelligence information to determine when and how to 
respond to the prevailing mood of the electorate; to consider the views and likely 
responses of voters when designing, marketing, implementing and modifying party 
policies; to gain feedback about the public’s reactions to these policies, to issues and 
to events” (Worcester, 1991: 125). Polls, therefore, play a central role in forging links 
between political elites and citizens, as well as providing a means by which the general 
public can contribute to the decision-making processes of government. 
In this way, public opinion polling becomes an invaluable source of information, the 
pulse of the body politic. For political elites accustomed to managing mass politics 
through the control of information, opinion polls and the interest they engender 
among media and other observers can be problematic. Issues become immediately 
amplified; popularity becomes quantifiable. Information dynamics no longer function 
as before, forcing politicians to adapt and react to the new phenomenon of mass 
public opinion. This learning process is immensely important and ultimately indicative 
of the quality of elections within a country. 
Public opinion, then, whether it is known or only perceived, permeates the lexicon and 
behaviour of political elites. I argue that the influence of public opinion polling must 
therefore be modelled through the lens of elite perceptions to capture accurately its 
impact on the quality of elections. Because elites are primarily concerned with either 
improving or preserving their own positions, perceived shifts in the competitive 
environment, as illustrated through public opinion polls, are what instigate changes in 
political behaviour. “The struggle over public opinion is, in other words, a key part of 
the struggle for power” (Manza and Brooks, 2012: 92). 
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1.3 Improving the Quality of Elections in sub-Saharan Africa 
Over the last 15 years, somewhat remarkably, consistent, regular elections have 
become routine in a majority of countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The quality of these 
elections may vary across countries and many are almost certainly not free and fair by 
any meaningful standard, but it is nevertheless important that they happen at all. As 
recently as 1989, multi-party elections were rare in sub-Saharan Africa, and few would 
have expected to see the wave of democratisation that swept the continent in the 
years that followed (Lindberg, 2006). Jeffrey Herbst notes that “the electoral 
revolution that swept Africa has been swift and dramatic. It is also historically 
unprecedented: never before have so many poor countries with such weak institutions 
attempted to democratise at once” (Herbst, 2008: 61). 
The wave of democratisation that reached Africa in the early 1990s brought with it a 
renewed enthusiasm about the continent’s prospects for better public management 
and, most importantly, improved economic growth and welfare for its citizens. Yet, 
after almost twenty years, for all the expectations, few success stories have emerged 
from a region where violence, disease, and extreme poverty still maintain a 
stranglehold on much of the population. The assumption was that this infrastructure of 
democracy, via regularly elected representatives, would ensure adequate political 
competition and representation of public opinion. In practice, many African states 
have managed to stifle political competition in spite of the advent of multi-party 
politics. 
Proponents of public opinion polling contend that it has the power to influence the 
quality of elections positively when it is introduced into electoral processes. Be it 
through the force of collective action or through the re-moulding of electoral 
institutions, public opinion polling, it is argued, can contribute to more transparent and 
representative elections. This study focuses on key elections and referenda conducted 
in Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria, and Uganda over a period of 2002–2012.  
The decision to focus the analysis solely on opinion polling during elections and 
referenda was deliberate. Elections are now considered an intrinsic mechanism of 
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governance, irrespective of a country’s democratic credentials. Certainly, elections can 
be considered a cornerstone of democracy. They are first and foremost an opportunity 
for citizens to exercise popular will in selecting their leaders, giving the government 
much needed legitimacy. Moreover, elections, at least in theory, create opportunities 
for new ideas and new actors to enter the political arena, either in the form of 
alternation between governments or through policy debates triggered by election 
campaigns. These entry points are important as “alternation of power builds 
confidence in former opponents, encourages stability, and allows the public to learn 
visions different groups have for the country” (Brahm, 2005: 1). 
Elections, however, are not the sole preserve of democratic states. Their popularity 
among authoritarian states has also grown in the aftermath of democratisation. 
Elections can provide the appearance of political liberalisation that forestalls more 
dangerous forms of popular dissent and international pressure, appealing to political 
elites in need of public displays of legitimacy and popularity. Sub-Saharan Africa has 
both types of regimes, and opinion polling has emerged in each. Selecting elections as 
the common point of analysis enables this thesis to compare its influence and impact 
across different political systems. This allows for a more robust representation of the 
intersection of opinion polling and elite politics in sub-Saharan Africa. 
It is this context that drives this thesis’s interest in the quality of elections, and more 
importantly, the potential for public opinion polling in improving that quality. More 
practically, it has been argued that “political actors are more likely to be responsive (or 
to ‘pander’) to public opinion in the build-up to an election than they would be 
between elections” (Rounce, 2004: 7). Perception is important here as politicians have 
a need to be seen to be responding to public opinion. If the voters are not aware of the 
link between their public opinion and elite decision-making, then elites derive no 
benefit from basing their decisions on public opinion. “Political actors must be able to 
receive credit for decisions made in order for their responsiveness to be worthwhile” 
(Ibid). 
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Numerous authors have developed methodologies for assessing the quality of 
elections5 and for explaining incremental changes in their quality.6 Underpinning many 
of these models are two core attributes or assumptions that are the focus of this 
research. The first is transparency, a level of openness and availability of information 
about the electoral process, which is crucial to avoiding basic electoral fraud and to 
informing citizen decision-makers about their electoral choices. The second is 
representativeness. The term is chosen deliberately to encompass two distinct though 
related concepts in electoral quality. One, elections are meant to be representative of 
citizen interests and preferences, meaning that politicians should be responsive to 
these and adjust their strategies accordingly.7 Two, elections should be representative 
of the true outcome of citizen voting, meaning that results should reflect actual vote 
tallies rather than those plucked from thin air or from the president’s pocket.  
1.4 Locating the Research: Methodology, Scope and Limitations 
This thesis has three goals: first, to ask whether there is evidence that public opinion 
polling in Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria, and Uganda is changing the way in which politics is 
conducted around elections; second, to develop a theoretical framework to 
understand the underlying characteristics that shape the interface between polling, 
the political elite, and electoral politics in sub-Saharan Africa; and third, to determine 
whether polling has contributed to more transparent and representative electoral 
processes in these selected countries. Research in this area is sparse, and, as such, this 
thesis has adopted an exploratory approach. The nature of the research has dictated 
the selection of the methodology and guided the scope of the thesis. This approach 
has both strengths and limitations, both of which are acknowledged below. Each of 
these areas is covered in more detail later but they are introduced here. 
                                                          
 
5
 See Lindberg 2006; Diamond 2002. 
 
6
 Howard and Roessler (2006) develop a framework for measuring “liberalising electoral outcomes.”  
 
7
 Przeworski, A., S. Stokes, and B. Manin. eds. 1999. Democracy, accountability, and representation. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
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1.4.1 Methodology 
Assessing change in political processes is a difficult task. Determining what and how to 
measure changes in attitudes, perceptions, and behaviour within complex political 
contexts is inherently challenging and requires a very specific and clear methodology 
from the outset. There is always the risk that important elements are unobserved or 
unaccounted for, compromising the explanatory power of the research.  
The thesis responds to this challenge in two ways. First, chapter 2 lays out a clear 
theoretical framework that discretely defines the subjects of the study and the 
variables by which their relationship will be assessed. While this framework is 
undeniably narrow and will not capture every process through which public opinion 
polling influences elections in sub-Saharan Africa, it serves to operationalize the 
research question by defining measurable parameters. Second, the case study 
methodology has been designed specifically to capture different forms of evidence 
across a set time period and drawn from a variety of sources. Ultimately, the case 
studies are essentially historical narratives that capture changes in the relationship 
between public opinion polling and political processes through the observed electoral 
periods, analysing, in particular, the perceptions and behaviours of those most directly 
involved in electoral politics. The results of these studies make it possible to adjudge 
the extent to which opinion polling is having an impact on the way in which electoral 
politics is conducted, including whether or not it is contributing to greater 
transparency and representativeness in elections in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The further challenge to implementing this particular study has been the absence of 
existing research dealing with public opinion polling around elections in sub-Saharan 
Africa. As stated above, the topic is still emergent, influencing greatly the choice of 
methods used to obtain relevant evidence. To compensate for the absence of evidence 
from secondary sources, the thesis has emphasised primary research, using a mixture 
of desk-based and field-based approaches. Using available resources, content analysis 
of major newspapers in Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria, and Uganda was conducted remotely. 
This was supplemented by targeted field research across the four countries over the 
course of 2012–13. The research also relied heavily on interviews with key 
14 
 
 
 
stakeholders to validate the findings of the content analysis, drawing primarily from 
among political journalists, opinion pollsters, current and former politicians, and 
leading academics and political analysts. This included over 50 formal interviews, 
generally lasting between one and two hours, as well as a wide array of more informal 
conversations and meetings with stakeholders. The interviews were all semi-
structured, with interviewees first asked to express their own impressions of public 
opinion polling’s role in recent elections. Only after interviewees had shared their own 
interpretation were further questions asked in order to inform the consideration of 
particular research variables. 
1.4.2 Scope 
The decision to adopt a four-country comparative study reflects the dearth of existing 
research in this specific area and the value of comparative cases in illuminating 
complex processes. Limiting the scope sufficiently to make the research feasible, while 
ensuring relevance, requires that the study has specific case selection criteria. The 
initial decision related to identifying those countries in sub-Saharan Africa where 
public opinion polling is sufficiently established to allow for in-depth research. The 
growth of the Afrobarometer project in the past decade has brought some semblance 
of opinion research to over 30 countries on the continent, but its penetration remains 
low in the majority of its sample. It was therefore necessary to first create a sub-set of 
countries where public opinion polling had been carried out for an extended period, 
covering a number of electoral cycles.  
Beyond this basic distinction, the selection of Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria and Uganda has 
been motivated by four factors, which combine theoretical and practical 
considerations. The countries were further selected on the basis of geographic 
considerations and variation across the dependent variables. The thesis aims to be as 
representative as possible of sub-Saharan African democracies and, as such, selected 
two countries from East Africa and two from West Africa to ensure geographic spread. 
More importantly, however, was the need for institutional variation among the cases 
with respect to the dependent variables. For instance, one expects to see a different 
15 
 
 
 
landscape for political information in the more diffuse media environments of Kenya 
and Nigeria than the smaller, more ideologically aligned media in Uganda and Ghana. 
Likewise, campaign strategies and adaptation to polling will differ in the more 
politically competitive contexts of Kenya and Ghana from the one-party dominant 
systems in Uganda and Nigeria. Finally, the propensity toward electoral violence seen 
in Nigeria and Kenya places a far higher importance on elite expectations than in the 
less combustible settings of Ghana and Uganda. 
1.4.3 Limitations 
These decisions about methodology and scope inevitably result in particular limitations 
as to the conclusions and broader generalisations that can be made in the study. Two 
of these deserve special mention. As with any study that is heavily reliant on case 
study evidence, external validity is a challenge. By design, the case study countries all 
have an opinion polling industry of some description and have all witnessed important 
changes to the role and influence of this polling over time. While efforts have been 
made to select cases representative of the diversity in sub-Saharan Africa, the 
countries studied do have characteristics in common when compared to countries in 
other regions.  
The study does not, for instance, explore the conditions necessary for an indigenous 
polling industry to emerge where one does not previously exist. It also does not 
address opinion polling in countries where there is not at least a nominal democratic 
system. These omissions, however, are somewhat unavoidable. It is impossible for a 
single study to cover all of these variations, further reinforcing the value of further 
research in other contexts. 
Second, this thesis cannot and does not purport to study all of the many different ways 
in which public opinion polling influences political systems. This relationship is complex 
and there are several avenues by which opinion research can shape the perceptions 
and actions of political elites. Given the evidence available, this thesis has focused on 
the specific possibility that public opinion polling can contribute to improved 
transparency and representativeness of elections. To do this, this thesis has further 
16 
 
 
 
narrowed its scope to encompass relatively observable variables, leaving aside more 
abstract conceptions of democratic quality and levels of democratisation. 
Nevertheless, this author believes that the study is able to capture the most significant 
political processes and variables at work, providing a suitably robust picture of the 
relationship between public opinion polling and electoral processes. 
1.5 The Way Forward 
This research contributes to that body of evidence by proposing a theoretical 
framework for examining the interaction between political elites and opinion research 
in Africa and applying it to a number of key case studies on the continent. The thesis 
employs a mixed method approach, using content analysis of print media and key 
informant interviews to inform detailed case studies of electoral campaigns in Kenya, 
Ghana, Nigeria, and Uganda. It demonstrates that public opinion polling is influencing 
elite perceptions and that on the basis of this influence elites have instigated changes 
in political behaviour, ultimately contributing to improvement or deterioration in the 
quality of elections. The four case study chapters present historical narratives that 
capture significant examples drawn over multiple elections from each of the four 
countries in which public opinion polling and elite perceptions of competition have 
instigated changes in political behaviour, ultimately contributing to improvement or 
deterioration in the quality of elections. 
The thesis proceeds from theoretical framework to narrative analysis. Chapter 2 
conceptualises public opinion research, contextualising it both in developed 
democracies and through research conducted in developing countries before 
expanding upon this discussion to establish the framework through which opinion 
polling and elite perceptions and behaviour interact in the electoral process. Chapter 3 
presents the case of Kenya where opinion polling has enjoyed a prominent, if 
controversial, role in the country’s recent political history. Chapter 4 reviews Ghana’s 
experience with opinion polling over the last decade, revealing an increasingly partisan 
electoral climate that pervades attempts at public opinion research. Chapter 5 
documents opinion polling’s emergence in Nigeria where polling is helping shine a light 
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on persistently fraudulent elections. Finally, Chapter 6 presents the case of Uganda 
where opinion polling has faced a tumultuous introduction in the context of waxing 
and waning political competition. Findings from these empirical chapters are brought 
together in the concluding chapter that offers comparative analysis and points to 
further research that is needed. 
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Chapter 2. Elites, Opinion Polls, and Elections in sub-Saharan 
Africa 
The recent, rapid expansion of public opinion research in sub-Saharan Africa is 
undeniable. Grounded in the belief that polls can contribute to more transparent and 
representative elections, external donors and local polling organisations have stepped 
up their efforts to meet a growing demand for public opinion polling. In Nigeria, 
opinion polling was credited with turning the balance against then-President Olesegun 
Obasanjo’s attempt to amend the constitution to allow himself a third term in office. 
Yet, in Kenya, opinion polling received a significant amount of blame for the 
widespread violence that ensued following the contentious 2007 elections. To better 
understand these variations, this thesis investigates to what extent public opinion 
polling influences the political dynamics of elections in sub-Saharan Africa and what 
explains the variation in that influence across cases? 
This chapter situates the proliferation of polling in sub-Saharan Africa within the 
historical and contemporary debates on the relative merits and drawbacks of public 
opinion research, while exploring the theoretical links between public opinion polling, 
political elites, and political change. Potential mediating influences in the form of 
political context, elite responses, and the role of the media are explored before 
presenting theories for explaining the influence of public opinion polling. Positing 
public opinion polling as a mechanism for change, this chapter introduces three 
theoretical models that are broadly representative of Tilly’s classification of political 
mechanisms as either: relational, environmental, or cognitive. These classifications 
relate to change generated from interactions within networks, external influences, and 
internal influences, respectively, as discussed below. 
A collective action model, which suggests that polling can harness public opinion and 
force government responses by overcoming the collective action problem, positions 
opinion polling as a relational mechanism capable of altering “connections among 
people, groups, and interpersonal networks” (Tilly, 2001: 24). An institutional model, 
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which contends that polling’s influence on elections is mediated through political 
institutions, suggests opinion polling is an environmental mechanism, an “externally 
generated inﬂuence on conditions affecting social life.” (ibid) The lack of a model 
theorising opinion polling as cognitive mechanism for change, operating “through 
alterations of individual and collective perception,” is identified as a gap in the 
literature. I argue that the ability of opinion polls to influence elite perceptions and 
decision-making is an essential first stage in the process by which polling impacts upon 
elections. Building on this premise, this chapter goes on to develop a framework to 
incorporate the concept of elite perceptions into existing theories to explain the 
varying influence of public opinion polling on elite behaviour and the consequent 
quality of elections, asking the question: why does the presence of public opinion 
polling influence the political elite to restrict and distort campaigns and outcomes in 
some elections but not in others in Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria and Uganda? 
2.1 Conceptualising Public Opinion Polling 
Before delving into the politics of polling, it is important to understand what is actually 
meant by the term “public opinion polling” and how it has been conceptualized in the 
literature. It is by no means an uncontroversial concept, generating significant debate 
in its country of origin, the United States, as well as elsewhere. Nevertheless, from this 
rich repository of literature it is possible to distil two principal strands; public opinion 
polling is generally construed as either an attitudinal or a behavioural phenomenon. 
This is an important distinction and one that has repercussions on how polling 
ultimately influences politics. 
2.1.1 Opinion Polling as an Abstract Representation of Public Opinion 
In one conception, public opinion polling can be defined as the quantitative 
representation of the aggregation of individual attitudes or beliefs in society. Althaus 
contends that a great strength of opinion research is its ability to identify issues within 
a society, as well as weaknesses within its own polling results. Surveying the electorate 
not only yields interesting results as to preferences and opinions; it also provides data 
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on the people themselves and their capability to make informed choices in the political 
process (Althaus, 2003). Berelson (1952: 19), in turn, argues that “opinion studies can 
help democracy not only to know itself in a topical and immediate way but also to 
evaluate its achievement and its progress in more general terms.” 
That such an instrument would be in high demand is hardly surprising. It has great 
potential consequences for how strategies play out in the political arena. Sanders 
(1999: 273) contended that “surveying, because of its power to make inferences 
through sampling to underlying populations and communities — including 
unconventional or imaginary ones — provides unprecedented opportunities to make 
claims about the nature of public opinion in these populations and communities. This 
kind of analytical purchase on the empirical conditions of political life is something 
both pragmatists and democrats should embrace.” 
However, the reliability and impartiality of opinion research has long been questioned 
by academics and researchers who point to the fickle nature of public opinion and the 
difficulties inherent in defining and measuring what the masses think (Crespi, 1989). A 
predominant and persistent concern is that opinion polling does not adequately 
capture ‘public opinion’ due to practical and methodological constraints. Most 
prominent among the critics here is Herbert Blumer who claimed that opinion polling 
as exercised does not adequately capture public opinion but rather treats society as if 
it were “only an aggregation of disparate individuals” (Blumer, 1948: 546). Not 
knowing “whether individuals in the sample represent that portion of structured 
society that is participating in the formation of public opinion on a given issue” means 
that there is no empirical way of ensuring that the evidence that emerges is really 
representative of the prevailing opinion among interested groups. 
These critics of representative accuracy were soon joined by those attacking the 
methodological validity of modern opinion polling. Althaus (2003: 288) highlights one 
persistent concern in the reporting of opinion data: “What to do with the respondents 
who give "don't know" or "no opinion" responses? In light of the representation 
problems…it seems inappropriate to omit the percentages of these responses when 
reporting survey results.” 
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This need for selectivity underscores Bordieu’s fear that the aggregation of opinions 
meant that marginalised and less vocal groups would see their interests expunged 
from public discourse by the weight of majoritarian rule through opinion polls. He 
writes: “Its most important function is to impose the illusion that there is something 
called public opinion in the sense of the purely arithmetical total of individual opinions; 
to impose the illusion that it is meaningful to speak of the average of opinions or the 
average opinion” (Bourdieu, 1979: 125). Those less conversant in politics are more 
likely to give ‘don't know’ and ‘no opinion’ responses than more knowledgeable 
people. This means that public opinion tends to be disproportionately well educated, 
affluent, male, middle-aged, and partisan relative to the population it purports to 
represent (Berinsky, 1999). Althaus (2003: 278) argues that “because ill-informed 
survey respondents tend to behave differently than models of collective rationality 
expect them to, aggregating individual opinions turns out to be a surprisingly 
inefficient way to pool information dispersed across a mass public…the mass public is 
often unable to compensate for its inattentiveness to politics.” 
2.1.2 Opinion Polling as a Behavioural Form of Political Participation 
Another conception of opinion polling ascribes a more behavioural quality, more or 
less equating it with other forms of political participation. Certainly Tilly (1983: 462) 
believed that the emergence of public opinion polling was tantamount to the 
emergence of a new, modern form of participation, arguing “we now live in a world in 
which the idea of a defined aggregate set of preferences at a national level, a sort of 
public opinion, makes a certain amount of sense. It makes enough sense that 
nowadays we can consider the opinion survey a complement to, or even alternative to, 
voting, petitioning, or protesting.” 
Indeed, such is the appeal of public opinion polling that some observers believe that 
opinion polls may be more successful even than traditional forms of participation 
(Berinsky, 1999). But this emergence of public opinion polling as a form of political 
participation did not sit well with everyone. Wacquant (2004: 7), drawing on 
Bourdieu’s analysis, complained that “polls are an instrument not of political 
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knowledge but of political action whose widespread use tends to devalue other means 
of group-making, such as strikes, demonstrations, or the very elections whose formally 
equalitarian aggregative logic they ostensibly mimic.” 
Verba (1996) disagrees, arguing that opinion polls are actually a more representative 
form of political participation as they require no resources and reduce selection bias. 
Viewed in the context of participatory processes, opinion polling exhibits no more 
flaws than do other forms of participation. It is not perfect, without doubt, but then 
political participation itself is generally inadequate to some extent. While not 
advocating a ‘referendum democracy’ Verba does contend that the addition of polling 
to the arsenal of political participation makes for a powerful tool for equal 
representation.  
This conception of polling hearkens back to its origins in the United States. George 
Gallup, founding father of modern polling, was a populist who believed that voters 
should have some input into decision-making processes. His vision for opinion polls 
was that they would objectively capture the preferences of voters, which, in turn, 
could be shared with their representatives, thus providing a critical link between these 
two components of representative government. Elites could be more responsive to 
public opinion, and citizens could feel more engaged in what has become a more 
participatory political process (Gallup, 1939). 
On the other hand, there is a strand of criticism that argues that opinion polling is 
potentially restrictive for political participation. Opinion polling can be just as much a 
weapon of mass manipulation as mass empowerment. Indeed, the statistical nature of 
polls makes them particularly susceptible to deception and bias. As easily as polls can 
open the flow of new information, those in positions of power can control its message 
and its timing. Understanding the electorate better can give politicians a keener 
awareness of how to present themselves in a positive light. Moreover, polls can also be 
used to spread misinformation to the benefit of one candidate over another (Marsh, 
1984). 
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One argument focuses on the influence opinion polls have on voter decision-making 
and participation. Justin Lewis (2001) contends that the creation of a body of poll 
results in citizens becoming passive observers rather than active participants and 
actually represses real discussion of issues. Lewis expands directly on the claims made 
by Benjamin Ginsberg. Ginsberg (1986) broadly saw the establishment and existence of 
electoral institutions and processes and the rise of opinion polling in the United States 
as important means by which governing elites control and manipulate the nation's 
citizenry. The symbolic existence of these institutions and processes helps maintain the 
legitimacy of political leaders and government and helps foster the appearance of a 
national consensus, while obscuring whose interests actually dominate political life.  
Ginsberg also argued that opinion polling actually converts public opinion from a 
behavioural phenomenon controlled by the actors themselves to an attitudinal 
phenomenon controlled instead by the researchers conducting the surveys. Perceived 
in this way, public opinion polling could actually be construed as devaluing the political 
power of traditional forms of political mobilisation. (Mattes, 2007)  
2.1.3 Implications for the Influence of Public Opinion Polling 
Converse suggests the ubiquity of polls has conditioned people to view polls as 
expressions of public opinion. “If ... any deflection whatever of behaviour by the 
representative which arises as a result of some exposure to poll data, even the most 
vague ‘taking account of it,’ classifies as an instance of actual influence, then of course 
public opinion in poll form must be said to have a great deal of influence. And this kind 
of minimal influence must occur in very large doses among political practitioners, or it 
would be extremely hard to explain why such users pay many millions of dollars a year 
for this expensive class of information” (Converse, 1987: S21-22). 
Others contend that public opinion polling “is the handmaiden of modern democracy,” 
a necessary corollary for political systems that both encourage citizen reliance upon 
the state in the form of welfare and other public services and yet limit citizen 
participation in politics and influence on decision-making to relatively infrequent 
elections (Bradburn and Sudman, 1988). Where this influence is likely to take place and 
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the relative value of that influence is another of the great debates within the public 
opinion literature. It also has implications for this research in determining how best to 
conceptualise public opinion polling in the theoretical framework. 
2.2.1.1 Polling-Public Policy Nexus 
Asher (1988) contends that opinion polls serve a dual purpose for enriching the citizen-
state relationship. They provide political information, making the system more 
transparent, while also creating opportunities for citizen influence on political elites 
who must be seen to be responsive to their demands. The exact of nature of the 
influence of opinion polls on policy outcomes remains unclear (Jacobs & Shapiro, 1994; 
Page, 1994), but its influence political processes appears well entrenched in Western 
democracies. In some cases, polls have been used by political elites to catalyse 
expressions of support for their preferred policies (see S. Herbst, 1993). In short, public 
opinion on its own is unlikely to trigger policy change, but information drawn from 
opinions can and does shape the formation and implementation of policy (Sobel, 
2001).  
Indeed, there is convincing evidence that public opinion has a strong influence on 
policymaking or at least in fashioning the context in which political elites must make 
their policy decisions (Foyle, 1999, 2004; Kull & Ramsay, 2003). Surveying the use of 
polling in post-Communist countries in the early 90s, Matt Henn (1997: 133) finds that 
“polls both feed directly into the process of defining democratic structures and 
institutions in post-communist societies and also help to ensure that political elites are 
kept in touch with people's views, needs and aspirations. [The evidence] also suggests 
that polls may be used in governmental and parliamentary debate to influence the 
course of policy-making and legislation.”  
Stimson’s model of dynamic representation is more nuanced, contending that public 
opinion actually rarely matters in a democracy, but that public opinion change is 
crucial. It argues that policy adjusts over time to changes in public opinion, both 
through elections themselves and through the personal perceptions of policy-makers. 
Public opinion only matters, at least in terms of stimulating change, when the general 
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public rouses itself beyond its usual levels of political indifference. “When public 
opinion changes, governments rise or fall, elections are won or lost, and old realities 
give way to new demands…when electoral politicians sense a shift in public 
preferences, they act directly and effectively to shift the direction of public policy. We 
find no evidence of delay or hesitation” (Stimson et al., 1995, p. 560). At the same 
time, while preferences are often stable and systematic, it is important to distinguish 
between policy changes arising due to changes in attention and those due to changes 
in preferences (Jones, 1994).  
By contrast, Weissberg contends: “The conventional poll is inherently unsuited to 
making policy choices regardless of expert claims to the contrary. Moreover, all the 
proffered ‘new and improved’ possibilities, such as deliberative polling, or untold 
electronic variants are probably even less adequate” (Weissberg, 2001: 8). By treating 
substantive responses from filtered questions as though they represented the entirety 
of a population's opinions is misleading because it obscures the potential for 
misrepresentation of voices. He continues: “This analysis suggests that contemporary 
polls are seducing respondents, not offering them hard choices of the type faced by 
legislatures or policy analysts …. Polls do not provide worthwhile advice about policy; 
they measure only wishes for a world of benefits with no costs” (Ibid: 13). 
What these critiques largely have in common is their conception of public opinion 
polling as an attitudinal phenomenon, and indeed, in the context of public policy 
influence, this conception may be appropriate. In the periods between elections, polls 
may not be broadly representative of people’s political participation for the reasons 
mentioned above, but there is reason to believe that their character changes when 
applied to electoral processes, requiring a different conception of public opinion 
polling. 
2.2.1.2 Polling – Elections Nexus 
The most obvious locus for influence of public opinion polling, and also the focus of 
this thesis, is elections. Opinion polls are most prominent during these periods and as a 
result the relationship between the two has received some consideration. Prompted 
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by the pervasive penetration of opinion polling into Western electoral campaigns, 
scholars began to raise concerns about the possible consequences for voters (West 
1991). Some have worried that polls released during election campaigns will alter voter 
preferences or that surveys will change campaign dynamics as politicians attempt to 
adapt to rapidly changing voter preferences (Asher, 1987; Sabato, 1981). There are 
also concerns that polls will distort voters decision-making as to how or whether to 
vote, with scholars contending that opinion polling influences voter behaviour through 
mechanisms such as the ‘bandwagon effect’ when “the information about majority 
opinion itself causes some people to adopt the majority view for whatever reason” 
(Marsh, 1984: 51). 
Similarly, Noelle-Neumann theorised that polling created ‘spirals of silence,’ arguing 
that people use the media and personal experience to perceive those opinions that are 
popular and those that are not. When people believe that their opinions are shared by 
the majority of people, they are happy to express them openly, even to strangers. If, 
however, they feel that their opinions place them in the minority, they lack confidence 
in them and are less likely to discuss their opinion beyond their immediate social circle 
(Noelle-Neumann, 1984). But while these concerns address principally the influence of 
polls on voters, which is not the subject of this thesis, opinion polling’s influence on 
other political actors within the context of elections is important. 
It is argued that “however they become visible and with whatever mistakes they 
include, public opinion polls often shape and constrain actors (including politicians, 
policy makers, interest groups, and social movement organizations), irrespective of 
their ultimate truth content” (Manza and Brooks, 2012: 91). This suggests that the 
political elite bring their own perceptions to their analysis of public opinion. How 
political elites react to public opinion and how they adapt their behaviour is driven as 
much by what they think the public want as what public opinion may actually be. 
Politicians and political parties in elections, then, have clear incentives to understand 
the politics of public opinion polling and situate themselves appropriately.  
For example, public opinion research followed closely on the heels of political 
liberalisation in Asia. Opinion polling’s first major contribution to democratic politics 
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came in the Philippines in 1986. Following decades of dictatorship, Ferdinand Marcos 
announced a ‘snap’ election, relying on recent survey evidence giving him a supposed 
16-point lead in any presidential race. In the weeks immediately preceding the 
election, state-sponsored media released polls giving Marcos a healthy lead but with a 
large number of voters undecided. 
A confidential poll taken at around the same time but only published years later used 
more sophisticated techniques for assigning undecided voters to compile numbers 
which gave the victory to Marcos’ challenger, Corazon Aquino. Controversy over the 
election results in which observer tallies did not match official numbers culminated in a 
popular movement that succeeded in overthrowing Marcos and installing Aquino as 
the new president. Speculation still abounds as to the identity of the sponsor of the 
confidential poll and the role it played in mobilising elite and popular support for 
removing Marcos, but subsequent elections have seen opinion polling solidify its place 
in Filipino politics (Mangahas, 2000) 
Other countries where political liberalisation has allowed for the emergence of opinion 
polling have also experienced significant changes in its democratic processes as a 
result. Analysing the impact the rise in opinion polling has made in Indonesia since the 
fall of Soeharto, Marcus Mietzner writes: “Despite obvious complications and 
downsides of Indonesia’s prospering polling business (threats of populism, corruption, 
and manipulation), one crucial finding of the scholarly literature on political opinion 
surveys should not be forgotten: the existence of open, competitive, and uncensored 
activity by pollsters is a strong indication of a dynamic democratic system. More 
importantly, opinion surveys and quick counts have significantly increased the 
credibility of all post-authoritarian elections since 1998, making a substantial 
contribution to the relative stability of Indonesia’s young democracy” (Mietzner, 2009: 
123). 
The use of polls by electoral campaigns has important implications. Rather than 
motivating a move by candidates towards the centre on policy issues in an effort to 
appeal to the greatest numbers of voters, polling is instead being used to attune 
strategies selectively, based on their fitting certain targeted subgroups. “Polls are 
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being used to narrow rather than widen the appeal of candidates” (Jacobs and Shapiro, 
2005: 639). In the United States, this use of polls to ‘microtarget’ individual voters has 
signalled an important change in campaign tactics, as candidates have moved away 
from broad-based, and often expensive, media strategies toward personalised 
techniques. Such approaches can have important implications for campaigns in less-
developed political systems where such localised approaches can exacerbate existing 
political divisions. Indeed, Bergan et al. demonstrate in their research how in the US 
campaigns have honed in on localised mobilisation as the new focus of electoral 
energy and resources, using new hyper-specific polling data to guide the scope and 
depth of their engagement (Bergen et al., 2005). 
The extent to which public opinion polling can be universally modelled as a form of 
political participation is open to debate, but I would argue that in the confines of 
electoral processes such a conception is both warranted and necessary for explaining 
its influence on electoral politics. Indeed, there is very little that distinguishes the 
actual election from the pre-election polls that precede it. They are measuring the 
same thing in essence, and as Verba argued above, polls could actually be construed as 
more representative of the electorate than elections themselves. A theoretical 
framework for explaining influence, I argue, must conceptualise public opinion polls 
related to elections and referenda as forms of political participation to capture its 
impact effectively. 
2.2 Contextualising Public Opinion Polling and Political Change 
However public opinion polling is conceived, there is general consensus that it has 
become and is becoming both pervasive and powerfully influential within the politics 
of Western democracies and the transitional democracies of Eastern Europe, Latin 
America, and Asia. Indeed, Slavko Splichal (2012: 43) argues that the analytical value of 
public opinion polls lies less in their scientific merits than in their political 
effectiveness. He argues that much of the empirical evidence indicates that “opinion 
polls are a political rather than a scientific phenomenon … specific functions of polls 
are not their intrinsic characteristics but depend on, and are defined by, users and 
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observers [and] are always relative to observer and context.” If we are to understand 
how public opinion polling is influencing the elections and politics of sub-Saharan 
Africa it is useful first to review the existing literature on how this influence manifests 
itself in other contexts. This includes understanding the locus of that influence, the 
contextual factors, and the likely conduits of that influence, all of which are addressed 
below. 
2.2.1 Polling in Transitional Polities 
A longstanding failure of the political science literature on public opinion polling has 
been its generally narrow focus on western liberal democracies and the particular 
characteristics of those societies. As a result most of the existing research deals with 
excoriating the methodological shortcomings of polling or debating their validity as 
representations of public opinion. Nazanin Shahrokni (2012: 205), in her study of 
opinion polling in Iran, argues that “by overlooking the social, political and historical 
processes within which both polling and the interpretation of its results are embedded, 
critics fail to understand the variation in the meanings that are attached to these 
practices across time and space. In other words, a study of polling is simultaneously a 
study of the changing character of polling, the different kinds of ‘publics’ that are 
constituted by it and the socio-political environment within which it is embedded.” 
Having established the general pathways for influence of public opinion polls in the 
form of public policy and elections, it is necessary now to investigate the particular 
conditions under which public opinion polling is operating in the transitional 
democracies of sub-Saharan Africa. Understanding this context shapes the theoretical 
options open to those investigating public opinion polling and African elections. 
Indeed, Robert Mattes (2007: 119) argues that what distinguishes opinion surveys in 
new democracies from surveys in Western polities is their political nature. “Put simply, 
surveys of transitional societies are not purely social scientific instruments. While 
political scientists and sociologists might initiate public opinion surveys in transitional 
societies as vehicles for scientific inquiry, the vast majority of cross-national research is 
supported by international foundations and bilateral aid agencies precisely because of 
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their potential political and developmental impacts.” Survey researchers in transitional 
societies are, by their very existence, political actors in that opinion polls and the 
information they provide can be construed as a tangible threat to the political elites in 
these countries. In demonstrating the real political ‘lay of the land,’ opinion polls can 
break down carefully constructed veneers of legitimacy developed through various 
means by existing political elites and challenge their attempts “to overload the 
meaning of their electoral ‘mandate’.” 
Mattes (2007) further argues that very distinct characteristics in these societies and 
political systems imply important consequences for the exercise of public opinion 
polling. Broadly, three of his contextual factors are relevant to the focus of this 
research. First, the novelty of public opinion polling has an inevitable impact on its 
quality and its credibility. Generally, in African politics there is a certain level of 
scepticism and suspicion toward empirical research of any kind, but particularly toward 
public opinion polling. The political elite are comfortable with their methods for 
measuring support and question the impartiality and accuracy of relatively 
inexperienced polling companies. Indeed, the pollsters themselves often do 
themselves few favours. While the more established and reputable firms publish their 
methodologies, other firms operate in mysterious ways that undermine the credibility 
of all polling. 
Moreover, the media do a poor job of covering opinion polls in general. They often do 
not interrogate the numbers or analyse them appropriately, preferring instead to 
quote press releases verbatim or to fit the polls to existing political storylines. This is 
not ubiquitous, of course, but it is widespread enough that a significant level of 
uncertainty exists as to whether the story presented in the press is an accurate 
reflection of the underlying polling data. The political elite must sift through this to 
establish the ‘truth,’ something Mattes claims the “relatively innumerate and sceptical 
political class of elected leaders, policy-makers, civil society leaders and news 
journalists” struggle to do. 
Lastly, the problem of ethnic identity-based politics, bequeathed first by the vagaries 
of colonial mapmakers but often exacerbated by post-colonial regimes, creates a 
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number of challenges for opinion polling. The relative heterogeneity of these societies 
complicates efforts to draw representative samples, while the entrenched bitterness 
derived from constant political one-upmanship shrinks the space for open inquiry amid 
claims of bias and ethnically-driven rigging (Posner, 2005). It also intensifies elite 
reactions to increasing competition, ultimately driving behaviour that reverses the 
logic of most representative democracy theory. 
The following explores these contextual factors further. These issues prescribe the 
limits of public opinion polling’s influence on electoral politics in sub-Saharan Africa 
and so cannot be dismissed. Indeed, any model seeking to explain elite electoral 
strategies in relation to the introduction of public opinion polling must be able to 
address these factors and build them into its explanation. 
2.2.2 The Uncertainty of the Media and Polls 
The media in its various forms has been shown to have a clear influence on the 
relationship between public opinion and electoral politics. Rounce (2004: 23) cites 
Iyengar and Reeves (1997) who contend that “as the most important mediator 
between ‘the public’ and policy-makers, the media has an important function to 
perform in terms of information transmittal.” Susan Herbst (1998) found that 
journalists’ perceptions of public opinion significantly altered their presentation of 
political issues within their articles. Rather than specifically referencing opinion polling 
data, reporters generally rely on their own conception of what the public think, adding 
a further layer of perceptions to the relationship between polling and politics.  
Lewis (2001) argues that the reporting and interpreting of poll results provide a 
mechanism that protects elites' interests even in the U.S. Rosenstiel (2005) shares this 
view, arguing that the media’s presentation of polls in the United States reflects a 
serious decline in journalistic standards. Specifically, he argues that journalists use 
polls to avoid having to investigate issues more deeply, choosing instead to draw upon 
their own unique interpretation, which further damages polling’s credibility with the 
public. In his view, the increasingly dependent relationship between polling and the 
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media has compromised the quality of campaign journalism while also exacerbating 
the influence of corporate interests in political media.  
Ansu-Kyeremeh (1999: 67) highlights the weakness of the media in accurately 
reporting the findings of opinion polling in sub-Saharan Africa. Citing Yankelovich 
(1996), he argues “no matter how thorough the polling methodology, journalists' 
treatment of its results is the key to its legitimacy in society. Hence, Lavrakas et al. 
(Lavrakas et al., 1995: 14) emphasize the need for 'proper' coverage of polls by the 
media, citing Morin's belief that 'most news media are data rich but analysis poor'.” 
Indeed, in many developing countries, innumeracy may make journalists unwilling or 
unable to engage with survey data.  
Henn (1998: 209) argues the same: “the use of polls in the political process by the new 
regimes as a means of consulting the public enhances the latter's positive view of polls, 
and ultimately improves their reliability; on the other hand, the experiences of polling 
undertaken or utilized by parties and the mass media organizations serves to diminish 
the public's confidence of and participation in opinion polls, and ultimately 
undermines the quality of polls.” In sub-Saharan Africa, many media houses are often 
overtly state-owned or covertly connected to particular political parties, undermining 
their impartiality in commissioning or reporting opinion poll results. Even in cases of 
independent ownership, poor journalism often results in blatantly partisan polls being 
presented as objective facts (Seligson, 2005). In both cases, the credibility of opinion 
polling suffers. 
In addition to distorting the information that voters receive during the campaign, the 
media can also be guilty of reporting incorrect polling results as a result of their own 
misunderstanding of the data. Patterson (2005) finds evidence of journalists 
exaggerating the importance of statistically insignificant changes in polling numbers, 
usually due to their not having sufficiently understood the press releases given them 
by the campaigns. Certainly within the sub-Saharan African media environment, this 
practice is readily apparent and so understanding how the media perceive and exercise 
their role as mediators and communicators, given their specific contextual constraints, 
will help to illuminate the relationship between public opinion and politics.  
33 
 
 
 
 
2.2.2 Elites and the Nature of Political Competition in sub-Saharan Africa 
Having conceptualized public opinion polling and located its influence within political 
processes of transitional democracies, the final step is to establish the principal actors 
upon which this influence is being exerted. Here, the nature of electoral politics in 
transitional democracies provides the rationale behind restricting the focus to political 
elite responses to public opinion polling (Luong, 2002). In many African countries the 
state itself has been the locus of class formation and elite activity, undermining the 
ability of society to hold the state to account. Van de walle (2006: 66) considers it 
“more useful to think of clientelistic politics in Africa as constituting primarily a 
mechanism for accommodation and integration of a fairly narrow political elite rather 
than the logic of mass party patronage. Most of the material gains from clientelism are 
limited to this elite.”  
The preponderance of centralized decision-making in African states facilitates elite 
capture of the political process whereby a small group of influential individuals shapes 
policy for the country as a whole. The concentration of these institutions of 
governance in the capital also leads to a detachment between representatives and 
their constituencies,8 a problem that is further exacerbated by the often poor quality 
of infrastructure in many African countries.  
                                                          
 
8
 Ekeh (1975) argues that the structure of colonialism created the African phenomenon of the dual 
publics: the first a primordial public based on traditional values and the second a civic public based upon 
imported Western practices. Within the primordial public, the expected reciprocity of citizen is 
observed, with individuals claiming rights and privileges from the community in exchange for the 
fulfilment of certain duties and obligations — the social contract in practice. Within the civic public, 
however, the individual seeks only to gain and measures his relationship with the collective interest 
merely in material terms. In contrast to the primordial public, there is no moral obligation inherent in 
the relationship with the civic public; rather one is expected to extract the maximum amount of 
personal gain at the lowest possible cost to oneself. 
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This separation between the governed and the government breeds distrust that can be 
easily manipulated by political and social actors.9 Recently, it has manifested itself in 
electoral violence when voters feel that their voices have been manipulated or 
quashed in favour of incumbent candidates or political elites. These competing 
influences create an unstable political system, characterised by authority exerted 
through both formal and informal institutions (Hyden, 2008). Elite politics becomes a 
matter of ‘politics of survival’ where these institutions must be manipulated in such a 
way as to ensure the continuation of elite survival (Migdal, 1988). 
Introducing public opinion polling into this combustible mix does not alter the 
underlying dynamics of elite-driven politics. Rather it operates within this milieu, 
necessitating that elites are made endogenous to the model. Both from practical and 
theoretical considerations, this is the most likely means by which public opinion polling 
will exert influence on electoral politics.  
These contextual factors must be incorporated into any theories purporting to explain 
the influence of public opinion polling on the quality of sub-Saharan African elections. 
The specific historical and ethno-regional characteristics of the countries involved 
require the theory to be sufficiently flexible as to accommodate variations in context. 
The centrality of elites in African politics suggests that in determining the pathways 
through which polling influences electoral quality the perceptions and behaviour of 
elites must be taken into account. Lastly, the contradiction between the prominence of 
the African political media during elections and their apparent inadequacies in 
delivering consistent coverage suggests that journalists and editors should be central 
to the investigation but that the quality of coverage should be somehow incorporated 
                                                          
 
9
 Mamdani builds upon the theme of divided society, but draws the distinction not between conceptions 
of ‘publics’ but between groups of individuals. Following upon Ekeh, he asserts that colonialisms created 
an urban elite type of African who sought to emulate Western characteristics through the acquisition of 
education and wealth, while simultaneously creating a rural, politically disengaged type of African who 
laboured in the service of the collective interest but received little to no material or political benefit 
from it. At independence, the urban elite has as little in common with the rural peasants as the 
Europeans, and as such, politics continues in a form of domesticated colonialism, built upon a 
fundamental division between citizens (the urban elites) and subjects (the rural peasants) (Mamdani, 
1996). 
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into the model to remove an exogenous variable that could undermine the 
explanatory power of the theory. 
2.3 Theorising Opinion Polling and Political Change 
This review of the existing literature on the intersection between public opinion polling 
and politics provides the context in which to analyse the relationship between opinion 
polls, political elites, and elections in sub-Saharan Africa. I have argued above that 
political elites are central to my analysis of the impact of opinion polling on elections in 
sub-Saharan Africa; it is through their decisions and actions that change is catalysed, 
whether good or bad in terms of outcomes.  
Any model that attempts to explain this interaction must therefore be comprised of 
two stages. This is consistent with the literature on elite decision-making which defines 
the two stages as an influence stage followed by a decision stage. “During the 
influence stage, the action is dominated by informal contacts among decision makers, 
and perhaps also actors without formal decision power. In the decision stage, decision 
makers must reach a decision outcome” (Naurin and Thomas, 2009: 1). 
At the influence stage, opinion polling can shape political discourse and the 
interactions between prominent players, such as political commentators, editors, and 
politicians. Democratic politics is very much a learning process, with all actors trying to 
determine the appropriate role for them to play. The introduction of opinion polling 
into this mix adds a new element for those involved to accommodate. Politicians must 
choose how to engage with political opinion polling. Do they reject it as guesswork or 
do they adopt it as another informational tool in their arsenal? The media must learn 
to report polling, but to do so accurately requires understanding the mechanisms 
behind the polls. Is polling merely a convenient headline grabbing statistic to be 
regurgitated without comment or is the media responsible for analysing and 
interpreting the data that emerges from the polls?  
Pollsters themselves face difficulties in managing their role in the political discourse. 
The prominence of polls within the media gives them an almost celebrity status as the 
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people with the answers, but with this prominence comes the risk of politicisation. In 
the context of sub-Saharan Africa, this almost invariably comes attached to labels of 
ethnicity and/or regional or religious affiliations. Polls are believed or dismissed on the 
basis of the demography of the pollster, rather than the soundness of the 
methodology. What occurs at this stage lays the foundation for what occurs in the 
second, decision stage. This results in a first stage hypothesis that states: 
First stage hypothesis: Polling forces political elites to recognize facets of public 
opinion to which they were previously ignorant or resistant. 
With regard to the second stage, fundamentally, this thesis is about political change, in 
the form of the emergence of public opinion polling, and the role of political elites in 
adapting to that change in the context of elections. Revisiting Tilly’s classification of 
mechanisms for political change in an attempt to understand and explain this 
relationship, two models have been proposed, based on relational and environmental 
mechanisms: collective action theory and institutional theory, respectively. No existing 
theory models opinion polling as a cognitive mechanism for change, an omission that 
this thesis addresses by incorporating the concept of elite perceptions into its model 
for explaining the impact of public opinion polling on the quality of elections. Where 
the other two models place their emphasis on the decision stage, taking the influence 
stage somewhat as a given, the model proposed later in this chapter brings the 
influence stage to the fore, arguing that it is the perceptions of elites, particularly with 
regard to shifts in competition, that drives elite decision-making and ultimately the 
quality of elections. 
2.3.1 Collective Action Model 
The collective action model is based on the premise espoused first by Mancur Olson 
(1965: 2) that “unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless 
there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common 
interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or 
group interests." The collective action problem becomes how to overcome this innate 
tendency against cooperation even where the rewards are clear. This model 
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corresponds most closely to the original intentions of Gallup’s first use of opinion 
polling, where it would improve the practice of democracy by creating a means by 
which citizens could participate in political processes and by confirming that “the sum 
total of individual views adds up to something that makes sense” (Gallup, 1944: 84). In 
the context of this research, one theory suggests public opinion polling is a possible 
solution to this intractable problem. 
Shahrokni (2012), in her study of opinion polling in Iran, develops the theory that 
polling does not merely reflect public opinion; it can also harness it and force 
government responses by overcoming the collective action problem. Through the kinds 
of questions asked and through its aggregation, opinion research can capture diffuse 
and disorganized strands of public thought and channel it as one, coherent voice. 
Alexander quotes the example of the Watergate scandal in the U.S., when, through 
“public response registered in small but fateful numerical shifts in the polls, seismic 
changes in state institutions would follow” (Alexander, 2006: 87). 
Shahrokni’s theoretical model focuses on the effects of polling in more authoritarian 
societies, where the ability to express individual opinions is restricted. In this context, 
polls can expose people to new or different questions from new angles or different 
perspectives. The act of polling public opinion becomes a proxy for opinion expression, 
not just a tool to represent, persuade or manipulate public opinion. “In turning latent 
opinions into measurable entities, [opinion polls can become] a reliable means of 
documenting dissent and difference” (Shahrokni, 2012: 217). Using this model, opinion 
polling is the locus of a struggle within the political system between competing 
concepts of truth, of structure, and most importantly of power. 
Under this model, one would expect the emergence of public opinion polling to be 
accompanied by new interpretations within the political discourse, as existing political 
elites acknowledge the development of differing opinions within the political system. 
Overcoming the collective action problem through aggregation stirs elites into political 
change. The shift in the political discourse would be reflective of improved 
transparency in the electoral process, while changes in elite behaviour, in adapting to 
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hitherto unknown opinions, would move toward greater responsiveness of the 
electoral system to citizen interests and demands. 
Second stage hypothesis 1: Public opinion polling’s contribution to transparency and 
representativeness is dependent on its ability to shift the political discourse in such a 
way as to overcome the collective action problem and enable civil society to force 
elites to adopt more transparent and representative strategies. 
To test this hypothesis, I will analyse news media and key informant interviews to 
discern evidence of broad-based collective action as a result of public opinion polling 
and map this against shifts in elite electoral strategies, defined as being either more 
transparent or representative or less. If this hypothesis is to hold, one would expect to 
see political movements emerging on the basis of the aggregation of opinion 
presented in public opinion polling, overcoming the collective action problem and 
compelling elites to choose electoral strategies that may or may not be more 
transparent and representative. 
2.3.2 Institutional Model 
The institutional model prioritises the importance of institutions. The theory concerns 
itself with the creation of structures that intermediate between the generation of 
demands in society and the government itself. For institutionalists, change arrives 
generally in the form of an exogenous shock; the ability of the system to absorb and 
adapt to this change is dependent on its degree of institutionalisation.10 In the context 
of this research, public opinion polling is modelled as an exogenous influence for 
change that is mediated through political institutions. 
                                                          
 
10
For historical institutionalists, the explanation for variation in political outcomes lies in the particularity 
of institutional arrangements. “States are not generic. They vary dramatically in their internal structures 
and relations to society. Different kinds of state structures create different capacities for state action” 
(Evans, 1995: 11). The emphasis becomes on the ordering of relations and the understanding of political 
institutions “as acting autonomously in terms of institutional interests” (March and Olsen, 1989: 4). For 
more discussion see Lichbach et al. 1997.  
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Roderic Camp (1996), making specific reference to the Mexican 1994 elections in his 
book Polling for Democracy, argues that the emergence of opinion polling in the 
Mexican political sphere deserves significant credit for pushing the liberalization of 
Mexico forward. In spite of very real flaws in both the design and the coverage of 
opinion polling data before the elections, the presence of the information had a 
positive effect on institutional change in the previously restrictive Mexican system. He 
also finds supportive evidence for the theory that leaders, however removed from 
their constituencies, will choose policies that maximise the likelihood of their being re-
elected. In short, institutional change creates greater political competition that in turn 
drives more democratic outcomes by compelling the elites to adapt their strategies to 
match the preferences of the electorate. 
According to Henn (1998) this model for opinion polling’s influence can be traced back 
to Schumpeter and Gallup. Henn argues that George Gallup’s assertion that opinion 
research can “bridge the gap between the people and those who are responsible for 
making decisions in their name” (Gallup, 1940) implicitly assumes that the structure of 
political power in these societies corresponds with Schumpeter’s ‘classical doctrine of 
democracy.’ This posits the existence of an “institutional arrangement for arriving at 
political decisions which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide 
issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its 
will” (Schumpeter, 1976: 242). This model theorises a political system that is 
“sufficiently flexible to enable opinion polls to operate as links between the electorate 
and political representatives, and as mechanisms through which citizens can play a 
meaningful role in political affairs” (Henn, 1998: 10). 
Henn, however, presents a model in which this assumption does not hold, much as it 
does not in the case of most of sub-Saharan Africa. He argues that much of East 
European polities correspond more closely to Schumpeter’s model of ‘competitive 
elitism’ where democracy is defined as “an institutional arrangement for arriving at 
political decisions in which the individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a 
competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter, 1976: 269). Under this 
construct, political elites commissioning opinion polls are less interested that they 
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offer a form of participation for the voter than they are that polls help them gain 
further political power. As such, Henn argues, polls do not fundamentally change the 
dynamics of elite power and political dominance. “Instead, they provide information 
with which these elites might devise strategies to compete successfully with rivals to 
secure political power” (Henn, 1998: 11). The premise behind opinion polling becomes 
not the expansion of political participation but elites striking the balance between 
holding onto the votes of the party base and extending their influence over unaffiliated 
voters.  
Under Henn’s model, then, the influence of opinion polling is contingent upon the 
nature of the political system into which it is introduced. Much as Huntington (1968) 
contended that the increase in political participation, in this case in the form of polls, 
would require a proportionate increase in political institutionalization, Henn bases his 
analysis on the institutional composition of ‘complex politics’ to determine under what 
conditions polling is likely to make a ‘democratic’ impact. To stimulate transparency 
and responsiveness in elections under this model, stable institutions, such as the 
media and political parties, would need to operate to publicise and operationalise the 
results of opinion polls, creating an environment in which polls are consumed to 
inform political strategies and set realistic expectations. 
Second stage hypothesis 2: Public opinion polling’s contribution to transparency and 
representativeness is dependent on the ability of existing political institutions to 
absorb and adapt to a new form of political participation. 
To test this hypothesis, I will analyse news media and key informant interviews to 
discern evidence of institutional adaptations as a result of public opinion polling and 
map these against shifts in elite electoral strategies, defined as being either more 
transparent or representative or less. If this hypothesis is to hold, one would expect to 
see institutions changing in the face of public opinion polling, compelling elites to 
choose electoral strategies based on the character of the institutional change. 
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2.4 Theoretical Framework 
These models offer useful contributions to the understanding of public opinion 
polling’s ability to influence political change. They have certain limitations in explaining 
the variations in influence on the transparency and representativeness of elections in 
sub-Saharan Africa, however. The first, while appealing in its presentation of public 
opinion polling as a means of overcoming collective action problems, struggles to 
address variations in elite behaviour in response to the emergence of public opinion 
polling where the context of political information and opportunities for collective 
action are similar. Likewise, the second theory, while eminently comparative in its 
focus on institutions present across democratic systems in Africa, suffers from an 
inability to capture variations across time within countries where institutional 
structures have not changed in any significant way. The story of public opinion polling 
in sub-Saharan Africa is as fluid as the political systems it measures; it requires a more 
dynamic model to explain its variations effectively. 
This thesis proposes a new model using elements of each of the above models while 
incorporating a more robust concept of elite response to explain the variations 
observed. The model is predicated on the notion that “survey research is a historically 
situated political institution as much as a scientific technology” (Sanders, 1999: 249). A 
pragmatic analysis allows for a better understanding of how public opinion polls 
interact with other institutions and actors within the political sphere. Recognising that 
existing theories have failed to model opinion polling as a cognitive mechanism for 
political change, the new framework posits that changes in the electoral system should 
be modelled through the lens of elite perceptions and behaviour in response to public 
opinion polling. The political elite are the principal actors when it comes to the design 
and reform of electoral processes, and they determine what issues and opinions 
matter in the context of electoral information, strategies, and outcomes. 
This new framework is necessary for several reasons. First, it explicitly recognises that 
in the case of opinion polling in particular, it is not actual polling results that matter 
but rather the interpretations of them by elites and the media (Fried, 1997). The 
contextual factors described above illustrate the challenges faced by public opinion 
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polling upon its introduction into sub-Saharan politics, the uncertainty with which it is 
viewed and digested within the public sphere. This uncertainty requires that we move 
beyond arguments of structure or agency to understand perceptions and motivations 
in the context of incomplete or unreliable information.  
The novelty of public opinion polling within sub-Saharan politics, I argue, is also more 
likely to trigger in political elites a ‘third-person’ effect where “individuals who are 
members of an audience that is exposed to a persuasive communication (whether or 
not this communication is intended to be persuasive) will expect the communication to 
have a greater effect on others than on themselves. And whether or not these 
individuals are among the ostensible audience for the message, the impact that they 
expect this communication to have on others may lead them to take some action. Any 
effect that the communication achieves may thus be due not to the reaction of the 
ostensible audience but rather to the behaviour of those who anticipate, or think they 
perceive, some reaction on the part of others” (Davison, 1983: 3). This effect means 
that it is not just elite opinions we must concern ourselves with, but rather their 
perceptions of how public opinion polling is shaping the electoral landscape. 
Based on this notion, this model contends that elite perceptions of competition are 
central to the explanation of variations in transparency and representativeness 
brought about by the introduction of public opinion polling into sub-Saharan African 
elections. In a seminal work on public opinion, journalist Walter Lippmann (1922) 
argued that the reality of the world of public policy, including politicians and the 
media, is that it concerns perceptions, not facts, and that these must be analysed to 
determine their nature. Specifically, elites’ perceptions of competition shift play a 
critical role in shaping both the degree of change within the electoral process and the 
direction, whether toward greater or reduced transparency and responsiveness, of 
that change. Because elites are primarily concerned with either increasing or 
preserving their own power, perceived shifts in relative competitive balance, as 
illustrated through public opinion polls, instigate changes in political behaviour. 
In the classical model observed above, one might expect to see elites reacting to 
perceived increases in competition by offering greater openness in their campaigns 
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and directly tailoring their policy platforms to the wishes of the electorate, in short 
making themselves more electable by fitting most voters’ preferences. In sub-Saharan 
Africa, however, the political structure corresponds far more closely to the 
‘competitive elitism’ described by Schumpeter. Moreover, the addition of ethnic-
identity politics noted in the previous section makes the link between policy stances 
and ‘electability’ all the more tenuous. In fact, I would argue that under this system the 
logic of political competition is reversed, as seen in Figure 1. In the first stage below, 
the introduction of public opinion polling influences elite perceptions of the political 
dynamics of the election, creating opportunities for political change. In the second 
stage, I argue that elite perceptions of shifts in competition in particular impact elite 
behaviour and electoral strategies resulting in better or worse quality elections.  
Figure 1: Two-stage model of opinion polling’s impact on elections 
 
Public Opinion Polls 
Elite Perceptions of 
Shifts in Competition 
Restrictive and 
Manipulative 
Electoral 
Strategies 
Transparent and 
Representative 
Electoral 
Strategies 
As political information and as form 
of political participation 
Increased 
competition 
Stable or reduced 
competition 
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Under this model, where existing elites feel that opinion polls are threatening the 
existing competitive landscape, they will act to restrict transparency and 
representativeness of elections to avoid reality matching the evidence of the polls. By 
contrast, where polls support the existing balance of political competition, elites are 
generally ambivalent to the proliferation of polls and will, at times, embrace opinion 
polls as a means of further advancing their popularity with the electorate. This is not to 
say that polls are incapable of engendering political change. Rather it argues that 
opinion polls cannot be the catalyst for political change, as their presence as outliers 
within the system can be easily suppressed. In contexts, where fundamental political 
change is already brewing, however, opinion polls can amplify the strength of that 
movement, overcoming elite attempts to repress it.  
Hypothesis 3: Public opinion polling’s contribution to transparency and 
representativeness of elections is dependent on elite perceptions of shifts in political 
competitiveness, the more competitive the election is perceived to be the more likely 
elites will seek to restrict and manipulate the process and result. 
To test this hypothesis, I will analyse news media and key informant interviews to 
discern trends in shifts in elite perceptions that mirror shifts in public opinion polling 
outcomes and map these against shifts in elite electoral strategies, defined as being 
either more transparent or representative or less. If this hypothesis is to hold, one 
would expect to see elite perceptions aligning with the public opinion polling and that 
as competition tightens, elites pursue strategies that restrict and manipulate the 
electoral process and result. 
2.5 Defining Variables of Analysis 
This research aims to construct an evidence base that tests competing hypotheses as 
to why public opinion polling has contributed to greater transparency and 
representativeness in some cases in sub-Saharan Africa and not in others over the past 
decade. Specifically, it is interested in answering the question: why does the presence 
of public opinion polling influence the political elite to restrict and distort campaigns 
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and outcomes in some elections but not in others in twenty-first century Kenya, 
Ghana, Nigeria and Uganda? This requires capturing and interpreting shifts in both 
attitudes and behaviour in the four countries across time. The research design is a 
parallel-case study using key informant interviews and content analysis of print media 
during the electoral cycle of four sub-African countries (Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria, and 
Ghana). 
2.5.1 Key Variables 
This research uses as its independent variable “the presence of public opinion polls.” 
The variable is specifically narrowed to include only those polls directly related to 
political issues, such as elections and constitutional referenda. This allows the research 
to focus on the politics of institutionalising opinion polls into political processes.  
Additionally, this thesis tests three mediating variables to determine through which 
mechanism public opinion polling is most likely to contribute to changes in elite 
political calculations and to greater transparency and representativeness. These 
mediating variables equate to the models described above, namely: collective action, 
institutional adaptation, and elite perceptions of competition. In identifying examples 
of each, the research will determine the magnitude and direction of influence each has 
on the dependent variables, defined below. 
In defining its dependent variables, transparency and representativeness, this research 
draws on Hillygus (2011), who delineates three different functions for public opinion 
polling in U.S. presidential elections that are universally relevant and apt for testing the 
above hypotheses. These are the following: understanding voter behaviour; planning 
campaign strategy; and forecasting election outcomes. Namely, polls are posited to 
affect information dynamics in the political sphere; to influence elite decision-making 
and behaviour; and to have an impact on electoral practices and outcomes.  
The first influence variable, what this research calls “transparency” relates largely to 
the process of politics, specifically how information is managed and controlled, and 
how the introduction of opinion polling directly alters the manner in which the 
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dynamics of that information market function. The second variable, 
“representativeness,” is a composite variable (consisting of electoral strategies and 
electoral expectations) and relates more to the outcomes of politics.  
2.5.1.1 Transparency 
Wolf and Ireri (2010: 7) in their study of Kenya’s experience with opinion polling 
through 2005 concluded that “Africa is slowly awakening to the need and use of survey 
based research such as opinion polls. Opinion polls are slowly transforming Africa into 
an information based society, one that is listening to what the public wants and using 
research based data for decision making.”  
Transparency has become a prerequisite for good governance. Without it, society 
cannot observe or monitor the behaviour of policymakers who may adopt policies that 
are not in the general interest. Policymaking ceases to be responsive to the will of the 
“people” when policies are made secret, away from the prying eyes of public 
scrutiny.11 
Elections are no different in so much that transparency emerges when electoral 
institutions operate in a way that their operations are open to the public. Indeed, the 
media and citizens in many countries are demanding more information about how 
elections are managed and how results are reported.12 Opinion polls have a potentially 
important role to play in reinforcing the transparency of elections and their outcomes. 
The advent of polling has thrown open political party primaries that were once the 
domain only of the party elite, casting public glare on the selection of candidates for 
major races in many sub-Saharan African countries. In a relatively low information 
                                                          
 
11
For a review of evidence on democracy and transparency, see Hollyer, J. R., B. P. Rosendorff and J.R. 
Vreeland. 2011. “Democracy and Transparency.” The Journal of Politics, 73, pp. 1191-1205. Also Islam, R. 
2006. “Does More Transparency Go Along With Better Governance?” Economics and Politics, vol. 18, no. 
2, pp. 121-167. 
 
12
 See Kenya in 2013, even if the process was beset by technical difficulties 
47 
 
 
 
context, the ability of opinion polling to inform voters who their candidates will be is a 
strong contribution for transparency.  
Perhaps more importantly, opinion polling draws back the curtain on the tallying of 
election results. While in the past, vote-rigging and election-day fraud could only be 
implied, opinion polling provides open data with which to compare official results with 
polling projections. This scrutiny puts electoral institutions and the elites who populate 
them under pressure to provide more open and more honest results. 
In the context of sub-Saharan Africa, the control of political information has always 
been heavily tilted in favour of the political elite. Opinion polling popularises that 
information, moving the political discourse out into the open, and changing the 
dynamics of electoral politics to boot. This variable, then, addresses both the quantity 
and quality of information provided through mainstream media on voter preferences.  
2.5.1.2 Representativeness 
According to neo-patrimonial theory, African politicians rarely consider the needs of 
the mass public. Their positions depend on delivering only to those within their 
patronage network, limiting their responsiveness significantly and creating a tendency 
for policy to be based on personal rather than public interest. The emergence of 
opinion polls at the national, and in some cases the sub-national level, creates a new 
dynamic for elite decision-making. Now the preferences of the larger community can 
be captured and expressed, politicians must make a choice between continuing to 
serve the interests of their smaller network and appealing to the wishes of the masses. 
Public opinion has been shown to be particular effective in swaying elite opinion when 
the strength of opinion is high. Opinion polls showing divided or moderate opinions 
are unlikely to have an impact on politics, but those showing overwhelming majorities 
in favour of or against a policy are difficult to ignore. Even in neo-patrimonial settings, 
where the independence of public opinion is often in doubt, the revelation of poll data 
that shows strong preferences can be highly influential.  
48 
 
 
 
In electoral terms, Lindberg argues that “elections are not legitimate just because 
certain procedures have been used fairly but when actors involved consent and testify 
to its legitimacy. Although legitimacy is often framed in terms of attitudes and 
sentiments, behaviour is arguably the best indicator” (Lindberg, 2007: 12). The extent 
to which political elites view elections as legitimate is best measured by their 
acceptance of the official results. Only if the election is free and fair and the losing 
candidates accept the results can a result be considered fully legitimate. Expectations 
can be a powerful thing in terms of guiding behaviour, and opinion polls have been 
demonstrated to be particularly adept at setting expectations, either rightly or 
wrongly, in advance of elections. Determining how strong the influence of opinion 
polls is in terms of guiding elites to accept or reject election results is a particularly 
intriguing strand of the research. 
Opinion polls as sources of information are also important in setting electoral 
expectations for political observers and general citizenry alike. People may only 
regularly interact with a self-selected group of like-minded individuals, such that their 
perception of potential electoral outcomes is likely to be skewed. Without the benefit 
of impartial polling data, one may assume that because everyone in one’s group 
supports a particular candidate that that candidate is the preferred choice more 
generally.  
Whether people choose to accept its validity or not polling data provides much needed 
perspective in these situations. Indeed, in highly charged electoral campaigns, such 
information may be critical in avoiding widespread violence if parties believe that 
election results have been tampered with or altered against their candidate. 
Systematic polling through a campaign period establishes baselines and thresholds 
against which actual results can be judged. While there will undoubtedly be surprises 
and shifts, vast discrepancies between multiple opinion polls and the final tally will be 
suspicious. 
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2.6 Defining Methods of Analysis 
2.6.1 Case Selection 
The research will centre on four countries in sub-Saharan Africa: Kenya, Uganda, 
Ghana, and Nigeria. In selecting a case study methodology, I have accepted its inherent 
limitations in terms of ensuring statistical representativeness of my sample. The nature 
of this research, however, demands that any explanatory framework is built through 
an exploration of how processes work in particular contexts and under different sets of 
circumstances. I have employed, then, more of an idiographic approach, where I 
construct a broader argument from an “understanding of particularity,” seeking to 
understand how opinion polling has emerged and interacted within existing political 
processes and institutions differently in various settings, based on an analysis of cases 
(Baker and Edwards, 2012). This entails building in sufficient variation of circumstance 
in the cases using a number of different conditions. 
The selection of the four countries is based on a number of criteria. First and foremost, 
they have all conducted democratic (to varying degrees) elections in the past decade. 
Second, independent public opinion polling research has been carried out during at 
least two of these past electoral periods. These two criteria ruled out a great number 
of sub-Saharan African, while simultaneously ensuring that there would be sufficient 
data upon which to base an analysis. 
The countries were further selected on the basis of geographic considerations and 
variation across the dependent variables. The thesis aims to be as representative as 
possible of sub-Saharan African democracies and, as such, selected two countries from 
East Africa and two from West Africa to ensure geographic spread. More importantly, 
however, was the need for institutional variation among the cases with respect to the 
independent variables. For instance, one expects to see a different landscape for 
political information in the more diffuse media environments of Kenya and Nigeria 
than the smaller, more ideologically aligned media in Uganda and Ghana. Likewise, 
campaign strategies and adaptation to polling will differ in the more politically 
competitive contexts of Kenya and Ghana from the one-party dominant systems in 
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Uganda and Nigeria. Finally, the propensity toward electoral violence seen in Nigeria 
and Kenya places a far higher importance on elite expectations than in the less 
combustible settings of Ghana and Uganda. 
It is relevant to note here that while the methodology was constructed to ensure 
variation between countries, the research revealed that there was also significant 
variation among the elections held in each country. Indeed, this finding informed the 
construction of a model that allowed for different outcomes across time within 
countries. It also contributes to the evidentiary richness and explanatory strength of 
the proposed model. 
2.6.2 Methods of Analysis 
The variables being tested in this research are difficult, if not impossible, to quantify. In 
many cases, they are ephemeral, here today, gone tomorrow, like much of public 
opinion. But just as public opinion polling captures preferences in that instant and 
records them for posterity, so too does the political news media capture the mood and 
behaviour of the political elite and imprints it upon the historical record. In attempting 
to capture data on both elite strategies and the various influences that shape them, it 
is appropriate that we turn to the country’s media for information. Flawed though it 
may be, and this research has demonstrated many problems with the media in sub-
Saharan Africa, media coverage, and particularly prominent newspapers remain the 
best window into the perceptions and ambitions of the political elite, for they are a 
part of it. 
The principal interest in this research was to make comparisons across countries over 
time with respect to the influence of public opinion polling. It was critical therefore to 
select a reliable, consistent method of assessing attitudes and behaviours that would 
enable such comprehensive analysis to be done. On this basis, content analysis was 
chosen as the best available option. Content analysis is a research method used to 
systematically and objectively describe and quantify phenomena (Krippendorff, 1980) 
and is often principally associated with analysing documents.  
51 
 
 
 
Of specific relevance to this research, content analysis of news media has emerged as a 
viable method for measuring attitudes and values and assessing attitude change 
among the political elite. Labelled the Media Indexing Hypothesis, there is strong 
evidence that media coverage accurately reflects the tenor of elite debate, thereby 
rendering the media in effect a conveyor belt (Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston, 
2006). The argument is that the media are largely passive, essentially “reflecting the 
actual substance of elite debate, and especially that emanating from the most 
powerful elites” (Groeling and Baum 2008: 4). Newspaper were selected as the 
preferred analytical medium because there is evidence to suggest that “structural 
characteristics of the print media make newspapers more effective…for acquiring 
detailed information about political issues, party policies, and the government’s 
record” (Norris and Sanders, 2003: 233-4). As such, the media serves as a dual source 
in the context of this study. The journalists and editors, themselves, are direct sources 
targeted for interview while the articles and op-eds they have written stand in as a 
proxy for the prevailing opinions among the political elite. 
Newspaper articles drawn from the leading daily and weekly papers were analysed 
from six months before the election/referendum through one month after, resulting in 
a seven month overall which was standard across each country and time period. The 
period was selected to encompass the bulk, if not the entirety, of the pre-election 
campaign, while allowing one month for post-election fallout or analysis to filter into 
the coverage. Newspapers were selected on the dual criteria of circulation/ 
prominence and availability of archives during the relevant periods. This process 
generated the sample of articles available for content analysis for each particular event 
under study. Additional newspapers did contribute to the overall knowledge base of 
the work without being included in the more rigorous content analysis. 
The sample for each country case study was first analysed using quantitative content 
analysis techniques. Quantitative content analysis collects data from media content in 
the form of volume of mentions, circulation of the media (audience reach), and 
frequency. Using these techniques, an illustration of the relative penetration of public 
opinion polls in the respective national media could be established. Where more 
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mentions of the term ‘opinion poll’ or related terms were present, I could infer that 
polling was of greater significance to the country’s political media. 
However, one cannot assume that quantitative factors such as frequency of media 
messages equate to impact. Nor can one assume that quantitative factors alone drive 
media impact and political influence. A mixed method approach was required, in which 
qualitative content analysis techniques could complement the findings derived from 
the purely quantitative analysis. The strength of this approach to content analysis is 
that it allows the researcher to test theories in order to extract better understanding 
from the text. Figure 2 provides an illustrative schematic of the process of deductive 
content analysis used in this research. 
Following these techniques, the articles were reviewed using three broad 
categorisations: information only, mediating variables, and elite strategies. Items 
which included polls but no analysis were coded as ‘information only.’ Items which 
discussed mediating variables were sub-coded under ‘collective action’, ‘institutional 
adaptation’, or ‘elite perceptions’. Items which discussed elite strategies were coded 
as either ‘transparent/representative’ or ‘restrictive/manipulative’. Using this method, 
a huge database of articles was distilled into usable analytical chunks, which have 
subsequently informed this research. 
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 Figure 2: Flow chart of deductive content analysis 
 
Source: Mayring, 2000 
The principal online sources for articles were African newspapers online archives, 
where available; allafrica.com, an African-focused media aggregator with over 900,000 
articles from across the continent stretching back to 1997; and BBC Monitoring, a UK-
based service which monitors and archives media from every country in the world. The 
British Library also holds several African archives, which were used to supplement the 
electronic resources, where necessary. The specific newspapers reviewed are provided 
in each country case study. 
While this approach has many strengths, there are a number of limitations that 
deserve mention. First, the sample is necessarily limited due to the availability of 
sources. Not all newspapers are available online or via other accessible sources, 
although every attempt was made to include articles from the principal newspapers in 
each country. Second, while the quantitative analysis portion of the research is by 
nature impartial, the qualitative analysis is almost exclusively reliant on this author’s 
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interpretation of text and meaning within the text. To counter this, I included a third 
element to this dissertation’s research methodology: key informant interviews. 
The key informant interviews were done principally in person during periods of 
fieldwork in each of the four countries between March 2011 and May 2013 (a list of 
interviewees is attached in Appendix 2). These interviews were essential for the 
success of the research for two reasons. First, the interviews were able to validate the 
findings gained from the in-depth content analysis. It was important for this research, 
given its emphasis on difficult-to-measure concepts like influence and attitudes, that 
the evidence to support its assertions could be triangulated and verified. The 
interviews spanning different professions and political affiliations were the most 
appropriate means of doing this. Second, where the interviews did not corroborate the 
findings of the content analysis precisely, they introduced different contextual and 
structural considerations that enriched the research and contributed to the 
development of the overall analytical framework. However versed one may be in the 
literature of a subject, there remains no substitute for having lived experience of 
events and personalities. The key informant interviews provided the research with that 
window to the past. 
The selection of respondents was based on what is casually known as the ‘snowball’ 
approach. Key individuals were contacted initially who subsequently recommended 
further respondents for interviews. Using an accepted qualitative test of ‘saturation’, 
interviews were sourced until the responses began to duplicate (i.e., if all new 
respondents were essentially repeating what had already been recorded, the interview 
list is deemed to be sufficient) (Baker and Edwards, 2012). The interviews were 
conducted using a semi-structured methodology through which a set of standard 
questions were asked both to address the principal research questions and to provoke 
further discussion within the topic. Where targeted respondents were not available in 
person, these interviews were conducted via phone or email, as required. 
Nevertheless, not all planned interviews were conducted due to scheduling conflicts or 
outright refusal of access. While this is not considered to have significantly impaired 
the research, it is a limitation worth noting. 
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2.7 The Intersection of Polling, Elites, and Elections 
This thesis examines the impact of the recent introduction of public opinion polling on 
the quality of elections in sub-Saharan Africa. Having surveyed the relevant literature, 
this chapter has suggested a new framework to understand the underlying 
characteristics that shape the interface between polling, the political elite, and 
electoral politics in sub-Saharan Africa. The arguments developed above posit opinion 
polling as a new, modern form of political participation to which the political elite must 
adapt. This creates opportunities for either the expansion or contraction of political 
space around elections. Using a two-stage model, I hypothesise that it is by shaping 
elite perceptions—more so than changing the nature of political participation or by 
changing political institutions—that public opinion polling is having the greatest impact 
on electoral processes. 
I have argued in this chapter that opinion polling can influence electoral dynamics by 
altering the flow of information that drives political elite decision-making and by 
shifting the locus of political contestation from the private to the public sphere. Polling 
catalyses a surge in demand for political information that in turn forces electoral 
politics out into the open, with each development played out in the headlines. 
Politicians and their advisors, faced with this new tool, will often have no choice but to 
embrace polling’s potential, irrespective of the caveats. As it pervades the political 
discourse, opinion polling concentrates and intensifies attitudes and preferences that 
may have otherwise been more diffuse or transient. This intensity demands a response 
from the political elite, and however they may resist it ultimately engenders 
adaptation in electoral strategies. 
Two assumptions pertaining to the political conditions in sub-Saharan African underpin 
the application of this framework to the four countries covered in my case studies. The 
first is the uncertainty of political information, as characterised by generally poor 
media capacity, inexperienced pollsters, and general scepticism of research in general. 
The second is that ethnic-identity politics, far from encouraging progressive 
adaptation, actively induce politicians to grasp for the familiar in the face of change, 
prompting renewed emphasis on clientelism and ethnic-centred messaging. 
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On the basis of these assumptions, my model predicts that once polling has pervaded 
the political discourse it shapes elite perceptions of the degree of political competition 
they face in any given electoral period. Where opinion polls illustrate an increasingly 
competitive contest, elites will react to undermine the openness and transparency of 
that election with an eye toward manipulating the outcome in their favour. Moreover, 
contrary to conventional wisdom, elites will not seek to broaden their base of support 
through responsive platforms or policies, but rather will fall back on strategies 
designed to mobilise core supporters predicated on issues of ethnicity, religion, or 
other such divisive factors. The four chapters that follow will examine the evidence 
that public opinion polling in Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria, and Uganda is changing the way in 
which politics is conducted around elections and will seek to determine whether 
polling has contributed to more transparent and representative electoral processes in 
these selected countries.  
This thesis shows that public opinion polling is emphatically influencing the political 
dynamics of its four country cases. Moreover, in those elections and referenda where 
public opinion polling can be argued to have contributed to greater transparency and 
representativeness it has done so due to specific shifts in elite perceptions of 
competitive balance within the electoral process. For instance, President Daniel arap 
Moi’s decision not to exert his influence to manipulate the 2002 Kenyan election result 
toward his favoured candidate was, at least partly, based on his perception of relative 
electoral position emerging from public opinion polling. Likewise, stable perceptions of 
lack of competition as expressed through polling have enabled Presidents Museveni 
and Jonathan, of Uganda and Nigeria respectively, to allow for, if only marginally, 
greater transparency and representativeness in their most recent elections in 2011. 
With respect to the nature of these elite perceptions, I examine how the quality of the 
media and the specific ethno-regional character of each of the countries intersect with 
public opinion polling to shape perceptions of competition shifts in elections. I show 
that by focusing on the perceptions of elites, the quality of media coverage can 
become endogenous to the model, placing the onus for discerning accuracy on the 
elites, rather than on the researcher. I also demonstrate that the role of ethno-regional 
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politics matter only in the way in which they structure politics, not in motivating any 
particular movement toward or away from transparent and representative elections. 
The quality of electoral institutions is also seen to be integral to establishing polling’s 
ability to deliver greater transparency and representativeness. Ultimately, the research 
shows that public opinion polling is most likely to improve the transparency and 
representativeness of sub-Saharan elections in non-competitive environments where 
the pressure for elite survival is lower and where it cannot be instrumentalised as a 
tool for obtaining or retaining power.  
This finding has important implications for the continued implementation of public 
opinion polling in sub-Saharan African elections. It suggests that public opinion polling 
is no panacea for the problems observed in these elections. Its ability to instigate 
change is inherently limited by the underlying context of the political system in which 
it operates. It can, however, facilitate political change by amplifying the strength of 
that change, potentially overcoming elite attempts to repress it. Let us turn to the case 
studies now to understand why. 
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Chapter 3. Public Opinion Polling in Kenyan Elections 2002–2011 
Prior to the 1990s, election opinion polling in Kenya was rare and sporadic. This was 
largely the result of elite control of political information. Hornsby (2001) argues that 
Kenya elites had little interest in gathering data about their ability to deliver what the 
voters wanted, precluding any need to capture the views of ordinary citizens. They 
were able to exert this will as elite control of the media was considerable, making 
newspaper editors loath to publish data on citizen preferences or government 
performance on political issues. 
Opinion polling in Kenya has come a long way since then, but its impact on Kenyan 
elections and the country’s on-going political development remains controversial. This 
thesis tests three hypotheses related to the way in which opinion polling influences 
elite strategies and the quality of elections. Specifically, it attempts to determine 
whether it is opinion polling’s ability to substitute for collective action, to force 
institutional adaptation, or to shape elite perceptions around electoral competition 
that determines the likelihood that elites will move toward or away from more 
transparent and representative electoral processes. 
This chapter reviews the evidence of opinion polling’s influence on Kenyan elections 
and finds that it is generally supportive of the third hypothesis. Under President Moi in 
the 1980s and 1990s, the opinion polling that was carried out was largely irrelevant 
due to his political clout and control of state resources to manage the electoral 
process. By 2002, the political environment had changed sufficiently that opinion 
polling was able to contribute to a more transparent and representative election. 
Likewise in the constitutional referendum of 2005, political elites strategically backed 
down in the face of overwhelming popular opinion against the constitution.  
By 2007, opinion polling had become increasingly sophisticated and pervaded much of 
Kenyan politics, shaping perceptions and party choices for candidates. Polling pointed 
to a close race, and its inability to make a definitive pronouncement contributed to an 
increasing focus on ethnic mobilisation and a chaotic response to Kibaki’s controversial 
victory. Chastened but undeterred by its role in the melee, opinion polling continued 
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to feature heavily in political media coverage. Indeed, its prominence in 2007 
convinced many hitherto sceptical politicians as to the merits of engaging pollsters in 
their campaigns. 
The integration of opinion polling into Kenyan politics has been by no means a smooth 
transition. The prominence polling has gained within elite political circles is 
undeniable, although its reception has been mixed. The instances where public opinion 
has been clear and decisive, the advent of polling has provided an invaluable channel 
for that information to reach the political elite. Indeed, its role in the political process 
seems likely only to grow in the near future, particularly with the arrival of a new 
decentralised system of governance in Kenya. The incomplete understanding of polling 
and how it relates to politics, however, creates broad opportunities for its misuse 
within the media and among politicians. The ability of polling to consistently affect the 
quality of elections and consequently the country’s political institutions remains 
muddled by the inexperience of the media and the complex incentives of the political 
elite.  
3.1 The Context of this Research 
3.1.1 Historical Context 
Kenya, at independence, inherited a colonial system of governance that featured a 
highly centralised state with a dominant executive branch. The colony had a significant 
population of European settlers who had been drawn to Kenya by the prospects of 
wealth from plantation agriculture, occupying land that had been appropriated from 
local populations. Operating as an almost feudal system, these plantations ran 
principally on the labour of the rural Africans. To maintain this codified system of 
inequality, the colonial government ensured that Africans could only mobilise 
politically in ethnically defined regions, precluding an attempt to form nationwide 
movements. As a result, many of the key features of Kenya’s current political 
landscape can be considered as having their genesis in the colonial period, namely: “a 
centralised state with a powerful executive, political conflict around the issue of 
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inequality, particularly with reference to land, and a tradition of violent confrontation 
between the state and popular movements in opposition” (Marquette et al., 2008). 
Two major political parties dominated the politics of the early years of Kenya’s 
independence. Jomo Kenyatta’s Kenya African National Union (KANU) represented the 
dominant Kikuyu ethnic group and forged an early alliance Oginga Odinga and his Luo 
grouping. Opposing them was the Kenyan African Democratic Union (KADU) which was 
largely constituted by the Kalenjin and other marginal ethnic groups in the Rift Valley, 
while also garnering support in the Coast Province and among the white population. 
The competition was short-lived. Using state patronage, Kenyatta lured KADU leaders 
into defecting to his party, culminating in the merger of KADU with KANU in 1964, and 
Kenya became, essentially, a one-party state (Mueller, 2008). 
Opinion polling influence on early politics was equally tumultuous. Before 
independence, there were attempts made to apply election polling techniques to 
Kenya but with little success. Post-independence, this process continued. Hornsby’s 
(2001) research has uncovered records on four opinion polls conducted on Kenya in 
the period 1964-66. Hornsby also notes that “Tom Mboya as Secretary-General of 
KANU and Minister also ran a small polling unit, which prepared surveys on national 
issues for the government, but these were never published” (ibid). 
When the Kenya People’s Union (KPU) was founded in 1966 and KANU began to face 
tangible political competition, all opinion polls were immediately halted, already 
reflecting a certain animosity on the part of political elites towards political 
competition. Kenyatta was not at all interested in engaging in a fair competition for 
votes with the KPU; nor did he have any regard for the opinion of the general public on 
key political issues. Instead, Hornsby argues that “opinion-canvassing…took place 
informally through the network of politicians and civil servants who provided the 
transmission belt from the centre to the periphery of the country, and also fed back to 
the leadership the views and strength of views of local communities on key problems 
facing them” (Hornsby 2001). Indeed, under Kenyatta and his successor Daniel arap 
Moi from 1978, one could argue that general elections themselves became a form of 
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opinion poll — a non-binding method of expressing the nation’s views on the conduct 
of events.  
Until the combination of democratisation and the physical development of 
independent communications and analysis media (mobile phones, computers) in the 
early 1990s, the control of the various media exercised by the government meant that 
they generally followed the agenda defined by the dominant KANU coalition. Where 
they did challenge it, it was with a specific objective and set of ’masters’ in mind. From 
the late 1960s until 1992, efforts to register voter opinion were negligible (Branch and 
Cheeseman, 2005). 
4.1.2 Recent Political Context 
After years of domestic political protests and increasing international pressure linked 
to the wave of democratisation, President Daniel arap Moi’s decision to repeal the 
constitutional clause defining KANU as the sole political party in December 1991 
ushered in a new era of multiparty politics in Kenya. In anticipation of general elections 
scheduled for the end of 1992, political parties once again coalesced around ethnic 
identities (Throup and Hornsby, 1998). Despite widespread unpopularity, Moi emerged 
victorious from the presidential elections, with KANU winning clear majorities in 
parliament in both 1992 and 1997. Brown (2004: 327) contends that “this was made 
possible by a blatantly uneven playing field and the ruling party’s use of numerous 
corrupt practices, ranging from gerrymandering and the stuffing of ballot boxes to 
violent intimidation, all facilitated by the opposition’s fragmentation.” 
KANU’s victories in these general elections were achieved amid violence and 
allegations of electoral irregularities. While the government maintained that the 
violence was ethnically motivated triggered by the advent of multi-party politics, 
others have argued that politicians instigated the violence as a tool for winning the 
elections (Dercon and Gutierrez-Romero, 2012). Yet, the lack of a coherent opposition 
meant that the fundamental legitimacy of the results was rarely challenged. There was 
no credible alternative to Moi (Kagwanja, 2003). 
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In a reversal of early political alignments, in 1992 and 1997 elections, Moi’s KANU drew 
its strongest support from his own Kalenjin group and other Rift Valley groups, while 
the opposition parties had strongholds in Kikuyu and Luo areas (Barkan and Ng’ethe, 
1998). This reflects the persistent reality that Kenya’s presidential races are usually 
won through coalition building and appeals to the swing voters in provinces that lack 
significant population of dominant ethnic groups and, therefore, rarely vote as a bloc 
(ICG, 2008). 
Moi had a distinct advantage going into these elections in as much as the opposition 
parties were rarely more than the ethnic constituencies of particular candidates. 
Throup (2001: 3) suggests that “over the last decade the country’s political parties 
have become ever more exclusive.” In 1992, a broad-based alliance of ethnic groups 
joined together under a political party named FORD (Forum for the Restoration of 
Democracy) that presented a real opportunity for defeating KANU in the elections, but 
it ultimately disintegrated into rival ethnic factions. The trend of opposition 
disintegration gained pace in the run-up to the 1997 elections. “FORD Kenya lost most 
of its Luo followers to Raila Odinga’s National Development Party (NDP), and FORD-
Asili self-destructed when its veteran leader, Kenneth Matiba, decided to boycott the 
1997 polls. Even the Democratic Party, a previously cohesive coalition of Kikuyu and 
Kamba, lost its Kamba supporters to the revamped Social Democratic Party (SDP)” 
(ibid).  
Despite its second electoral victory in 1997, the KANU government was never as 
securely in place as it had been before. Internal schisms and in-fighting, drought and 
flood, economic decline, the rapid development in news gathering and 
communications technologies and a gradually growing civic awareness all served to 
weaken the government’s control over the media and over the population. At the 
same time, opinion polls began to flourish, building a constituency of consumers 
among the political elite. 
Chastened by their defeat in 1997 elections, three opposition leaders Mwai Kibaki, 
Michael Kijana Wamalwa and Charity Kaluki Ngilu (who would later come to be known 
as the Big Three) determined that they must find a way of working together. 
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Recognising the importance of publicity, they pushed the idea of opposition unity 
through media sources and prominent meetings, but nobody took them seriously, not 
even KANU. Amutabi (2009: 70) sees this as “the impetus that would see inter-ethnic 
bridge-building develop later to become the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition 
(NARC). The opposition leaders had realised that this was the only way they could 
defeat KANU at elections. The populous Kikuyu had realised that they could not go it 
alone.” While it was a difficult lesson to take, it would prove strategically important in 
the elections of 2002. 
3.1.3 Ethnicity in Kenyan Politics 
That ethnicity has long been central to political mobilisation in Kenya is a commonly 
accepted premise among scholars (Barkan, 2011). Linked to clientelistic theories of 
governance, the perception is that Kenyans vote along ethnic lines to maximise their 
community’s share of public goods by ensuring the presence of their own 
representatives in government. If a certain community votes someone into a position 
of power, the people of that community will benefit from the largesse of the state 
once that person had obtained power. 
Kenya is a multi-ethnic society and has more than 40 ethnic communities. The principal 
ethnic communities are the Kikuyu, the Luyha, the Luo, the Kalenjin, the Kamba, and 
the Kisii (see Map 1 below). As discussed above, power in Kenya since the colonial 
period has usually been associated with one particular ethnic group or another. From 
independence until the death of the first president Jomo Kenyatta in 1978, power was 
increasingly restricted to a small cadre of trusted Kikuyu. By contrast, under Moi, 
political power became concentrated in the hands of Kalenjin elites. The on-going 
ethnicisation of government, the civil service and even political parties has for years 
been considered one of the major contributors to poor governance and weak 
accountability in Kenya, as well as conflict (Omolo, 2002). 
Ethnicity is most often exploited during elections, as it tends to be an easy identity 
through which to mobilise people. An Afrobarometer study finds that although 
Kenyans don’t generally define themselves in ethnic terms, their electoral behaviour is 
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shaped by ethnic identity politics. “Respondents also show a high degree of mistrust of 
members of other ethnic groups and consider the behaviour of these other groups to 
be influenced primarily by ethnicity. In general, voting in Kenya is therefore defensively 
and fundamentally an ethnic census” (Bratton and Kimenyi, 2008: 20). 
Map 1 Ethnic distribution in Kenya 
 
Source:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/7172038.stm 
 
As previously noted, the particular composition of ethnic identity in Kenya often 
requires politicians seeking election to form alliances and coalitions with leaders of 
other ethnic groups. Sebastian Elischer (2008) has labelled these ‘coalitions of 
convenience,’ where erstwhile political enemies forge a relationship against a common 
adversary. The 2002 election was a good example of this in the form of NARC, which 
survived only three years beyond the election. The potential link between opinion 
polling and the formation of these coalitions is something which emerges from several 
case studies in this thesis and would benefit from further research. 
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3.1.4 The Media in Kenyan Politics 
Kenya has a fluid political environment characterised by personality, ethnicity, and 
party affiliation. Although Kenyans have long agitated for ideology-driven party 
politics, this has not been achieved due to weak party political systems, and practices 
that seem to favour short-term political gains. Kenya’s media suffers from similar 
flaws. Most of the media in Kenya are commercial in nature and profit is the principal 
motive. As such, the media favours content that sells, focusing on personalities, 
celebrities, and other ‘soft’ issues that do not require much investment in terms of 
time, monetary and even specialised human resources that would offer deeper and 
meaningful coverage of issues. 
Kenya’s media, particularly its print sector, is largely independent and does not shy 
away from criticising leading politicians and the government. The sector is pluralistic 
and relatively rigorous, although the influence of the commercial advertisers can 
impact of the quality of reporting. In the print media, there are four daily newspapers, 
one business daily, and several regional weekly newspapers. Among broadcast media, 
the state-controlled Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) predominates in markets 
outside major urban areas, and its coverage generally favours the government. Two 
private media houses, the Standard Media Group and the Nation Media Group, also 
run television networks and popular daily and weekly newspapers. Radio is also 
prominent, particularly in rural areas, although these tend to be ethnically aligned 
(Lansner, 2012). 
The content analysis that informs this chapter is drawn from articles published in three 
principal (i.e., those with greatest circulation and greatest prominence in Nairobi) 
newspapers (The Daily Nation, The Standard, and The Star) and follows two parallel 
tracks. The first quantitative track reviews articles over a seven month period around 
elections to determine quantity of opinion polling coverage while the second 
qualitative tracks examines the writings of key political commentators across the 
entire period of 2002–2010 to determine shifts in perceptions and attitudes to opinion 
polling on the basis of content and tone. 
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3.2 Public Opinion Polling in Kenyan Elections 
The addition of opinion polling into this combustible crucible of elite politics has the 
potential for both extraordinary gains and losses in the quality of electoral processes. 
This research builds on the premise that electoral politics is principally about elite 
strategies and behaviour. Therefore, for opinion polling to influence the quality of 
elections, it must first influence political elites. To analyse this influence on elites in 
Kenya, this chapter takes a two stage approach and applies across the four 
electoral/referenda periods under review. Firstly, while the physical act of opinion 
polling can be consequential as being representative of the relative openness of a 
society, this thesis focuses almost exclusively on the information it produces. 
Specifically, it examines the process by which that information is interpreted, 
disseminated, and consumed by the political elite of specific sub-Saharan democracies. 
This process of institutionalising public opinion polling data into the political discourse 
is the first facet of analysis of its impact on the quality of elections in Kenya. A negative 
finding in this stage clearly precludes any influence on Kenyan political elites and 
consequently on the quality of elections. 
Secondly, information does not exist in isolation. Once it has been analysed and 
consumed by the relevant actors, they must choose either to act upon it or not. 
Collectively, these are the outcomes of the introduction of public opinion polling on 
Kenya’s electoral processes. In this stage, I test my hypotheses as to how opinion 
polling can contribute to more transparent and representative elections by reviewing 
and analysing elite responses to public opinion polling through the news media and 
through first-hand accounts. How political elites respond to political information is 
often as revealing as the information itself. 
What has emerged is a picture of elite politics that conforms very closely to the 
clientelistic system assumed in the model introduced in Chapter 2. Growing political 
competition as captured and publicised by opinion polls, far from instigating greater 
transparency and representativeness, actually occasions a growing reliance on 
patronage and ethnically-focused politics. By contrast, periods of less competition 
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allow for greater openness and responsive electoral processes based on the data 
emerging from opinion polls.  
Indeed, public opinion polling’s role in shaping perceptions here is readily apparent. 
Politicians have adopted an almost schizophrenic love-hate relationship with the polls, 
often conditioned on their treatment by those same surveys. Publicly, opinion polls are 
often sneered at or ridiculed as bought and paid for by the opposing party, particularly 
when the results are poor. But privately, politicians regularly pay to have their 
questions added to large public surveys or, in some cases, have polling companies 
formed on their behalf (Private interview, 16 April 2012). The political elite will 
acknowledge and react positively to opinion polls that either publicly confirm their 
preeminent position within the competitive landscape or privately point to new 
strategies they might employ to improve their competitive position. This dichotomy 
between public and private strategies and behaviours confirms that perceptions 
matter.  
The media has an equally complex relationship with opinion polls. In one capacity, they 
are meant to provide a conduit, reporting only the facts and data with which they are 
provided. When those facts are incorrect or biased, however, the media becomes 
implicated in the manipulation. Being new to the polling game, media do not yet have 
the capacity to provide the kind of specific analysis needed to decipher the landscape 
of opinion polling in Kenya. Indeed, where media tries to act as a filter, it often leads 
its readership further astray, by focusing on the wrong headline numbers or 
misinterpreting data that is not directly comparable. Media has come a long way in ten 
years, but inconsistencies remain. This uncertainty also plays a role in shaping elite 
perceptions and strategies. 
Likewise, the pollsters themselves are learning how to operate effectively in a 
politically charged environment, steeped in ethnic tensions that pervade much of the 
political process. Even non-partisan pollsters find themselves tarred as biased based on 
the ethnicity of their managing director (Private interview, 17 April 2012). Alliances 
with international polling firms provides much needed credibility for pollsters, but 
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their science is still too easily dismissed as mysterious and artificial, with even 
educated Kenyans questioning the validity of sampling as a statistical technique. 
Table 1: Pollsters in Kenyan politics 
Polling Organisation Elections Active Affiliation or other ties13 
Consumer Insight 2007 Considered to be biased toward Kikuyu 
candidates 
Infotrak 2007, 2010 Considered to be biased toward Odinga and 
his affiliates 
International 
Republican Institute 
2007 US agency funded by USAID and affiliated with 
the US Republican party. Has extensive 
election programmes around the world.  
Ipsos/Synovate/ 
Steadman 
2002, 2005, 2007, 
2010 
Independently owned, now part of 
international brand. Has been variously 
accused of favouritism but no formal links 
Strategic Research 2007, 2010 Independent, generally considered quite 
credible 
RMS 2007 Independent, now part of global TNS brand 
 
2002 changed the stakes of Kenyan elections. They were no longer stage-managed 
with predetermined outcomes; they were open, competitive, and winner takes all 
affairs. This opened the door to a whole new set of problems for the political elite. 
Questions of boycotts, which arose during the early stages of the 2002 campaign, and 
rejections of official results, as in the 2007 elections, became important strategic 
decisions for politicians. 2002 also provided the first real opportunity for opinion 
polling to flourish, and there have been numerous ups and downs in the decade since. 
What follows is a narrative that charts the emergence of opinion polling in 2002; 
follows it through the first constitutional referendum in 2005 where it accurately 
predicted a rejection of the draft; analyses the influence of polling on the crisis of the 
2007 election; and culminates in the 2010 constitutional referendum. 
                                                          
 
13
 This applies to the organisation only. It is not always possible to discern the data source or funding agent of 
individual polls released under the names of organisations or newspapers. Independent firms may be open to 
accusations of bias when they conduct and publish polls on behalf of particular parties or individuals. 
69 
 
 
 
3.2.1 The 2002 Elections 
Brown (2004: 328) notes that “in June 2001, one-and-a-half years before Kenya’s 
ground-breaking December 2002 elections, the Kenyan political scientist Rok Ajulu 
wrote: ‘There is ... little prospect that President Moi will give way to a replacement at 
the end of his second five-year term in 2002’.”Given the facts at the time, there 
seemed no reason to argue with this assertion at the time it was made. By the end of 
2002, however, Moi was no longer president and his protégé, Uhuru Kenyatta, had lost 
the election by over 30 points with only 31 per cent of the popular vote. Kibaki’s NARC 
also won 125 out of 210 seats in parliament to KANU’s 64. 
The margin of Kibaki’s and NARC’s victory was, at first glance, surprising. Moi had ruled 
Kenya since 1978, surviving attempted coups and maintaining his grip on power 
through a skilful manipulation of Kenya’s ethnic and regional divisions. Moi’s strategy 
to expand his network of patronage using state resources was partly made possible 
through what Branch and Cheeseman has termed the “informalisation” of the state 
(2008: 4). “Increasingly, the Presidency took on extra powers, while the checks were 
weakened. This was a deliberate strategy to maintain control and to ensure that the 
President could manoeuvre as he wished, unencumbered by external controls. This led 
to a weakening of state institutions, which were increasingly seen as serving the 
country’s elite rather than the people” (Sundet et al., 2009: 7). 
With Moi stepping down in 2002, the election represented an opportunity for Kenya to 
break with its authoritarian past and press forward with its democratisation. To do so 
meant constraining the power of its dominant elites and resisting efforts by Moi and 
his KANU colleagues to impose a successor on the country. Yet, as the above quote 
suggests, the prospects for such a turn of events seemed bleak as the campaign for the 
2002 elections began in earnest.  
Having decided to relinquish power, Moi turned his hand to king-making, appointing 
Uhuru Kenyatta, son of the late president of Kenya, as his replacement at the helm of 
KANU. Perhaps recognising that KANU’s popularity and appeal to voters was ebbing, 
Moi used this manoeuvre to reconnect with past sentiments while revitalising the 
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ruling party under new, younger leadership. Unfortunately for him and for KANU, this 
campaign never really gathered momentum.  
3.2.1.1 Polls Shaping Perceptions 
Tracking the quarterly opinion polls issued throughout 2002 illustrates this well. Early 
surveys in August 2002, gave Kenyatta a slim lead among prospective candidates (The 
Standard, 12 August 2002), but pundits were already cautioning KANU from relying too 
heavily on these early numbers: “The poll, in fact, should send alarm bells ringing in 
Mr. Kenyatta’s camp…If Mr Odinga is not the KANU nominee, a full 68 per cent of his 
supporters will not vote for whoever gets the party nomination” (Daily Nation, 13 
August 2002). 
The advice proved prophetic. Once Odinga had guided former vice president Saitoti 
and other key cabinet ministers first out of KANU and into the Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP) and then into the Rainbow Coalition in early October, “Project Uhuru” was in 
jeopardy. By October, polls were showing a landslide victory for Kibaki’s NARC, and 
Moi was being urged to reconsider his selection of Kenyatta as the KANU candidate 
(Daily Nation, 12 October 2002).  
It was not merely the poll data, however, that had turned against Kenyatta and KANU. 
This new source of information became grist to the mill of political punditry, providing 
the raw data for the creation and dissemination of the “received wisdom” of the day. 
As the chart below demonstrates, as the polls began shifting so did the collective 
opinion of political commentators, reinforcing not only the messages coming from the 
quarterly polls but also the importance of the polls themselves in driving political 
discourse. 
Table 2: Political Commentators in the Kenya 2002 Election Campaign 
2002 
Elections 
Mutahi Ngunyi  
(political scientist and columnist) 
Macharia Gaitho  
(political editor, Daily Nation) 
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2002 
Elections 
Mutahi Ngunyi  
(political scientist and columnist) 
Macharia Gaitho  
(political editor, Daily Nation) 
Pre-
August 12 
Poll 
28 July: “If Mr Kenyatta gets 
nominated as KANU's presidential 
candidate there will be no point 
fighting him…If they nominate Mr 
Kenyatta, he will be seen as a 
'legitimate' candidate.” 
9 July: “The opposition has demonstrated 
once again why it simply does not have 
what it takes to pose a real threat even 
to a rudderless KANU.” 
 
Post-
August 12 
Poll 
8 September: “What would happen if 
the Kenyatta project falls down on the 
face or if something were to happen 
to Mr Kenyatta? Who would be the 
beneficiary? I submit that after the 
Rainbow exodus, the beneficiary 
would be Mr Mudavadi.” 
17 September: “Mr Kibaki would 
obviously be the strongest candidate 
amongst the Big Three… But only for 
those caught up in old-fashioned 
thinking. A recent opinion poll which 
placed KANU's Uhuru Kenyatta ahead of 
all opposition challengers was quite 
revealing.” 
Post-
October 
11 Poll 
27 October: “But Mr Kenyatta is 
caught in a tricky situation. On the 
one hand, he needs the state 
machinery to win the election, and as 
a result he has to stick with the 
President. On the other hand, he 
realises that President Moi is likely to 
be a liability to his campaign. This is 
so because to most Kenyans, voting 
Uhuru Kenyatta is voting for Moi. And 
the president has told us as much. As 
the opposition wave peaks, Mr 
Kenyatta should get pragmatic. He 
needs to take charge and play hard 
politics.” 
 
18 November: “The rebels bolting to the 
Opposition left Mr Kenyatta carrying the 
ticket of a severely weakened ruling 
party that, for the first time since 
Independence nearly 40 years ago, is in 
real danger of losing its hold on power. 
 The Opposition, by contrast, is energised 
and united like never before, and is in a 
position where victory seems almost 
certain. How Mr Kenyatta makes use of 
the resources KANU can command, 
including the ability to blatantly steal the 
election, will determine whether he will 
be Kenya's third president.” 
Post-
December 
9 Poll 
“KANU should stop whining about the 
IRI opinion poll. They should, in fact, 
thank the Washington-based 
organisation for providing them with 
the worst-case scenario. If the poll is 
right, it will have at least forewarned 
them! 
Mr Kenyatta …should counter the 
effects of the IRI poll. If he does not 
do it, people will begin to perceive Mr 
Kibaki as the forerunner in this 
election. And since people like to 
associate with winners, some of Mr 
Kenyatta's supporters are likely to 
find Mr Kibaki attractive.” 
22 December “KANU had absolutely no 
quarrel only a few months ago when the 
very same pollsters released a survey 
which showed Mr Kenyatta winning the 
presidency. A lot, of course, changed 
since then, and that does not include, to 
my knowledge, a change in the 
management and ownership of the 
polling firm. 
 
All indications are that the National 
Rainbow Coalition is pulled massively 
ahead and that Mr Kibaki is set to 
become Kenya's third president.” 
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The coverage and analysis of the quarterly polls reflects the process of assimilation of 
this new form of political information into the political sphere. The early polls are 
treated with caution, with the pundits hedging their bets between the ill-conceived 
“Project Uhuru” and the as yet amorphous Rainbow Coalition. The October quarterly 
poll, however, shakes them from the fence, and the onus is placed firmly on Kenyatta 
to beat back the opposition juggernaut. By December, the political media has given up 
on KANU and its chances of beating the opposition coalition, and the quarterly polls 
have clearly influenced their own positions on the campaign. 
By December, Kibaki’s lead appeared insurmountable, with opinion polls predicting he 
would win with almost 70 per cent of the vote against just over 20 per cent for 
Kenyatta (Daily Nation, 10 December 2002). Political observers warned that KANU 
ignored these numbers at its peril: “If Mr Kenyatta decides to hide his head under the 
sand, he will be like the little bird that decided to jump from the 10th floor of a city 
building. As it passed each floor with speed, the bird quipped: ‘Everything is alright!’ 
What it failed to see was the tarmac pavement waiting down there!” (Daily Nation, 15 
December 2002)  
The evidence from this section supports the notion that political opinion polling is 
shifting political discourse, opening up new sources of information that counter the 
prevailing wisdom espoused by the government or other elite interest groups. Indeed, 
this author’s review of over 15,000 newspaper articles published in Kenya between 
June 2002 and January 2003 unearthed 62 mentions of the term “opinion poll.” 
Normalised per 1000 articles, this results in 4.03 mentions per thousand a not 
insignificant number, given the relative novelty of opinion polling to Kenyan politics. 
Opinion polling therefore must have some capacity to influence elite strategies in the 
context of competitive elections. The question that remains is through what means will 
that influence be channelled. 
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3.2.1.2 Strategic Responses to Opinion Polling 
Nevertheless, in spite of the overwhelming polling data, Kibaki’s and NARC’s victory 
exceeded the predictions of many commentators, and it certainly seems to have taken 
Uhuru’s supporters by surprise. “In the end, the campaign's undoing was the 
misplaced confidence they retained that, somehow, Moi would pull a trick that would 
see Uhuru through. Even when the cause appeared lost, Uhuru's handlers were still 
exuding confidence that they remained unbeatable. They kept up the smugness even 
after a series of opinion polls showed Kibaki leading by an overwhelming margin. It was 
a lesson that Uhuru, even as he gears himself for a possible repeat run in 2007, is never 
going to forget” (The Standard, 26 January 2003). This determination to ignore the 
opinion polls highlights that while the data had penetrated deeply into the political 
media and political classes, the techniques were sufficiently unknown within the 
Kenyan political landscape that their predictions could be dismissed or downplayed at 
the highest levels. 
President Moi and the KANU hierarchy, however, seemed to accept the polling results 
as valid and reflective of public opinion having turned against them. “Unlike in 1992, 
President Moi and other senior KANU figures were willing to let their candidate go 
down to defeat” (Throup, 2003: 2). Uhuru certainly benefited from state resources 
throughout the 2002 campaign but it would seem that the amounts were much less 
than Moi enjoyed in 1992 or 1997. It also appears that Uhuru himself and his family 
provided a significant chunk of his campaign funds in the absence of financial support 
from the president and other KANU ‘big men.’ Without these resources, Uhuru’s 
campaign could not rely on the anticipated campaign of bribery, rigging, and 
intimidation. “KANU did bribe, it did rig, it did intimidate voters, but in a spasmodic, 
half-hearted manner, which merely ensured its defeat” (ibid: 1). 
That KANU would be on the end of such an election drubbing seemed a forlorn hope 
for those in the opposition in the run-up to the 2002 election campaign. The ruling 
party had become too adept at dividing its opponents, manipulating the election 
process, and outright rigging elections when necessary. Yet, in this campaign, the 
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opposition was able to unite and present a consensus candidate for the voters of 
Kenya to elect, and the victory was emphatic. 
It seems not unreasonable to argue that the emergence of opinion polling and its 
impact on the political campaign was a contributing factor in this outcome. For an 
opposition prone to disharmony, the aggregation of public opinion through polling 
presented a powerful tool for overcoming their collective action problem. By force of 
numbers, the public, reluctant to openly reject the regime, could express their 
dissatisfaction privately but no less forcefully through surveys. The steady stream of 
positive poll data created a driving momentum for the opposition, making it easier to 
offset the incumbent advantages of KANU and maintain coalition unity. 
Polling here also exhibits an ability to influence the strategic calculus of elite politicians 
where the strength of public opinion is too difficult or costly to overcome. It provided 
Moi with quantitative evidence upon which to make his choice between intervention 
and acceptance. Had the numbers been closer, it may have reassured him of the 
benefit of intervening on Kenyatta’s behalf. Overturning a close to 50 per cent margin, 
however, proved too speculative and too uncertain to risk. In this case, Moi’s 
perception of the competitive landscape, as seen through these polls, persuaded him 
that pursuing a course that reduced the quality of the election would be counter-
productive. 
A further outcome exhibited by this evidence is that opinion polling becomes a means 
of managing expectations among the media, politicians, and the public. Rather than 
viewing election-day in isolation, the political class use polling data to devise strategies 
for interpreting and reacting to electoral outcomes. This creates a further buffer 
against shock results where election numbers do not closely match the perceptions of 
various political actors. Ideally, this foreknowledge mitigates the likelihood of 
“spontaneous” violence accompanying election announcements. 
Indeed, the institutionalisation of violence as a viable election strategy is one of less 
salubrious sides to Kenyan politics campaigns. Although prevalent throughout Kenya’s 
history, it really came to the fore under Moi in the newly democratised regime on the 
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1990s. Reports on elections held in early days of Kenya’s democratic transition 
implicated high ranking political figures in organising and employing vigilante gangs to 
intimidate potential voters in opposition areas. These gangs used violence to displace 
people from their home regions, essentially preventing opposition supporters from 
voting (Akiwumi report, 1999). In this period, violence became a means of securing 
political power and winning elections. 
While it cannot be directly linked to the impact of opinion polling, the 2002 elections 
were noteworthy for their relative lack of systemic violence. Both of the previous 
elections had featured targeted attacks on members of ethnic groups that generally 
supported the opposition. “Between 1991 and 2001, the so-called clashes killed 
thousands of Kenyans and displaced hundreds of thousands more. It was widely feared 
that similar attacks would occur in 2002. This threat, however, failed to materialise” 
(Brown, 2004: 332). Though clearly effective in disenfranchising certain constituencies, 
NARC’s lead over KANU in the opinion polls was too large to be overcome by violence 
alone. Electoral violence also likely did not feature in 2002 because, in the past it had 
involved attacks of Kalenjin on Kikuyu settlements in their areas (as there were Kikuyu 
opposition candidates) but in 2002 both presidential candidates were Kikuyu (Ibid). 
3.2.1.4 Implications for Research 
The 2002 Kenyan election signals an intriguing trend in the way in which the political 
elite engage with political opinion polling. When it is first introduced into electoral 
politics, its novelty appears to disrupt existing elite strategies. While the media and 
opposition elements press their advantage in terms of new information, the old guard 
clings all the more fervently to their pre-conceived notions of electoral politics and to 
their time-honoured strategies, until it is too late to adapt successfully. In an era prior 
to polling, Moi and his team could have relied upon their election machine to build 
support around Uhuru and downplay Kibaki’s chances for victory. In the absence of 
independent evidence to the contrary, the voice of the President and the state 
apparatus would have been more greatly valued than that of Kibaki’s campaign. 
Opinion polling removed this window and set new terms for the electoral contest, 
ultimately creating an impossible task for Moi to achieve. The popular expectation was 
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now clearly set on a Kibaki win, and the effort necessary to overturn that perception 
was either unfeasible or unappealing. 
This apparent success argues strongly for opinion polling’s ability to contribute to more 
transparent and representative elections. In the context of this thesis’s hypotheses, it 
makes a strong case for the theory that polling’s ability to mobilise popular sentiment 
against Uhuru was essentially a collective action movement, forcing Moi to accept an 
outcome he would not normally have been willing to accept. There is also a case to be 
made for the centrality of elite perceptions here. Moi had ridden against popular 
sentiment before as president. What differed here was that Moi (and the general 
public) was able to perceive clearly Kibaki’s insurmountable lead and made a strategic 
decision to renege on any attempts to restrict or manipulate the electoral process. 
3.2.2 The 2005 Referendum and Inter-election Manoeuvring 
Getting rid of Moi and KANU, however, did not mean that Kenya was rid of its elite old 
guard. On the contrary, Kibaki was an old political hand, and when faced with the 
prospect of reforming the constitution to the detriment of his own political position, 
he unsurprisingly demurred. Again, it would take a chorus of popular protest to 
constrain this anti-democratic behaviour, and again opinion polling featured strongly in 
the debate. 
The advent of opinion polling meant that the 2007 presidential campaign effectively 
kicked off within months of NARC’s victory in the 2002 elections. Polls which rated 
popular opinion of government performance held the spectre of impending electoral 
defeat over the heads of incumbent politicians. In September 2003, the Daily Nation 
warned the government it should learn from the results of on-going polling, citing 
opinion polling as “a reliable guide of what Kenyans think, what they want and how 
they are likely to vote” (Daily Nation, 15 September 2003). 
In 2005, Kenyans voted in a referendum to decide whether or not to adopt a new 
Constitution. Constitutional reform had been an issue for opposition groups even prior 
to the 2002 elections, but it had been put aside in order to tackle the primary objective 
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of unseating Moi. Nevertheless as part of a pre-election agreement among the leaders 
within NARC, a proposed new constitution was proposed that would dilute the power 
of the presidency by creating a position of prime minister with executive powers. Raila 
Odinga, one of the major political figures in NARC, was put forward as the leading 
contender for this new position. Throughout the drafting, disagreements within the 
coalition delayed the process (Dagne, 2008). 
Ultimately, President Kibaki and his supporters forced through a draft that maintained 
the strong executive role of the President, angering many both in and out of 
government who had long campaigned for a more restricted presidential role. It was 
seen as an attempt by Kibaki to manipulate the political system to his advantage and 
to further entrench the dominance of his ethnic group, the Kikuyu. Kenya went 
through a tumultuous pre-election period with isolated confrontations between the 
proponents and opponents of the constitution. Kenyans were asked to vote their 
preference by choosing between the symbols of a banana for ‘Yes’ or an orange for 
‘No’ (Wolf and Ireri 2010).  
3.2.2.1 Polls Reifying Perceptions 
Following the excitement of the 2002 campaign and consequent optimism over 
Kenya’s political future, reality and its slow pace for change cast a decided pall over 
Kenyan public opinion in years that followed. Indeed, declining public confidence in the 
government became a prominent media theme throughout 2003 and 2004, sometimes 
without credible evidence to support it. In April 2004, The Standard reported that: 
“Public confidence in President Kibaki’s government has plummeted in the past 12 
months” (3 April 2004).  
In July of the same year, a prominent newspaper ran the headline ‘Uhuru floors Kibaki 
in popularity rating,’ claiming that, if an election were held in July 2004, Kenyatta 
would defeat Kibaki. The poll, however, was only conducted in the urban areas, where 
Kenyatta drew the majority of his support. “The reporting of urban-only polls 
consistently underestimated Kibaki’s support by missing out his strongholds, focusing 
instead on the strengths of his opponents” (Branch and Cheeseman, 2005: 333). 
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Misrepresented or not, opinion polling became a near permanent feature of the 
political landscape. Polling showed that while public confidence in the government, 
and, to a certain extent with NARC itself, was waning, Kibaki was actually maintaining 
strong personal support among the population (Daily Nation, 19 December 2004). 
Nevertheless, opposition supporters continued to tout urban polls predicting Kibaki’s 
downfall (The Standard, 19 February 2005; 11 June 2005) to refute national polls 
demonstrating a clear, though shrinking, Kibaki lead (Daily Nation, 24 July 2005). 
A falling out between Kibaki and prominent Luo politician Raila Odinga over 
constitutional reform shaped Kenyan politics following the 2002 elections, culminating 
in the 2005 referendum campaign. Opinion polling, now quite entrenched in the 
political media, featured prominently as the competing sides pressed their respective 
cases for and against the constitution to the voters. As in 2002, opinion polling showed 
a consistent pattern, with the Orange “No” campaign regularly leading in the polls. 
Opinion polls that emerged during the campaign faced criticism from both sides with 
each deriding the results as ‘doctored’ (The Standard, 23 October 2005). The Banana 
camp argued that its support was on the rise, citing gains in polling numbers while 
rejecting the actual results of the poll itself (The Standard, 22 October 2005). The 
Orange side claimed that their numbers were artificially deflated to hide the 
magnitude of its lead (The Standard, 22 October 2005). 
These polls revealed how divided Kenya had become along regional and ethnic lines 
over the constitutional issue. The Banana campaign’s strongest presence lay in the 
Kikuyu heartland of Central province and some areas of the Rift Valley, while the 
Orange campaign held sway in every other region, sometimes by a wide margin. The 
results also showed a pronounced urban–rural divide, with support for the 
“Yes/Banana” side coming overwhelming from the countryside and support for 
“Orange/No” dominant in the cities. While in the end, the gap was too vast to 
overcome, the campaign served as an important preface to the main event in the 2007 
presidential elections.  
Two opinion polls were conducted in October and November 2005 before the 
referendum, with the last one done just four days before. These predicted that the 
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draft constitution would win only 43 per cent support. Unsurprisingly, these poll 
results were dismissed by the proponents of the draft constitution. The final outcome 
of the actual referendum, however, proved the polling accurate, as 43 per cent voted 
in support of the proposed constitution with 57 per cent against. The opinion poll had 
predicted the official results from the Electoral Commission of Kenya precisely (Wolf 
and Ireri 2010). 
2005 witnessed the further development and institutionalisation of public opinion 
polling into Kenyan electoral politics. From over 14173 newspaper articles published in 
Kenya between May 2005 and December 2005 there were 63 mentions of the term 
“opinion poll.” Normalised per 1000 articles, this results in 4.45 mentions per 
thousand. That the prevalence did not recede in spite of the relative lack of 
competition in the referendum points to the growth of interest in polling. This further 
saturation was accompanied by a growing acceptance and understanding of the 
concept of public opinion research among the political elite. This trend cuts two ways 
in relation to the theories posited in this thesis. On the one hand, a better grasp of 
opinion polling by elites undercuts its ability to mobilise new opinion. Rather, polling 
merely surfaces political realities and, certainly in the case of Kenya, political battles 
that may have previously gone unseen by the general public. At the same time, the 
nature of polling allows political elites to quantify differences and to map support in a 
more systematic way, opening the door for a refinement of old strategies and the 
introduction of new ones. 
3.2.2.2 Strategic Responses to Opinion Polling 
Contrary to Moi’s capitulation in the face of popular opposition, however, the opinion 
polls in this instance stirred Kibaki and his supporters into action. Unfortunately, rather 
than pursuing open political competition, Kibaki harkened back to the days of 
authoritarian governance in his tactics. “President Kibaki seems to have adopted 
retired President Moi’s style in handling the political storm created by the 
referendum…With the referendum campaigns in top gear, and the Banana side trailing 
according to an opinion poll, the President has been smoked out of his privacy” (The 
Standard, 23 October 2005).  
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This coincided with government ministers publicly announcing that “the Government 
would use all its resources to carry the day” (The Standard, 23 September 2005). These 
assertions raised concerns that the government would not be beyond using illicit 
tactics to ensure that the constitution passed in November. These fears escalated as 
the polling day approached and discussions centred on the use of opinion polling data 
to target potential swing provinces. Both sides had commissioned independent polls to 
assess their regional support, with the Orange campaign fearing that this was a 
precursor to targeted rigging and intimidation (The Standard, 20 November 2005).  
Ultimately, the Banana camp conceded defeat early, vowing reconciliation between 
the opposing camps following such a bruising campaign. It was a devastating defeat for 
Kibaki and his team, and one that would usually occasion a collapse of government or 
other such repercussions. The aftermath of the referendum defeat, however, proved 
deceptively peaceful. This, for some, “falsely created the impression that Kenya had a 
stable and democratic political culture” and “hardened feeling and greatly weakened 
the legitimacy of the Kibaki regime from 2006 onwards” (Kanyinga et al., 2010: 11-12). 
The opposition, in particular, appear to have placed great credence on the data 
emerging from political polling. Branch and Cheeseman found that: “While politicians 
have been slower to embrace the potential of opinion polling than journalists, they are 
now beginning to do so, but rely principally on the misinformed findings reported in 
the media” (2005: 335). Indeed, the credibility gap in media reports on polling played a 
leading role in the leadership struggles that characterised Kenyan opposition politics 
through 2005-2007. On the one hand, there was Kalonzo Musyoka, Environment 
Minister in the government, who from early 2005 began to emerge as the popular 
choice among potential opposition candidates according to the polls (The Standard, 10 
April 2005). On the other, there was Raila Odinga, widely regarded as the kingmaker of 
Kenyan politics, who had fallen back on the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) following 
his rupture with Kibaki over the constitutional process.  
In polls, Odinga barely registered as a viable presidential candidate in his own right, 
but his refusal to back Musyoka, in spite of his high poll ratings, prevented Musyoka 
from becoming the consensus candidate for the LDP (Daily Nation, 19 June 2005). 
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Rumours began to abound that Odinga was no longer satisfied with the potential 
prime minister’s post and was seeking to position himself for a presidential run (The 
Standard, 12 June 2005). Following the successful battle against the draft constitution, 
Odinga officially declared his candidacy, again in spite of opinion polls regularly listing 
Musyoka as the most popular politician (Daily Nation, 8 January 2006).  
An analysis of the editorials of two key political commentators during this period 
reveals the extent to which political opinion polling was pervading political discourse, 
while not yet driving elite decision-making. At the time of Odinga’s declared candidacy, 
the reaction appears ambivalent in the press. Popular perceptions deem Odinga to be 
unelectable, a notion supported by his low opinion ratings, and yet, pundits are less 
than convinced of Musyoka’s ability to maintain his predominant position.  
Table 3: Political Commentators in the Kenya Inter-Election Period 
2005-2006 
Campaign Coverage 
Mutuma Mathiu,  
Daily Nation columnist 
Macharia Gaitho,  
Daily Nation editor 
January 2006, 
following 
December 
quarterly poll 
 
Kalonzo – 35% 
Kibaki – 26% 
Uhuru – 17% 
“I don't know when it became a 
political truism that Mr Odinga 
couldn't win a straight 
presidential contest. But 
politicians and bar-room 
analysts have hitherto assumed 
that Mr Odinga's best route to 
power is through proxy. Mr 
Musyoka has been watching the 
opinion polls with rising 
confidence.” 
“For Mr Musyoka, there was the 
recent Steadman opinion poll where 
he was rated the most popular 
politician at present. The conventional 
wisdom is that the Steadman opinion 
poll flattered Mr Musyoka. The fact of 
the matter is that Mr Odinga must be 
acutely aware of the supreme 
importance Mr Musyoka attaches to 
his support.” 
July-August, 
following July 
quarterly poll 
 
Kibaki – 30% 
Kalonzo – 27% 
Raila – 14% 
Uhuru – 13% 
Ruto – 5% 
“As usual, the political pieces 
are arranging themselves on the 
board in a most opportune and 
advantageous fashion for Mr 
Kibaki. And, perhaps for the first 
time in his presidency, he is 
looking good politically, a 
situation which is probably too 
good to last.” 
“It is becoming increasingly clear that 
there is an on-going evolution of the 
Kenyan political party scene. The 
formation of Narc Kenya, and now 
ODM Kenya, sees the emergence of 
two formidable political machines. All 
other parties might slowly become 
redundant.” 
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October 2006 
 
Kibaki – 41% 
Kalonzo – 20% 
Raila – 13% 
Uhuru – 5% 
Ruto – 3% 
“As a united force, ODM has the 
potential to play a big role in 
politics, perhaps even win next 
year's election. As scattered bits 
and pieces, each representing a 
Bantustan, they are all 
finished.” 
“If ODM sticks together, not all the 
candidates will be in the running, and 
there is a possibility that they will all 
throw their support behind one of 
their own. It could be assumed that 
once ODM settles on a single 
candidate and that vote rallies behind 
him, then the picture could 
dramatically change.” 
December 2006 
 
Kibaki – 42% 
Kalonzo – 20% 
Raila – 14% 
Uhuru – 5% 
Ruto – 3% 
“Today, Mr Odinga is leading a 
strong force to liberate us from 
Mr Kibaki. The force includes Mr 
Musyoka, Mr Kenyatta and Mr 
Ruto and has unsuccessfully 
tried to enlist Mr Moi's support 
in the process. Mr Moi, it would 
appear, may have chosen to 
stand with President Kibaki, the 
man who liberated us from 
him.” 
“We enter the election year with a lot 
of political uncertainties. President 
Kibaki, it is clear, will be going for a 
second and final five-year term. But it 
is not clear even at this late stage on 
which ticket he will be standing. On 
the opposition side, ODM-Kenya, 
another loose coalition very much in 
the Narc mould, has positioned itself 
as the main challenger for the reins of 
power. It faces the task of choosing a 
flag bearer without the losers walking 
away in a huff along with their 
supporters to look for alternative 
tickets.” 
At least at this stage, political polling in Kenya is not seen as robust enough to prevent 
Odinga from declaring his candidacy in the face of consistently low polling data. 
Indeed, instead it points to a belief among the political elite that polls can be shifted, 
that the numbers of today need not be the numbers of tomorrow. Odinga, a 
prominent user and consumer of polls, clearly felt that the polls were not adequately 
capturing his inherent support or that through force of personality and perhaps a few 
favours, poll numbers could become more positive (Private interview, 26 April 2012). 
The strategic relevance of polling, then, remains notional and highly dependent on 
personalities and context. 
In transitional democracies, opposition parties and movements face considerable 
obstacles in mobilising popular support against the ruling government. Beyond the 
disadvantage in resources and access, they also often face inertia in those who feel 
that whatever they do the government is likely to win in the end. Public opinion polling 
goes some way to overcoming this challenge, when it can provide potential opposition 
sympathisers with credible hope that their side is capable of victory. Odinga and his 
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side used their slow but inexorable rise in the polls to generate momentum that was 
ultimately sufficient to secure a rejection of the draft. 
The success of opinion polling in so accurately predicting the outcome of the election 
convinced some that Kenya, its pollsters, and its media had “come of age.” This 
pronouncement overshadowed many obvious weaknesses both within the polling 
industry and those that disseminated and consumed the information (Private 
interview, 16 April 2012). 2005, though significant, proved something of a false dawn 
in the learning process of Kenya’s comprehension of political opinion polling. 
3.2.2.4 Implications 
Clearly, opinion polling features significantly in the 2005 referendum campaign and in 
shaping the electoral landscape for the upcoming 2007 elections. The politics of the 
referendum were played out in horse-race fashion across the front pages of the 
newspapers, enabling politicians to base their projections on publicly available 
information rather than conjecture. Again the outcome of the referendum can be said 
to provide support to two of this research’s hypothesis. The triumph of the Orange 
camp can be represented as a victory for collective action over the government, with 
polling playing a key role in aggregating disparate opinion and channelling it into the 
campaign.  
By contrast, it could also be portrayed as illustrative of the role elite perceptions play 
in the elite electoral strategies. The government, perceiving themselves to be on the 
losing end of the referendum, folded their cards early in the hopes of living to fight 
another day. Rather than persisting with a campaign they knew they could not win, 
they regrouped and prepared themselves instead for the 2007 elections, a competition 
that was ultimately far more important for them to win.  
The idea of perceptions remains important here because in spite of opinion polling’s 
growing profile in Kenyan politics the information it provided was always tinged with 
uncertainty. The proliferation of polling was not matched by a similar improvement in 
media coverage. Numbers were printed unfiltered, lumping together reputable polling 
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firms with dodgy organisations and transparent statistical techniques with shady 
survey methods. The overall effect was to undermine polling’s strength as a purveyor 
of political information, a realisation that would not become truly apparent until 2007. 
3.2.3 The 2007 Elections 
As Kenya approached the 2007 general elections, it was increasingly clear that the 
many significant promises that were left unaddressed over the previous five years had 
exacerbated the existing political polarisation. The constitution review process had 
been frustrated largely by Kibaki and his party; the anti-corruption agenda was going 
nowhere; and ethnicity continued to drive political appointments in the public sector. 
The government’s legitimacy having been weakened by the referendum result and its 
popularity declining in most of the country, Kibaki faced real uncertainty heading into 
the 2007 elections. This had important consequences, culminating eventually in the 
controversial general elections. 
When 2007 began, Kenyan politics were so fluid as to be almost unfathomable. 
President Kibaki, still personally popular, was the consensus choice of a number of 
political parties which had thus far coalesced around the name NARC-Kenya. 
Meanwhile, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), although the most popular 
political party, had neither agreed its nominee nor the process by which it would select 
its candidate. It seemed everyone thought their candidate had a chance to win. One 
commentator noted: “The opinion polls have gone to some people’s heads, so 
consensus will be difficult. It should also confound voters to thrust a candidate at them 
after all the excitement of the prospect of voting for their presidential choice” (The 
Standard, 3 February 2007). 
 ODM, united in their opposition to the constitution, proved unfit for purpose for the 
upcoming general election. Its component elements began to unravel with each side 
backing their preferred candidate (Daily Nation, 8 January 2006). Polling in March 2006 
had Musyoka maintaining his position as most popular, marginally ahead of Kibaki, but 
with Odinga beginning to move up the ranks. By mid-2006, new alliances had begun to 
take shape. The LDP was asserting itself as the most popular party with 36 per cent 
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support at the expense of the ODM, with NARC, now no longer associated with Kibaki’s 
candidacy for president, registering 24 per cent (The Standard, 22 July 2006). These 
results had the LDP pronouncing that it would contest the election independently and 
without partners, if no viable alliance could be made. This gave it a strong bargaining 
position from which to seek out allies across the political spectrum (Daily Nation, 4 
August 2006). 
These bargains ultimately resulted in the emergence of two new political entities, 
formed from the fragments of existing parties. The LDP, FORD-Kenya, and elements 
from within KANU united to reconstitute the Orange Democratic Movement under the 
name ODM-Kenya, while Kibaki and his supporters broke away from the existing NARC 
to form NARC-Kenya. By October 2006, polling showed these two entities to be 
engaged in two-horse race, notwithstanding confusion among the population over the 
‘fluidity’ of the party offerings (The Standard, 13 October 2006). 
3.2.3.1 Polling Dichotomising Perceptions 
Yet, while opinion polling seemed unable to adequately reflect the intra-elite politics 
that were driving the candidacy squabbles among the opposition, political pundits still 
viewed polling data as a suitable source of information on which to base predictions 
for the forthcoming election. While confusion over who would represent ODM-Kenya 
still persisted, for the first time, the electoral landscape was reflecting the bi-partite 
division that would characterise the highly contested election of 2007. A Steadman poll 
in October 2006 saw Kibaki’s ratings reach 41 per cent, his highest in years, but it also 
found that the combined numbers for the four presumptive ODM candidates, Kalonzo 
Musyoka (20), Raila Odinga (13), Uhuru Kenyatta (5), and William Ruto (3), also 
equated to 41 per cent as well. If the opposition stuck together, there was a chance for 
victory (Daily Nation, 16 October 2006).  
The interpretation and dissemination of this still relatively new source of information 
became a permanent fixture in political punditry throughout the 2007 election 
campaign. Indeed, the process of institutionalising polling data into political discourse 
was already well underway. Even before the respective parties had selected their 
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candidates, political commentators were able to use polling data to make assessments 
and predictions as to the likely storylines and outcomes of the election. From over 
16,400 newspaper articles published in Kenya between June 2007 and January 2008 
there were 295 mentions of the term “opinion poll.” Normalised per 1000 articles, this 
results in 17.92 mentions per thousand. This is a rapid explosion in frequency, 
propelled somewhat by the role polling was said to play in post-electoral violence, but 
given the time frame on study, this can only explain part of the meteoric rise in 
polling’s coverage in the media. 
This has several implications for the political process. On one hand, it is represents 
something of an institutional adaptation-in the sense that intra-party discussions and 
manoeuvring that would hitherto have taken place behind closed doors finds itself 
thrown open for public consumption. The actions of politicians can be seen to have 
consequences in the form of voter reactions, as captured through opinion surveys. 
Candidates can position themselves to be more in tune with voter aspirations to make 
themselves more electable in the future. At the same time, it places the nation in 
permanent campaign mode, with quarterly polls pitting prospective candidates against 
each other at a whim. Less well-known aspirants can be quashed by a run of poor 
polling data, while more powerful candidates can push through difficult times in the 
hopes of turning the polls around. An already fluid landscape has been made all the 
more uncertain and competitive by the addition of opinion polling. 
Turning again to a content analysis of key political commentators, one can track the 
rapid changes that took place in Kenyan politics over the year preceding the December 
election. The first half of the year marked the ascendancy of Raila Odinga, emerging 
from “unelectable” kingmaker to candidate in his own right. At no point, however, 
does Kibaki appear to be in any danger of losing. The political class, based on the polls, 
continue to warn of the perils of opposition coalition, but the discord within the ODM 
is repeatedly deemed to be too entrenched to allow for a repeat of 2002.  
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Table 4: Political Commentators in the Kenya 2007 Election Campaign (1) 
2007 
Campaign 
Coverage 
Gitau Warigi,  
Daily Nation columnist 
Philip Ochieng,  
Daily Nation columnist 
Macharia Gaitho,  
Daily Nation political 
editor 
February 2007 “I have been hearing 
the argument that the 
best way out of the 
ODM stalemate is to 
side-step the two 
principal combatants 
and settle for a less 
abrasive, compromise 
candidate.  
With the exception of 
one or two of the 
candidates who are 
capable of instructing 
their supporters who to 
vote for in case it is not 
them, the rest are 
unlikely to carry the 
same weight with their 
people if they lose the 
nomination contest.” 
“If, for instance, it had 
tackled the constitution 
with honesty, Narc 
might have remained 
united. There might 
have been no 
embarrassing 
referendum, no ODM-
Kenya, no demand for 
‘minimum reforms’ to 
ensure fairness in the 
next General Election. 
Raila Odinga's 
confederates would not 
now be having fun 
raising such issues as to 
whether or not Mr 
Kibaki swore to serve 
only one presidential 
term. Some claim that 
this is an 
inconsequential issue.” 
“This is the sobering 
message that the 
President has been 
receiving from some of 
his closest advisers. Part 
of the concern has been 
driven by a closer 
analysis of opinion 
polls. 
There has been a 
general feel-good factor 
in the Kibaki camp that 
he continues to enjoy 
favourable ratings over 
all his rivals. There has 
also been the sobering 
realisation that…if the 
ODM-K contenders 
come together and 
settle on a single 
candidate, the race will 
be too close to call.” 
April 2007 
 
Kibaki – 44% 
Kalonzo – 15% 
Raila – 18% 
Uhuru – 4% 
Ruto – 3% 
 “In a society where real 
issues matter so little, 
figures such as 
Steadman tosses 
around can powerfully 
sway the mass as to 
whom to vote for. That 
is why those alleged to 
score low marks can - 
rightly or wrongly - 
accuse the pollster of 
cooking up the figures 
in somebody else's 
interest.” 
 
 
“With the latest figures 
from Steadman Group, 
President Kibaki must 
be purring like a 
Cheshire cat. Mr 
Kalonzo Musyoka must 
be wondering when he 
fell off the catwalk.  
Mr Raila Odinga is 
accusing the pollster of 
denying him a tie for 
top place with President 
Kibaki. If he was running 
closer to the number 
one spot, he would 
have no problem at all 
with Steadman.” 
June 2007 
 
Kibaki – 45% 
Kalonzo – 14% 
Raila – 28% 
1 July: “Mr William Ruto 
added a new dimension 
to the saga when he 
disclosed the existence 
of a new ODM report 
 19 June: “When the 
leader of the Official 
Parliamentary 
Opposition defied Mr 
Moi and agreed to take 
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2007 
Campaign 
Coverage 
Gitau Warigi,  
Daily Nation columnist 
Philip Ochieng,  
Daily Nation columnist 
Macharia Gaitho,  
Daily Nation political 
editor 
Uhuru – 4% 
Ruto – 3% 
citing Mr Odinga, Mr 
Kalonzo Musyoka and 
Mr Ruto, as the only 
hopefuls capable of 
beating President Kibaki 
in the General Election 
if the entire Orange 
group united behind 
either.” 
Kanu to ODM, he 
seemed to have hit on a 
winning strategy. ODM 
at the time looked like a 
sure bet to send 
President Kibaki 
packing, and it seemed 
like good strategy to go 
with the winning 
horse.” 
July 2007 
 
Kibaki – 45% 
Kalonzo – 11% 
Raila – 25% 
Uhuru – 2% 
Ruto – 2% 
22 July: “Analysts view 
the [ODM nomination] 
contest as being 
between Mr Odinga, Mr 
Mudavadi and Mr 
Musyoka. But with an 
opinion polls rating Mr 
Mudavadi at only three 
per cent, the battle 
increasingly is 
narrowing down to Mr 
Odinga and Mr 
Musyoka.” 
31 July: “It seems like a 
large number of 
Kenyans are inclined 
towards President 
Kibaki having his second 
term. This is due to the 
muddle in ODM-Kenya, 
and also because over 
the last four years, the 
President's cool 
demeanour has made 
him a darling of many 
people. 
 
 
17 July: “All the polls so 
far show that the two 
[Ruto and Mudavadi] 
are relative minnows. 
ODM can take the 
Steadman polls or 
commission its own and 
use those numbers to 
weight the candidates. 
The fact of the matter is 
that the contest for the 
ODM presidential 
nomination is a two-
horse race between Mr 
Raila Odinga and Mr 
Kalonzo Musyoka, with 
the former pulling away 
and the latter going 
backwards.” 
 
Tom Wolf, a leading pollster in Kenya, has argued that “lack of familiarity that most 
public figures and their aides have with survey techniques encouraged inconsistency in 
the assessment of particular poll results, depending upon whether they produced joy 
or gloom. So, too, did the uneven capacity of media practitioners in reporting and 
interpreting them” (2009: 283). Without a monitoring mechanism to oversee polling 
practices, unfounded suspicions could easily fester. “The fact that only a handful of 
firms were engaged in such work meant a lower risk to professional reputation if any 
one of them produced results at great variance with those of the others, whatever the 
cause of such deviation” (ibid). 
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The political in-fighting was beginning to make an impact on the campaign. By April, 
Kibaki had consolidated his lead with 51 per cent support, with other candidates 
trailing far behind. For the first time, however, Odinga overtook Musyoka as the 
preferred opposition candidate (The Standard, 1 April 2007). While he only claimed 17 
per cent of the responses, this symbolic victory over his fellow prospective nominees 
proved decisive. Odinga’s strategy noticeably shifted, as he began to campaign as if he 
had already won the ODM nomination, regularly painting the election as a two-horse 
race between him and Kibaki (Daily Nation, 3 April 2007).  
Odinga’s newfound position as frontrunner became the dominant theme of the ODM 
nomination process. By July, reports of a deal struck among the candidates to clinch 
the nomination for Odinga began to make the rounds: “Mr Musyoka [was asked] to 
drop his bid in support of Mr. Odinga because opinion polls had shown that the 
Lang’ata MP was the frontrunner and for the sake of ODM-K unity” (Daily Nation, 22 
July 2007). Musyoka, having been dismissed as frontrunner in spite of his earlier high 
poll ratings, refused and broke with the party. By a quirk of logistics, Odinga and his 
supporters managed to secure the name Orange Democratic Movement, which had 
been hitherto unavailable, allowing Musyoka and his group to remain as ODM-Kenya. 
On September 1, Odinga was officially nominated as the candidate for ODM; while 
Musyoka carried the banner for ODM-K. 
While Odinga was claiming his place at the top of the opposition pyramid, successive 
months at the bottom of the opinion polling league table had taken their toll on Uhuru 
Kenyatta. As noted in the analysis above, his position among the opposition politicians 
had fallen to its nadir, and following months of the opposition candidates trailing 
Kibaki in the polls, it seemed a good time to jump ship to the “winning side.” When 
Kibaki launched his new re-election party—the Party of National Unity (PNU)—a few 
months to the elections, it came as a shock to the country that the Official Leader of 
the Opposition, KANU’s Uhuru Kenyatta, announced that he would be supporting 
Kibaki’s re-election whom he had run against in 2002 (The Standard, 14 September 
2007). Besides its unprecedented nature in normal democracies, for an official 
opposition leader to support the incumbent in an electoral contest, this move fitted 
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into the ethnicisation narrative of Kenya’s politics. Given that Kibaki and Uhuru are 
both from the Kikuyu community, and that the rest of the country had voted for each 
of them in 2002 when they were in different parties, Uhuru’s move could only be seen 
as an ethnic solidarity move (New Vision, 19 September 2007). To the rest of the 
country, it was the ultimate ‘confirmation’ that some Kikuyu elite were plotting to 
capture and monopolise power to the exclusion of other ethnic groups and that to 
them, the niceties of political party democracy did not matter much (Private interview, 
27 April 2012). 
The theories of opinion polling’s potential for influencing elite strategies and behaviour 
emphasise two key areas where polls can shift the calculus. The first is the introduction 
of ‘new’ information into controlled contexts, giving populations information they did 
not know existed, as in 2002. The other is to open up known political processes to 
greater scrutiny, elucidating that of which had hitherto been only whispered. The 
experience of 2007 certainly supports the ability of polling to do the latter, with its 
publicisation of the internal struggles within parties and coalitions and its 
‘democratisation’ of the process of candidate selection through the court of public 
opinion.  
A darker side to the politics of opinion polling also began to emerge, however, building 
upon the trend observed in the 2005 referendum. As well as setting the nation in an 
almost permanent state of political campaigning, the consolidation of opinion polling 
as a principal source of political information also brought with a hardening of popular 
preference and of popular expectation. The consistent focus on hard numbers within 
an incredibly fluid political context lent a false sense of certainty to very inconstant 
preferences. Elites began picking up on these perceptions and turning away from 
strategies that emphasise responsiveness to win new voters and moved toward more 
clientelistic strategies that could effectively guarantee the turnout of their core 
constituencies. This trend would have negative repercussions in terms of strategic 
decision-making and post-election reactions. 
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3.2.3.2 Strategic Responses to Opinion Polling 
The closeness of 2007 presidential election campaign contributed significantly to the 
tensions that surrounded the race. This competition gave increasing impetus to 
opinion polling. The industry had developed quickly since the last election, and the 
perceived animosity between the Kibaki and Odinga camps fuelled public interest and 
speculation in opinion polls, driving them to the forefront of media coverage. “These 
polls, conducted by companies including the Steadman Group, Infotrak Harris, 
Consumer Insight, and Strategic Research, were painstakingly pored over by voter and 
aspiring politicians alike” (Cheeseman, 2008: 168). 
During the campaign, a clear pattern emerged in the opinion polls, with Kibaki jumping 
out to an early lead between October 2006 and August 2007 before Odinga took over 
the leadership of ODM. Musyoka, who had been the leading opposition to Kibaki in the 
early stages, changed his mind on the validity of opinion polling when Odinga took his 
place behind Kibaki in April. Odinga then opened a wider lead in September and 
October 2007 before settling into the slim lead he help almost to the election. An 
incumbent was trailing in the opinion polls for the first time in Kenya’s history (Oucho, 
2010). 
Table 5: Polling Predictions versus Actual Results in the Kenya 2007 Election 
 Share of Votes in Presidential Election (%) 
 Kibaki (PNU) Odinga (ODM) Musyoka (ODM-K) 
Actual results 
 
45.97 
 
43.65 8.82 
Steadman 
18 December 2007 
43 45 10 
Strategic Research 
12 December 2007 
36 46 17 
Steadman 
23 November 2007 
43.3 43.6 11.4 
Strategic Research 
23 November 2007 
38.6 45.2 14 
Consumer Insight 
21 November 2007 
41.4 40.7 14.7 
Steadman 
23 October 2007 
39 50 8 
Infotrak 
21 October 2007 
31 52.2 14 
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Strategic Research 
20 October 2007 
35 51 14 
 
The opinion polls themselves became a key locus of candidate political activity. Kenyan 
politicians refused to allow polls to go unanswered in the media, lest their opponents 
get a jump on them by using the polls to garner positive coverage or to generate 
momentum for their campaigns. “Despite bullish public pronouncements, the 
campaign teams on both sides appreciated how tight the race was: increasing turnout 
by one per cent might have been enough to secure victory” (Cheeseman, 2008: 169). 
The process leading to the December 2007 general elections was generally peaceful. 
The parties campaigned across the country. A distinguishing feature of the campaign 
was the key messages. ODM had a mobilising slogan for each region, an approach that 
reflected the party’s policy on regionalism and development. On the other hand, PNU 
campaigned on the government’s success in reviving the economy and numerous 
infrastructural development projects underway across the country. But these issues 
appeared non-divisive. The campaign was generally peaceful. There were no major 
incidents of violence. Notable, however, is that both parties did not successfully 
campaign in each other’s strongholds. PNU did not get a foothold in Luo Nyanza and 
had difficulties launching campaigns in the Rift Valley Province. On the other hand, 
ODM had difficulties penetrating Central Province and the Mt Kenya region in general. 
Early figures from the Electoral Commission estimated that 60 per cent of the 
prospective electorate would hail from just three of the provinces: Rift Valley, Eastern, 
and Central. At the time, January 2007, ODM-K was polling as the most popular party 
in all but Central province, a Kibaki stronghold (Daily Nation, 18 January 2007). By 
December, the political calculus had shifted substantially as a result of newly 
registered voters and the regional affiliations of the presidential candidates. With the 
provinces of Central, Nyanza, and Eastern securely in the bag for Kibaki, Odinga, and 
Musyoka respectively, four provinces, with seven million voters between them, had 
become the deciding factor for all three principal parties. “All three candidates have 
been targeting Rift Valley, which has 3.3 million voters, Western with 1.5 million, Coast 
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with 1.1 million, and Nairobi’s 1.2 million…The three candidates have not made any 
significant trips to their strongholds” (Daily Nation, 8 December 2007). 
The twists and turns of the final months of the electoral campaign are particularly 
evident in the writings of three key political commentators. Raila Odinga’s steady rise 
in the polls over the summer months, as his campaign, accelerated prompt many to 
question whether Kibaki has the necessary mettle for a political fight with the 
charismatic leader. After months of to-ing and fro-ing over who will represent which 
party, the autumn sees the opinion polls narrowing the field down from five 
candidates to two with a serious chance to win. Significantly, even those among the 
political media who questioned the legitimacy of polls (Ochieng) cannot deny that the 
polls are correctly capturing the “vicissitudes” of Kenyan politics, as Raila surges into 
the lead. 
Table 6: Political Commentators in the Kenya 2007 Election Campaign (2) 
2007 
Campaign 
Coverage 
Gitau Warigi,  
Daily Nation columnist 
Philip Ochieng,  
Daily Nation columnist 
Macharia Gaitho,  
Daily Nation political 
editor 
August 2007 
 
 
Kibaki – 47% 
Kalonzo– 13% 
Raila – 36% 
Uhuru – 1% 
 
26 August: “President 
Kibaki, in an eerie echo 
of the 2005 referendum 
campaign, has so far left 
everything to retainers 
who are doing their own 
thing. And whereas 
ODM is working hard to 
be a tight-knit machine 
as it gears for its 
September 1 
convention, the pro-
Kibaki parties are still 
far from full throttle.” 
 4 August 2007: “There 
will be president Kibaki 
defending his seat on 
whatever ticket his 
grouping settles on after 
failing to wrestle Narc 
from Mrs Ngilu. Then 
there will be Mr Odinga 
at the head of a 
reconstituted 
opposition alliance, with 
Mrs Ngilu by his side as 
well as Mr Ruto and Mr 
Mudavadi.” 
September 
2007 
 
Kibaki – 38% 
Kalonzo– 8% 
Raila – 47% 
 
30 September: “Many 
political operatives are 
sharply critical of Kibaki 
Tena, whose activities 
seem confined to the 
boardroom rather than 
the grassroots. The 
recriminations were 
 3 September: “Even 
though President Kibaki 
has handsomely led the 
recent opinion polls, his 
ratings were roughly 
equal to the total 
combined ratings of the 
ODM candidates. Those 
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2007 
Campaign 
Coverage 
Gitau Warigi,  
Daily Nation columnist 
Philip Ochieng,  
Daily Nation columnist 
Macharia Gaitho,  
Daily Nation political 
editor 
bound to intensify with 
the latest Steadman poll 
showing Kibaki trailing 
Mr Raila Odinga by 
almost 10 percentage 
points.” 
are the votes, with the 
exception of what Mr 
Musyoka took away, 
that could now have Mr 
Odinga neck- and-neck 
with President Kibaki.” 
October 2007 
 
Kibaki – 37% 
Kalonzo– 8% 
Raila – 53% 
14 October: “In the 
heightened political 
campaigns, President 
Kibaki has campaigned 
intensively in the Rift 
Valley province, thrice 
in as many weeks, a 
twin pointer to the new 
style of vote-hunting 
that he has adopted, 
and the importance his 
campaign strategy 
places on that region's 
votes. 
With Western Province 
and the lion's share of 
Nyanza looking virtually 
lost to ODM, it is 
increasingly becoming 
apparent that President 
Kibaki's most crucial 
stand is going to be in 
the Rift Valley.” 
21 October: “Just a few 
weeks to the General 
Election, nothing can be 
more ‘newsworthy’ 
than Steadman's polling 
figures. A commercial 
newspaper ignores 
these figures only at its 
own peril. 
Yet, if you gave any 
analytical thought to 
Steadman's present 
statistics, Mr Odinga's 
lead might not surprise 
you…two months ago, 
Mr Odinga became the 
sole ODM presidential 
banner-carrier, in the 
same process, bagging 
all the popularity votes 
that once belonged 
severally to [his 
competitors].” 
 
9 October: “I spent the 
weekend in President 
Kibaki's backyard. And 
what I found was 
completely different 
from the confident 
swagger in everyone 
just a month ago when 
the issue of a second 
term was raised. The 
confidence is gone. The 
realisation that 
President Kibaki can 
actually lose to Mr Raila 
Odinga is hitting home. 
Many people are 
coming to think the 
unthinkable; that the 
President can actually 
be voted out of office. 
Right now, it looks like 
the election is Mr 
Odinga's to lose. He is 
ahead in every opinion 
poll and would seem to 
be gaining ground with 
every passing day.” 
 
Party activists on both sides needed their strongholds to turn out in big numbers to 
ensure victory. “This involved forming local ‘cells’, each given responsibility for a small 
number of polling stations. Party agents took a systematic approach to identifying and 
targeting marginal, undecided, and infirm voters to make sure that they made it to the 
polling stations. Voter mobilisation was also sometimes coercive. In Central Province 
and Nyanza voters were informed that they would be denied access to shops and 
transport if they could not show their ‘inky finger’ as proof that they had voted” 
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(Cheeseman, 2008: 169). Candidates backed up these moves at consolidation by 
spending their final weeks of the campaign trail for ‘mop-up’ exercises, visiting solid 
constituencies in effort to ensure that people did not fall complacent and fail to vote. 
As Odinga declared, “We are entering the climax of the campaigns and we are leaving 
no margin for error. We see victory in sight but you must come out with your vote” 
(The Standard, 19 December 2007). 
This emphasis on base turnout becomes a permanent feature of Kenyan electoral 
politics and greatly undermines opinion polling’s ability to contribute to more 
responsive campaign strategies. Far from democratising, polling almost becomes an 
instrument of coercion, used in tandem with electoral base-maximising strategies to 
elicit the largest turnout for a particular candidate. Indeed, in the absence of 
significant ideological differences between the candidates, this is the default electoral 
strategy and one for which opinion polling can be especially useful. 
The evidence from the December articles, written in the aftermath of the election, is 
clear. The polls, while narrowing into the final days, have convinced the best part of 
the Kenyan media that Odinga and ODM are headed for an easy victory. ODM and its 
supporters were equally convinced. While Kibaki and his backers would have held out 
hope for victory, it is sufficiently clear that his team were preparing themselves for 
defeat in the weeks leading up to the election. That opinion polling, still only a nascent 
industry within the country could exert such power upon the political elite, political 
and media alike speaks significantly to the process of institutionalisation that had 
occurred in Kenya from 2002 to 2007.  
Table 7: Political Commentators in the Kenya 2007 Election Campaign (3) 
2007 
Campaign 
Coverage 
Gitau Warigi,  
Daily Nation columnist 
Macharia Gaitho,  
Daily Nation political editor 
December 
2007 
 
Kibaki – 43% 
Kalonzo– 10% 
30 December: “One thing was clear 
all along: ODM was headed for a 
massive sweep of parliamentary 
seats, perhaps even more than 
Narc did in 2002. The party might 
30 December: “On Friday, a day after 
the elections, the Odinga camp was 
upbeat and ready to declare victory, 
even asking President Kibaki to 
concede defeat and start making 
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2007 
Campaign 
Coverage 
Gitau Warigi,  
Daily Nation columnist 
Macharia Gaitho,  
Daily Nation political editor 
Raila – 45% also win the Presidency. 
ODM will almost rival KANU in the 
latter's heyday in terms of strength. 
I have a feeling all those giants who 
were felled are privately very 
resentful of President Kibaki and his 
inarticulate conduct of politics.” 
arrangements for a handover. By 
contrast, President Kibaki's troops 
seemed to have surrendered and 
accepted the inevitability of defeat. 
By late on Friday night, however, the 
tide had started changing. As 
presidential results from pro-Kibaki 
regions started coming in, the gap 
started closing swiftly, and a shocked 
opposition began to realise that 
preparations for a triumphant entry 
into State House might have to be 
put on hold.” 
 
That opinion polling as a process had established itself within Kenyan politics in clear, 
but the outcomes of that institutionalisation are less so. Throughout the campaign 
period, the above discussion has demonstrated points at which political elites have 
altered course or been otherwise influenced by the emergence of opinion polling data. 
There are also clear examples, Odinga’s candidacy for instance, where the political 
elite have been able to work against the grain of popular opinion with a mind toward 
influencing it in their favour (Private interview, 17 May 2013). This argues strongly for 
the addition of perceptions into any analysis of opinion polling in the context of sub-
Saharan African politics. Polls in these contexts are not an exact science and the nature 
of politics in Kenya makes articulating definitive statements as to the competitive 
landscape nigh on impossible. 
Indeed this idea of perceptions guiding strategic action comes to the fore in the light of 
the post-election violence which swept Kenya. On the face of it, opinion polling should 
provide sufficient evidence to create credible expectations that avoid the spontaneous 
violence associated with accusations of fraud, rigging, and other election manipulation. 
In the case of Kenya in 2007, however, the opposite appears to be true. Odinga and 
the ODM had held such a commanding lead for the several months leading up to the 
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elections that popular opinion and, as shown above, even received wisdom among 
political pundits was that they were coasting to an easy victory.  
What these collective perceptions did not pick up was the narrowing of that lead that 
occurred in the weeks immediately preceding the election, which to the minds of 
statistical pollsters indicated more or less a dead heat. Having built themselves up for 
victory, the suddenness of their defeat was too difficult to swallow, and violence, so 
often associated with Kenyan elections in the past, became the only recourse for that 
frustration and anger. This prolonged, sectarian violence became the defining feature 
of the 2007 election. 
On 17 April 2008, the international community witnessed the swearing in of a new 
Kenyan cabinet and Prime Minister, as part of a negotiated power-sharing agreement 
between the incumbent President Kibaki and his principal opposition Raila Odinga. It 
was an ‘elite bargain’ which brought a close to almost four months of devastating 
violence that had racked Kenya since the disputed presidential elections held at the 
end of December. In a few short months, Kenya’s democratic credentials had sustained 
a severe blow and destabilised an entire region, including countries once thought to be 
relatively secure. Amid the accusations and recriminations that followed the events of 
early 2008, opinion polling emerged as a frequent scapegoat for those seeking 
catalysts for the violence. 
In spite of the disputed presidential vote count, the Electoral Commission of Kenya 
(ECK) announced the incumbent, President Mwai Kibaki of PNU, as the winner 
(Kanyinga, 2009). Raila Odinga’s immediate reaction was to reject the election results. 
He accused the ruling party of fraud and called for a vote recount. Odinga also rejected 
advice by the incumbent and countries like the U.S. that “those alleging vote 
tampering may pursue legal remedies” (The Standard, 30 December 2007). He 
maintained that the election dispute was not a legal matter but a political conflict that 
required a political solution. 
Odinga’s ODM declared that it would not go to court over the results because it had no 
confidence in Kenya’s judicial system, an institution that had failed to resolve past 
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political disputes and was said to be controlled by Kibaki loyalists (Harneit- Sievers and 
Peters 2008). After Mwai Kibaki was hurriedly sworn in, the ODM called on its 
supporters to hold protest rallies as a way of forcing Kibaki to concede defeat and 
accept that the election was rigged in his favour. While the rallies were meant to be 
peaceful, violence erupted in at least five of the country’s eight provinces. 
The uprising morphed into an ethnic conflict in a period of about two days. Over 
500,000 Kikuyu were displaced from their homes in Rift Valley, Western and Nyanza 
provinces. Displacement of thousands of other ethnic groups in Kikuyu dominated 
areas also followed as the conflict escalated. By the end of it, no less than 350,000 
Kenyans had been internally displaced and over 1,100 had died (ICG, 2008). 
Many prominent polls having declared Odinga the likely winner, coupled with an 
extremely close official result was deemed sufficient evidence for the opposition to 
reject Kibaki’s election on the grounds of fraud. “Significantly, while polls conducted by 
Steadman and Consumer Insight matched many observers’ assessment that the 
election was too close to call, polls by Strategic Research and Infotrak Harris using 
smaller and more tightly clustered samples consistently gave Odinga a sizeable 
majority. These misleading polls contributed to the disappointment and outrage in 
pro-Odinga areas at the declaration of a Kibaki victory” (Cheeseman, 2008: 169).  
For instance, in the Saturday Standard (October 13, 2007:2) it was reported of the 
Steadman opinion poll, “on the negative score, 68 per cent of voters in Central 
province would never vote for Raila, while only 43 per cent of voters in Nyanza would 
not vote for Kibaki.” Given that it was widely known that Central Province was the 
Kikuyu home base and Nyanza the Luo’s, the reporting of such numbers served only to 
fuel existing rivalries that were better left alone. Indeed, it is not surprising that the 
two communities would ultimately target each other in the ensuing post-election 
violence. 
Moreover, the last Steadman poll before the election gave a provincial breakdown of 
how voters might vote (see below). The poll demonstrated the relative strength each 
candidate had in his respective home constituencies with Kibaki predicted to receive 
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91 per cent of the vote in Central and Odinga 83 per cent in Nyanza. It also points to 
some obvious anomalies which fall outside of usual margins of error.  
Table 8: Polling Predictions versus Actual Results in Kenya 2007 Election 
 Steadman Predictions Actual Results 
 Kibaki (PNU) Odinga (ODM) Kibaki (PNU) Odinga (ODM) 
Nairobi 40 47 47.4 43.6 
Coast 31 57 32.8 58.8 
North eastern 42 48 50.4 47.4 
Eastern 48 7 52.2 5.2 
Central 90 8 96.4 1.8 
Rift Valley 37 61 35.7 61.7 
Western 26 68 32.5 66.6 
Nyanza 15 83 16.8 81.7 
 
While Odinga’s numbers, in most provinces, are in line with or slightly down on the 
Steadman estimations, Kibaki’s numbers are almost uniformly higher, and in some 
cases significantly higher. Kibaki polls 7 points higher in the important battleground of 
Nairobi, as well as eight and six points higher in Northeastern and Western provinces 
respectively. It is these salient differences which raise the spectre of rigging and 
electoral malfeasance (Long, 2010). Without the polls, many have argued, there would 
have been no expectation of victory from the opposition, and they would have 
accepted their defeat more willingly. 
The availability of public opinion data in this instance clearly contributed to the 
outbreaks of violence that followed the election result. This finding adds further 
credence to the hypothesis that opinion polling influences elite strategies and the 
quality of elections through elite perceptions of political competition. Perceptions of a 
Raila victory stolen by Kibaki supporters within the electoral institutions precipitated 
elite strategies that emphasised violence over judicial arbitration. But this outcome 
was not based entirely on these perceptions, rather the uncertain but hyper-
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competitive atmosphere, fed by opinion polls, throughout the campaign, intersected 
with underlying ethnic orientation of Kenyan politics to create perceptions that 
precluded transparent and representative elections from occurring. Having election 
results which do not match the preceding polls does not necessitate outbreaks of 
violence it merely provides the evidence for doubt. It is up to the elites to decide how 
they act upon it. In 2007, Kenyan elites were influenced by their perceptions of the 
competitive environment to adopt negative tactics which undermined the quality of 
the election. 
3.2.3.4 Implications for Research 
Having grown in prominence over the inter-election period, opinion polls became 
inescapable in the 2007 campaign season. Their influence became too pervasive, with 
every poll released receiving widespread, if almost universally shallow, attention and 
analysis. The result was a political discourse saturated in numbers, which could vary 
substantially at times and which put into stark relief the inherent divisions within 
Kenyan society. The persistent reiteration of these ethno-regional fissures heightened 
the atmosphere of the election and exacerbated the ‘winner-take-all’ mentality that 
already pervaded Kenyan presidential politics. Strategically, the inevitability and 
rigidity of quantitative polling almost certainly contributed to over-confidence in the 
Odinga camp, which in turn influenced the expectations of their supporters.  
The strength of conviction of these supporters was such, buttressed by the consistent 
leads in the public polls, that it is little surprise that the expectations of Odinga’s 
supporters were artificially high. That they went unmet created a highly charged post-
election environment which needed only the slightest of provocation to ignite (Private 
interview, 16 April 2012). Here the influence of perceptions rather than collective 
action or institutional mechanisms is readily apparent. The polls were not 
systematically manipulated to create a situation of chaos. Rather a relatively 
undeveloped, yet hyper-competitive, political system had not yet achieved the 
necessary understanding of polling to accommodate the rapid influx of public opinion 
data. Elite perceptions of increasing competition led to the adoption, not of more 
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transparent and representative strategies, but rather of strategies that focused on 
ethnic mobilisation and clientelistic relationships.  
3.2.4 The 2010 Referendum 
The failure of the 2005 referendum meant that the constitutional question remained 
unresolved through the 2007 election, contributing in no small part to the intensity of 
the contest that ultimately broke out into open conflict. Among the points of 
agreement in the unity government was to provide the country with a new 
constitution before the next general elections in 2012. This process culminated in a 
referendum in 2010, where voters overwhelmingly accepted a new draft which, 
contrary to initial predictions, maintained a strong executive president, eschewing the 
idea of balancing power between a president and prime minister. Opinion polling was 
conducted throughout the process, raising the question: what influence did it have on 
the constitution that was eventually promulgated? 
Violence was eventually subdued, and the Kenya National Accord and Reconciliation 
Agreement was signed on 28 February 2008. It led to the issuing and passage into law 
of the National Accord and Reconciliation Act of 2008. The Accord has reconfigured the 
Kenyan political landscape with the establishment of a Grand Coalition Government. 
The government was to be led by two principals: the President Mwai Kibaki leading the 
PNU and the Prime Minister Raila Odinga leader of the ODM. Among its first mandates 
was to institute a process for revising the constitution. 
The existing constitution concentrated power disproportionately in the executive 
branch of government, creating what has been called an ‘imperial presidency’ (ISS 
Africa, 2010). Weaknesses in other institutions, such as parliament and the judiciary, 
meant that Kenya’s could operate unchecked, often resulting in the marginalisation of 
certain ethnic groups and regions. As the culture of impunity strengthened, prospects 
for accountability both between state institutions and between the state and its 
citizens worsened. Undoubtedly, this context contributed to the violence that marred 
the 2007 elections. Amongst the objectives of the review of the former Constitution 
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was to move toward a freer and more democratic system of government that would 
guarantee good governance, the rule of law, and human rights. 
Once announced, those supporting the draft constitution, labelling themselves ‘the 
greens,’ and those opposed to it, labelling themselves ‘the reds,’ initiated national 
campaigns to win voters over to their sides. The leaders of the two parties in the 
coalition, Kibaki and Odinga, represented the ‘Yes’ campaign, while William Ruto, a 
cabinet minister, became the leader of the ‘No’ campaign. As the referendum drew 
near, many feared that the violence that followed the 2007 elections would recur. In 
June, a bomb exploded at an opposition rally, sparking a stampede that left six dead 
and many more wounded (Daily Nation, 13 June 2010). The ethnic divisions between 
the competing sides did not go un-noticed, inciting hate-speech and threats.  
Early in the campaign, leaflets began appearing in certain areas that warned ‘outsiders’ 
to leave the area before the referendum. “In Tenderet, in the southern Rift Valley, 
leaflets dated July 5th warned the communities to prepare for war should the 'Yes' 
team win. Local vigilante groups, 'Home Boys', some of who were believed to have 
carried out the atrocities in the post-election violence in Nandi East and Tenderet, 
were thought to be operating again” (Veritas, 2010: 1). In response, three MPs, 
accused of encouraging hate speech and violence in their constituencies, were 
arrested. One of them, reportedly a government minister, was alleged to have told a 
rally of predominantly Kikuyu participants that they ‘should prepare to leave Rift Valley 
en masse’ if the constitution was passed (ISS Africa, 2010). The rhetoric echoed that of 
the leaders during the worst of the post-election violence in 2008, and it heightened 
tensions in an already apprehensive atmosphere. 
3.2.4.1 Polling Reinforcing Perceptions 
All the polls pointed to a widespread victory for the “Yes” camp, with only the Rift 
Valley and Eastern provinces siding with the “No” side (Daily Nation, 4 June 2010). 
Nevertheless, some prominent personalities in the ‘Yes’ campaign expected to lose 
their parliamentary seats if the constitution were approved in the referendum. “They 
therefore showed ambivalence about supporting the Draft Constitution, earning 
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themselves in the process the nickname, ‘watermelons’ – green on the outside and red 
on the inside” (ISS Africa, 2010: 4). 
Newspaper reports confirmed that both ODM and PNU were conducting opinion polls 
in their strongholds to gauge popular sentiments on the draft constitution, with one 
leader acknowledging that “the polls influenced the way the team conducted 
campaigns…[we] had to change tact in Central and Eastern Provinces after initial 
results showed lukewarm support for the document. We turned to leaders at the 
grassroots after discovering we could not fully rely on politicians alone in the two 
provinces" (Daily Nation, 8 August 2010). 
As the stumbling block in the previous referendum had been the concentration of 
powers within the executive branch of government, it was assumed by most observers 
that a similar obstacle would present itself during this phase. This was made all the 
more likely by the fact that Odinga was now occupying the position of prime minister 
which stood to gain significantly in power should a new, power-balancing, constitution 
be ratified. Indeed, the panel of experts came back with a draft that did just that, 
stripping the presidency of some of its duties and enshrining them in the office of the 
prime minister. It did so in the face of strong public sentiment against such an 
arrangement. The unity government’s ‘division of labour’ had proved frustratingly slow 
and cumbersome for most Kenyans, who instead expressed a preference for a return 
to a strong executive (Private interview, 21 April 2012). This preference captured 
frequently by polls conducted at the time has led some to postulate that this 
influenced the constitutional committee to change the draft before the final stage to 
reinstate the executive presidency.  
While this is possible in theory, interviews with those familiar with the process suggest 
that in actuality, the change was due to shifts in the power dynamics within the elite. 
Odinga now felt he had a realistic shot at the presidency and his cohort felt it should 
have an opportunity to exercise the same powers Kibaki currently held. Likewise, 
Uhuru and his allies also had their eyes set firmly on the ultimate prize of the 
presidency. Sharing power just wasn’t very appealing in the final calculation. 
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3.2.4.2 Strategic Responses to Opinion Polling 
Where opinion polling did play a key role was in shaping elite reactions to the final 
draft of the constitution. Among its provisions, the document included some fairly 
significant land reform and land redistribution clauses that did not play well with the 
well-moneyed elites of Central province. Uhuru Kenyatta and Kibaki were initially 
considered to be against the constitution on those grounds. Odinga and his allies 
taking a firm stance on the ‘Yes side’, however, changed the equation. Opinion polls, 
which had been relatively inconclusive early on, began to move noticeably and 
inexorably toward the Yes vote (Private interview, 21 May 2013).  
With the wounds of 2007 still very recent, for Kenyatta and Kibaki to openly campaign 
for the No side would be political suicide. Their advisors took the opinion polls at face 
value and urged them to join the ‘Yes side’ to ensure that Odinga would not hold the 
upper hand in 2012, having defeated them again in a constitutional referendum. 
Having pushed through a document that restored the presidential prize, it was critical 
that Uhuru and his allies still have a hand to play when the general election rolled 
around. As a result, Uhuru and Kibaki joined the Yes bandwagon and the constitution 
swept to victory by a significant margin (Private interview, 27 April 2012). 
Again, polling proves a powerful weapon in shaping elite strategies. This case supports 
a kind of ‘bandwagon’ effect but not among the ordinary voter but among the political 
elite, who don’t wish to see themselves on the wrong side of the vote. While such an 
effect could prove detrimental to a system in the long-term where politicians 
constantly switching sides may undermine party ideologies and platforms. In the 
context of Kenya where personality politics still predominates, this constraining of elite 
choice is likely to improve the quality of elections, with representatives forced to align 
themselves more closely to their constituencies than their own preferences (Private 
interview, 25 April 2012). Indeed, the lead for the “Yes” camp was so consistent and so 
significant that it appears that, like 2002, polling was capable of calming fears of 
election tampering or widespread violence and intimidation.  
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Table 9: Polling Predictions versus Actual Results in Kenya 2010 
Referendum 
Poll Yes No 
Steadman/Synovate 
April 24, 2010 
64 17 
Infotrak 
May 29, 2010 
63 21 
Steadman/Synovate 
June 4, 2010 
57 19 
Steadman/Synovate 
July 23, 2010 
58 17 
Final result 68.55 31.45 
 
The success of polling correctly predicting the outcome of the referendum restored 
public confidence in polling, leading one reporter to declare: “The correct prediction of 
the outcome of the referendum on draft constitution shows that opinion polling in 
Kenya has come of age” (Daily Nation, 8 August 2010). Another, writing months later, 
summed up the current thinking on opinion polling well: “Remember, politicians have 
concocted opinion polls previously with a view to swaying the public which means they 
believe in the power of opinion polling. The problem is they would want polls that tell 
them what they want to hear. Unfortunately for the politicians, opinion polling by the 
above pollsters is professional and has come of age” (Daily Nation, 2 October 2010). 
Lacking, as it did, the competitive edge of a presidential election the 2010 referendum 
provided a relatively safe opportunity for polling to earn back some credibility and 
some stature after the recriminations that followed the 2007 election aftermath. 
Polling remained as popular as ever among the media houses, focusing again on the 
horse race aspect of the referendum campaign. From over 10,800 newspaper articles 
published in Kenya between February 2010 and September 2010 there were 104 
mentions of the term “opinion poll.” Normalised per 1000 articles, this results in 9.57 
mentions per thousand, down from the previous election but still a significant number. 
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What is particular noteworthy for the purposes of this thesis’s hypotheses is the 
manner in which prominent politicians adapted their positions on the basis of public 
opinion polls. The campaign saw evidence of Kenyan politicians responding to popular 
preferences rather than seeking to drive public opinion toward their own point of 
view. Again with an eye toward the larger prize of the upcoming presidential 
campaign, the political elite perceived a greater advantage in adopting more 
responsive strategies than in attempting to restrict or manipulate public opinion. Given 
the reduced competition, this is consistent with the model that predicts opinion polling 
contributing to more transparent and representative electoral processes under 
conditions of less perceived competition. 
3.3 Conclusions 
This review has revealed an industry that reflects rather than transforms the nature of 
the political system in which it exists. Its potential for elucidating what is often a 
tremendously convoluted context is for the most part undermined by the sharp 
divisions within the Kenyan political elite. While Kenya does possess a number of 
independent, professional polling companies, the spectre of ethnic bias looms over all 
data that is presented. The media, while consistently craving the numbers that opinion 
polling generates, has done little to equip itself with the necessary capacity to 
interpret and analyse those numbers objectively. However critical politicians or 
analysts may be of the data that emerges, they are still obliged to react to it, due to 
the sheer force of popularity these numbers carry among voters. Opinion data is 
political information of high priority that, whether good or bad, must be interpreted 
and strategised around. For the Kenyan political elite, opinion polling has become 
equal parts indispensable and incensing. It is a balancing act that neither the 
politicians, the media, nor the pollsters have fully mastered.  
Opinion polls as a source of political information have clearly exploded over the course 
of the past three elections in Kenya. This can be traced using the content analysis 
presented above, capturing the number of mentions opinion polls received in major 
newspapers in the country. But for all its pervasiveness, it remains a largely 
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misunderstood science. Even two decades into the country’s experience with opinion 
polling, it is viewed as a mysterious art tinged with ethnic and political biases. Always 
mediated through a filter of hyper-competitive, ethnically-centred elite perceptions, 
public opinion polling’s ability to catalyse improvements in electoral quality will always 
be limited. 
Polling’s influence on strategy and expectations is likewise constrained by the 
character of the political system. There is first-hand evidence that political parties 
value polls for their campaign strategies, but the focus is not on attuning party 
platforms to public preferences but rather on the usefulness of polls as a means of 
identifying target areas for ‘get out the vote’ campaigns. In this, Kenyan politicians are 
not substantially different from their Western counterparts, but the consequent 
hardening of ethnic cleavages as a result of these targeted forays further exacerbates 
electoral tensions.  
Indeed, in a political system in which parties are increasingly fluid and predominantly 
personality or ethnically composed, opinion polling’s role becomes less about setting 
realistic expectations and more about reinforcing preconceived expectations, whether 
accurate or not. The impact of the introduction of a nascent and still under-developed 
public opinion research industry into a competitive and constantly shifting political 
environment appears to hinge on the perceptions of political elite driving their 
strategic responses. This confirms this thesis’s hypothesis as to the likely influence 
opinion polling has on political dynamics around elections. If anything, opinion polling 
has served merely to amplify the weaknesses in Kenya’s on-going political 
development, surfacing most acutely the underlying tensions and power struggles that 
have long characterised the political system.  
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Chapter 4. Public Opinion Polling in Ghanaian Elections 2004–
2012 
“As soon as it became clear that John Kufuor and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) had 
won the December 2004 elections, hawkers took to the streets of Accra selling 
commemorative electoral maps. With cartoon elephants positioned over 
constituencies won by the NPP and cartoon umbrellas over those won by the National 
Democratic Congress (NDC), these maps gave their readers a rough understanding of 
where the strongholds of each party lie. The pictorial representation of Ghanaian 
politics illustrated the cleavages within the system: the NPP is an Asante party and the 
NDC is an Ewe party; the NPP is a southern party and the NDC is a northern party; and 
the NPP is a city party and the NDC is a country party” (Fridy, 2007: 285). 
Political opinion polling is a growing phenomenon in Ghanaian electoral politics. 
Grounded in governance traditions that span back to pre-colonial leaders, the modern 
polling industry is nevertheless still in the early stages of development (Ansu-
Kyeremeh, 1999). Influenced principally by the sharp party dichotomy that 
characterises Ghanaian politics, opinion polling has fallen too easily for the allure of 
‘horserace’ politics, with rival media outlets driving political news as much as reporting 
on it. At the same time, the country’s political stability, especially in light of 
persistently contentious election outcomes, has provided a solid foundation for the 
growing professionalisation of opinion polling in Ghana. An industry that developed 
initially to help a ruling party maintain its grip on power has the potential to contribute 
to Ghana’s further political evolution toward a sophisticated democratic system. This 
thesis tests three hypotheses related to the way in which opinion polling influences 
elite strategies and the quality of elections. Specifically, it attempts to determine 
whether it is opinion polling’s ability to substitute for collective action, to force 
institutional adaptation, or to shape elite perceptions around electoral competition 
that determines the likelihood that elites will more toward or away from more 
transparent and representative electoral processes. 
This chapter reviews the evidence of opinion polling’s influence on Ghanaian elections 
and finds that it is generally supportive of the third hypothesis. It finds that the 
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integration of opinion polling into Ghanaian politics continues to be uneven. Even as 
first-hand evidence emerges as to the importance politicians and their campaigns 
place on opinion polling information, publicly, political strategy remains non-committal 
and decidedly partisan in nature. While polling is beginning to play in an important role 
in increasing the transparency of internal strategy of political parties, its ability to 
influence positively the quality of electoral processes in Ghana is highly compromised 
by the uncertainty of its profile and the competitively charged political atmosphere in 
which the polls are released. 
4.1 The Context of this Research 
4.1.1 Historical Context 
Formed out of the consolidation of two British-ruled territories, Ghana became the 
first decolonised country in West Africa in 1957. It had a liberal democratic 
constitution with all the requisite institutions. The outlook seemed hopeful. Within a 
decade, however, the original constitution had been scrapped, the ruling Convention 
Peoples' Party (CPP) had been declared the only legal party, and President Kwame 
Nkrumah had been granted lifelong tenure. This increasing autocracy ultimately 
triggered a military coup in 1966, with officers seizing power and ending the First 
Republic. A short-lived Second Republic followed from 1968 to 1972 before the 
military once again took control (Gyimah-Boadi, 1994). 
From 1972 to 1979, Ghana was ruled by a series of military officers, culminating in a 
military regime headed by Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings. The Rawlings government 
decided to allow the on-going process of constitutional restoration to run its course, 
including the scheduled multiparty elections, and handed over power to the duly 
elected Hilla Limann and the People's National Party on 24 September 1979 (ibid.). This 
Third Republic, however, was also short-lived, as, by the end of 1981, Rawlings and the 
military had revoked the 1979 Constitution and seized power once again.  
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4.1.2 Recent Political Context 
In the early 1990s, the global wave of democratisation reached Ghana and the 
governing military council, the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), yielded to 
pressure to return the country to constitutional rule. In 1992, multi-party presidential 
elections were held in which, the chairman of the PNDC, Jerry Rawlings, won as the 
candidate of the National Democratic Congress (NDC), a party formed by the PNDC to 
contest the election (Gyimah and Brobbey, 2012). 
4.1.2.1 Transition to Democracy 
In Ghana, it has been argued that “a combination of both domestic political resistance 
by civic groups and organisations to authoritarian rule, and calls for the promotion of 
good political governance by external bilateral and multilateral agencies and donors, 
set the stage for the transition to democratic rule” (Arthur 2010: 207). However it was 
achieved, by May 1991, the PNDC government had accepted that Ghana would return 
to civilian, multi-party, democratic rule. A new constitution was approved via 
referendum in April 1992 and the ban on political activity was abolished. In relatively 
short order, opposition political parties were forced to find candidates and develop the 
logistical capacity to be able to contest an election that was scheduled to take place in 
just six months. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the NDC, the government’s new party led by Jerry Rawlings, 
won the presidential elections with 58.4 per cent of the vote, defeating Albert Adu 
Boahen of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) who won 30.29 per cent. Candidates from 
other political parties cumulatively garnered less than 11 per cent of the vote. In the 
parliamentary elections which followed, the NPP, the main opposition party, refused 
to participate as they considered the presidential elections have been rigged in favour 
of Jerry Rawlings by the PNDC (ibid). Ghana was now a democracy, albeit an imperfect 
one. 
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4.1.2.2 Opinion Polling in Ghanaian Politics 
The concept of public opinion is not foreign to Ghanaian politics. Pre-colonial political 
leaders in Ghana, as in many indigenous African political systems, made use of certain 
mechanisms for gathering public opinion, including voice votes at village and town 
meetings and other informal gatherings (Jones-Quartey, 1963). Indeed, it could be 
argued that many of the rituals surrounding the succession of Akan chiefs required 
participatory political techniques that relied on public opinion (Ansu-Kyeremeh, 1999). 
As Jones-Quartey relates: “A chief has no opinion of his own; he can only express the 
opinion of his people, and from this it follows that he can express no view until he has 
a chance of finding out through formal discussion what his people's view is” (Jones-
Quartey, 1963: 147; quoted in Ansu-Kyeremeh, 1999: 61). Other institutions such as 
“the asafo (militia) and nkwankwaa (youth association)” have also been noted as 
potential methods for ascertaining and measuring public opinion (Ansu-Kyeremeh, 
1999).  
Modern public opinion polling, however, did not arrive until the 1960s, emerging first 
under the auspices of a military dictatorship. Ghana’s first 'scientific' opinion poll 
emerged in 1967 when the Daily Graphic newspaper reported that “an independent 
foreign firm of consultants, Jeafan Limited' was conducting an opinion poll for it on the 
'vital subject' of return to civilian rule” (ibid.: 62). The content and production of the 
poll proved extremely controversial, undermining the growth of opinion research until 
the advent of democratic elections in 1992. 
4.1.3 Ethnicity in Ghanaian Politics 
Ghana is a multi-ethnic society composed of five large ethnic groups: Akan, Mole-
Dagbani, Ewe, Ga-Dangme, and Gume (Frempong, 2001). Their relative share of the 
population is as follows: Akan, 44.1 per cent; Mole-Dagbani, 15.9 per cent; Ewe, 13 per 
cent; Ga-Dangme, 3.7 per cent; Gume, 3.5 per cent; and all other groups cumulatively 
account for 11.5 per cent. The groups share many common traits, even though 
significant variations do exist. They are also not overly concentrated geographically. 
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Thus, “while regions do show a predominance of certain tribes, none is ethnically 
homogeneous” (Oelbaum, 2004: 245). 
Since independence, ethnicity’s importance in Ghanaian politics has varied 
substantially (Arthur, 2009): at “certain times ethnic tensions have manifested 
themselves overtly, only to be followed by long periods when the importance of 
ethnicity is denied by virtually all sides” (Lintz and Nugent, 2000: 22). The current 
constitution specifically bans ethnically-based political parties, stating that “each 
political party is expected to have ‘branches in all regions of Ghana and is in addition 
organised in not less than two-thirds of the districts in each region, and the party’s 
name, emblem, colour, motto or any other symbol has no ethnic, religious or other 
sectional connotation that gives the appearance that its activities are confined only to 
a part of Ghana’” (Arthur, 2009: 51). This overt stipulation creates incentives for the 
parties to pull voters, not only from their established ethnic strongholds, but also from 
areas of the country where their support is weaker. 
Map 2 Ethnic distribution in Ghana 
 
Source: http://geocurrents.info/geopolitics/elections/ethnicity-and-political-division-in-
ghana 
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Nevertheless, scholars have argued that in spite of these legal efforts to reduce the 
role of ethnicity in politics that it is impossible to dismiss the ethnic dimension in 
Ghana’s electoral politics. As shown above, the two principal parties, the NDC and the 
NPP, are largely considered strongholds of the Ewe and Asante/Akan, respectively 
(Map 2 above). This ethnic cleavage at the party level reflects back on Ghanaian voters, 
sometimes fuelling tensions between Ewes and Asantes during election campaigns 
(Oelbaum 2004). 
4.1.4 The Media in Ghanaian Politics 
Given the emphasis placed on media in this research, some analysis is required as to 
the composition and quality of the institution in Ghana and its relationship with the 
political processes of the country. The media is facing increasing scrutiny in Ghana, 
with the general public beginning to doubt the credibility of certain news outlets. This 
growing public dissatisfaction with the performance of the media in Ghana is not lost 
on the political elite and was summed up by then Vice President of the Republic, John 
Dramani Mahama: “A cursory look at our media would seem like we are a nation at 
war. Newspapers and radio stations are lined up in the political trenches with their 
political allies or paymasters. Throwing printed and verbal grenades and taking pot 
shots at the ‘enemy lines’, each side trying to outdo each other in inflicting maximum 
damage on the perceived ‘enemies’.” (Mahama, quoted in Owusu, 2012: 12) 
Some argue that the Ghanaian press is overly dependent on the political parties for 
their sources of political information. During election periods, this significantly hinders 
their ability to act as a viable filter for their readership. Instead, political ‘spin doctors’ 
are allowed to guide the news agenda by controlling what information is disseminated 
when and by whom (Diedong, 2013). This complicates the dissemination of opinion 
polling data, as the facts are always received through the filter of party-affiliation, 
rendering the reader more or less likely to believe the results based on their own 
political preference.  
Ghana’s media is relatively diverse. There are over 135 newspapers, including two 
state-owned dailies, published in Ghana. An estimated 110 FM radio stations, 11 state-
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run, broadcast nationwide, while there are approximately 27 television stations 
currently on air. While radio remains the most popular medium for the general public, 
the print media are viewed as the media of record. Radio stations host newspaper 
discussion panels where commentators review the main headlines and discuss top 
stories for those without access to print copies. Indeed, circulation remains very low 
for newspapers and limited revenue from advertising and other sources endangers the 
survival of private media houses (Gyimah-Boadi and Brobbey 2012). 
The content analysis that informs this chapter is drawn from articles published in four 
principal newspapers and follows two parallel tracks. The first quantitative track 
reviews articles over a seven month period around elections14 to determine quantity of 
opinion polling coverage while the second qualitative tracks examines the writings of 
key political commentators across the entire period to determine shifts in perceptions 
and attitudes to opinion polling on the basis of content and tone. 
4.2 Public Opinion Polling in Ghanaian Elections 
As in previous chapters, this chapter begins with the premise that electoral politics is 
principally about elite strategies and behaviour. Therefore, for opinion polling to 
influence the quality of elections, it must first influence political elites. Using the same 
two stage approach employed in previous case studies, this chapter reviews three 
electoral periods between 2004 and 2012. It first locates public opinion polling within 
prominent news media to assess its integration within political discourse. Based on this 
analysis, the chapter proceeds to examine the various possible avenues through which 
opinion polling has influenced elite electoral strategies in Ghana, testing the validity of 
the three hypotheses. 
                                                          
 
14
Through purposive sampling, four Ghanaian daily newspapers were selected for the study. Two state-
owned newspapers, the Daily Graphic and Ghanaian Times, were selected based on their circulation and 
their prominence within elite circles. Two privately-owned papers were selected for the study, The 
Chronicle and the Daily Guide, to offer editorial balance and due to their notoriety in political coverage. 
The articles covered the period of six months before each election-day and one month after to cover the 
campaign period and the immediate aftermath of the voting. 
115 
 
 
 
The evidence from Ghana provides a useful contrast to the Kenya case study in so 
much as it demonstrates that elite strategies in competitive elections need not be 
based on violence, even where ethno-regional tensions pervade the political culture. 
At the same time, this chapter lends further credence to the model that suggests that 
the principal mediating factor for opinion polling’s influence on the quality of elections 
is elite perceptions of competition. Polling in Ghana has made key inroads into the 
political discourse as represented by news and editorial articles in the major 
newspapers in the country, with some significant outcomes emerging as a result. 
A consistent theme throughout is the ambivalent posture adopted by the political elite 
to the emergence of polling. In the case of Ghana, public references to opinion polling 
are rare, but private commissioning and interpreting of polls and their results is rife 
(Private interview, 22 May 2013). This ability to publicly discredit information that 
ultimately informs campaign strategy is not unique to sub-Saharan Africa, but it 
highlights the need for the political elite to control their messages, and most 
importantly, to understand perceptions of polls in order to formulate their electoral 
strategies.  
Table 10: Pollsters in Ghanaian politics 
Polling Organisation Elections Active Affiliation or other ties15 
Daily Dispatch 2004, 2008, 2012 Independent, although suspected of being 
partial to NDC 
Danquah Institute 2008, 2012 Linked to the NPP 
Ipsos/Synovate 2012 Independently owned, now part of 
international brand. Has been variously 
accused of favouritism but no formal links 
Policy Alert Group 2004 Short-lived pollster, possibly linked to NDC 
Primary Research 
Associates 
2008 Short-lived pollster, possibly linked to NPP 
Research 
International 
2012 Ostensibly independent pollster with alleged 
links to NPP 
Policy and Strategy 
Associates 
2008, 2012 UK-based, Ghanaian-owned pollster, accused 
of NDC bias 
                                                          
 
15
 This applies to the organisation only. It is not always possible to discern the data source or funding agent of 
individual polls released under the names of organisations or newspapers. Independent firms may be open to 
accusations of bias when they conduct and publish polls on behalf of particular parties or individuals. 
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The partisan nature of the media in Ghana complicates the role of opinion polling 
immensely. That major newspapers are openly aligned to one party or the other has an 
inevitable impact on the quality of polling commissioned by those media houses and 
also on how it is analysed and interpreted (Private interview, 23 May 2013). At the 
same time, the relatively institutionalised party structure in Ghana would be expected 
to play some role in mediating elite strategies with relation to polls. The evidence for 
this is mixed. Certainly at the presidential level, where this analysis is focused, the 
perceptions of the candidate and his team appear in most cases to trump those of the 
party, triggering electoral strategies that while conducive to short-term gains may 
contribute to a long-term decline in the transparency and representativeness of 
elections in Ghana. 
The advent of multi-party politics marks the departure point for public opinion polling 
in Ghana. The media’s desire to publish public opinion polls far outweighed the need 
for sound methodology. As a result, newspapers printed anything that resembled 
polling data, regardless of the methodology used in compiling it. In one instance, the 
polling content was so dubious that one columnist wrote sarcastically: “God has given 
him (the journalist) the talent of opinion polling, such that he can decide to opinion-
pull you down today, and opinion-pull you up the next day” (Yankah, 1996; quoted in 
Ansu-Kyeremeh, 1999: 68). 
The 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections were similarly covered with the 
media latching onto anything resembling an opinion poll (Ansu-Kyeremeh, 1999). 
Politically, however, something had changed. The NDC were the only party to employ 
polling as part of its election strategy. The significance of its contribution to their 
success is debated but there is certainly an implicit acceptance by the NDC that 
opinion polls can form part of a winning electoral strategy (ibid.). By contrast, the 
People's Convention Party (PCP) and the NPP, after uniting to form the opposition 
Great Alliance, chose to rely on more traditional techniques for selecting candidates 
and judging their popularity with voters. Ansu-Kyeremeh notes that these “consisted 
largely of symbolism—observing the number and frequency of flying flags and 
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billboards and attendance at offices, as the basis for selecting common candidates” 
(ibid.: 67). Ultimately, the NDC poll numbers proved relatively accurate in predicting 
their share of the vote in the election.  
By the time of the 2000 elections the political landscape had changed again. President 
Jerry Rawlings, the charismatic leader who had ushered in Ghana’s democratic era, had 
served the constitutional limit of two terms in office and could not compete. The 
incumbent NDC were also running against an economy that was underperforming with 
high inflation and unemployment. The NDC’s vulnerability had already been revealed 
in several by-election losses to the NPP; it was becoming increasingly clear that the 
Ghanaian electorate were looking for a change (Boafo-Arthur, 2008).  
This sentiment was supported by the evidence of opinion polls commissioned by the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which showed that 52 per cent 
preferred the NPP and their candidate Kufuor to NDC’s candidate, the sitting vice 
president John Atta Mills, who garnered only 31 per cent. Nevertheless, the lack of 
regular opinion polling still allowed room for the NDC to muddy the waters in the run-
up to the election by presenting their own poll which showed that Mills was favoured 
by 43 per cent over his opponent Kufuor’s 38 per cent. In the end, Kufuor secured an 
easy run-off victory, after winning the first round but failing to reach the 50 per cent 
threshold. It marked the first peaceful transition of power from incumbent to 
opposition in Ghana’s history (Gyimah-Boadi, 2001). It was also the point at which 
Ghana’s opinion polling industry began to transition from ad hoc survey techniques to 
more regular and more professionalised opinion research. 
4.2.1 The 2004 Elections 
The 2004 elections were considered something of a crossroads for Ghanaian politics. It 
was an opportunity for the NPP to strengthen their hold on power in the country while 
the NDC faced a tough challenge to recover lost ground. In light of its defeat in 2000, 
to many observers it appeared that the NDC was going to disintegrate into various 
factions. For the party to remain politically competitive, it had to rebrand itself away 
from the authoritarianism that had characterised the party before democratisation 
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and under Rawlings’ two terms. For its part, the NPP had to guard against 
complacency. With a strong presidential candidate at the helm, “leading members of 
the NPP had already written off the NDC before the 2004 elections” (Boafo-Arthur, 
2008: 38). What began as a long re-coronation for incumbent President Kufuor 
ultimately tightened into a much closer race, with opinion polling arguably playing a 
key role in promulgating the re-emergence of the NDC.  
4.2.1.1 Polls Shaping Perceptions 
The adoption of opinion polling in Ghana was not instantaneous. Public opinion polls 
are by their very nature a reflection of prevailing moods and judgments, and in the 
early stages of the 2004 campaign, the prospects for an NDC victory looked ominous 
indeed. Polling seemed to corroborate this general sense. In late July, one newspaper 
poll reported that at that time 49 per cent of Ghanaians would vote for President 
Kufuor while the main challenger John Atta Mills would receive less than half that or 
just 24.3 per cent of the vote. It also revealed that a sizable 18.6 per cent were 
undecided as to which of the presidential candidates to vote for (The Statesman, 27 
July 2004). 
Throughout the summer of 2004, further public opinion polls continued to emerge 
predicting a landslide victory for the NPP in the 2004 elections. As a result, the NPP 
went into the final months of the 2004 elections very confident that the NDC was all 
but beaten (Boafo-Arthur, 2008). A Lecturer at the University of Ghana, Professor 
Yankan Bediako, on the basis of an opinion survey conducted by the Institute of 
Economic Affairs (IEA) on the pre-election popularity of political parties in the country 
even went so far as to suggest that the NDC start thinking about the 2008 elections, 
since the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP) “has already won the December 2004 
elections” (The Chronicle, 10 September 2004). As the chart below demonstrates, as 
the polls began shifting so did the collective opinion of political commentators, 
reinforcing not only the messages coming from the polls but also the importance of 
the polls themselves in driving political discourse and perceptions. 
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Table 11: Political Commentators in the Ghana 2004 Election Campaign 
 Kofi Akosah-Sarpong,  
freelance political columnist 
12 October 2004 “The two main parties, NPP and NDC, are fighting not only across wide 
ideological divide (the NPP's foundation is rooted in capitalism and the 
NDC's social democracy; and both have violent past) but as voters feelers 
indicate the margin in the polls is not widening, as the NDC increasingly 
closes in, extreme negative campaign is at the center of the action. So 
come to think of the hot acrimonious climate leading into the December 7 
general elections.” 
2 December 2004 “In a measure that shows the Ghanaian/West African culture of deep 
prophetic predictions dancing confusingly with modern scientific opinion 
polls each of the main political parties, the NPP and the National 
Democratic Congress (NDC), pollsters claim their party is leading in the 
swelling opinion polls. The credibility of most of the myriad of polls is in 
doubt. In the 2000 general elections opinion polls commissioned by the 
United Nations Development Programme, 52 per cent of 5,000 
interviewed preferred candidate Kufuor to then Vice President Atta Mills 
who got 31 per cent. The contradictory nature of most of the current polls 
reflects the domination of the voter population by the youth who are 
mostly floaters with no traditionally emotional ties to the core political 
traditions of Danquah-Busia and Nkrumaist.” 
17 January 2005 “The 2004 general elections saw a surge in Ghanaian political activity 
through not only internal Ghanaian non-political groups but also those in 
the diaspora that represents the basis for an active core of support rooted 
in Ghanaian communities rather than a passive shell that coalesces on the 
December 7 general elections. 
To work out how they can win, the NDC must first work out why and how 
they lost. The NDC had broad message but the NPP were different. The 
NPP were smart, they separated the party machine from government and 
skillfully separated personalities. The NPP came into NDC areas with very 
specific targeted messages to take NDC voters away from NDC.” 
 
Yet as the campaign gathered momentum, the pendulum began to shift, and opinion 
polling became among the first media to point to a resurgence of NDC support, 
especially in their strongholds. “A random sampling of opinions plus intelligence 
permutations survey conducted by the paper in this former colonial capital shows that 
the fortunes of NDC presidential candidate, John Evans Atta Mills are changing. The 
electorate is now saying ‘adze wo fie a oye.......’ This means that majority of the 
electorate had decided to vote for their own son this time around.” (The Chronicle, 28 
September 2004). 
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On the eve of the election, both major political parties, the NPP and the NDC, took to 
the offensive, each citing polling data that pointed to a first round victory in the 
December 7 elections. In the local political parlance, both sides predicted ‘one touch’ 
victories, avoiding the need for a run-off election as had occurred in 2000. Indeed, the 
two main parties each claimed to be expecting victory with “60 per cent and above in 
the forthcoming elections” (The Chronicle, 23 November 2004). 
The evidence from this section supports the contention that political opinion polling is 
shifting political discourse and capable of shaping the perceptions of the political elite. 
This influence, however, remains strategic and not widespread. Indeed, this author’s 
review of over 7,900 newspaper articles published in Ghana between June 2004 and 
January 2005 revealed just 19 mentions of the term “opinion poll.” Normalised per 
1000 articles, this results in 2.40 mentions per thousand. This is relatively small, 
significantly less than in Kenya, but still reflective of an issue that deserves coverage in 
the prominent elite-focused news media of Accra. Opinion polling therefore must have 
some capacity to influence elite strategies in the context of competitive elections. The 
following section reviews the locus and pathways of that influence and its impact on 
the electoral quality. 
4.2.1.2 Strategic Responses to Opinion Polling 
Building on the improving opinion polling numbers, the listless NDC campaign gained 
momentum as the campaign entered September. With former president Jerry Rawlings 
throwing his full political capital behind the party, the NDC was quickly able to 
reinvigorate its support in its principal regions and constituencies. Indeed, the 
campaign of the NDC “became more ethnic-orientated” (Boafo-Arthur, 2008: 39). 
Hitherto a foregone conclusion, the race was now tinged with excitement, as the 
political media began to speculate on possible outcomes. Most importantly, the NPP 
had to increase their effort to match the surging NDC campaign as the opinion polls 
began showing that the NDC had narrowed the gap.  
A further development in the 2004 election, which would have significant 
consequences on both immediate political strategic calculations and the importance of 
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more sophisticated opinion polling, was the emergence of ‘skirt and blouse’ voting, 
where a voter votes for one party’s presidential candidate but votes for a different 
party’s parliamentary candidate. In 2004, “16 constituencies could be labelled as 
having voted ‘skirt and blouse’ where the presidential candidate obtained very high 
votes in a particular constituency but the parliamentary candidate failed to win the 
seat” (Boafo-Arthur, 2006: 47-8). This “growing political sophistication” of the 
Ghanaian voter implies that political candidates must convince their constituencies at 
an individual level, having little recourse to ride the coattails of his or her party. It also 
ushers in a kind of politics where highly specific opinion polling is far more relevant, 
both to politicians seeking election and political commentators seeking to make 
informed predictions of electoral outcomes. 
Not everyone was convinced that the preponderance of opinion polls now flooding the 
media market was a good thing. In August, Mr. David Adeenze Kanga, deputy chairman 
of the Electoral Commission (EC), advised journalists to be judicious in reporting 
opinion poll results lest they deceive the electorate. “He observed that in a situation 
where journalists put a spin to promote a particular presidential candidate or political 
party, which did not reflect the actual facts on the ground, could generate heat when 
electoral results did not favour that candidate or party. He added that the most crucial 
thing in election was the result and that if a smaller party did not accept the result of 
an election that party could go to bush and cause confusion to the whole nation” (The 
Chronicle, 5 August 2004). 
As could be expected, his words went unheeded. As the campaign wound toward its 
conclusion, the opinion polls began to come thick and fast. With less than two weeks 
to go before the election, most polls agreed that President Kufuor was on course to 
win a second term. “’If no-one wins more than 50 per cent of the vote, there will be a 
run-off but most commentators think that unlikely. He really has to do something very 
foolish or outrageous to lose. The election is his for the taking and my surveys indicate 
there will be only one round of polling,’ said Ben Ephson, the editor of the privately-
owned Dispatch newspaper, who has accurately predicted the last two elections. ‘If 
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everything goes well, the incumbent will be able to obtain 55 per cent of the vote’" 
(IRIN, 26 November 2004). 
Nevertheless, there was still time for one last ditch effort by the NDC to sway public 
opinion. A final poll from the Policy Alert Group, commissioned by the NDC, found that 
opposition candidate Atta Mills would just secure victory with 50.2 per cent of the 
votes. To the credit of the Ghanaian media, however, it was clearly remarked that: “It 
is the only poll result that has given Professor Mills an edge over the NPP’s candidate 
and incumbent President Kufuor. Earlier survey by the Daily Dispatch Research Team 
predicted a first round win for President Kufuor with between 53-55 per cent votes” 
(GhanaWeb, 6 December 2004). Kufuor won the presidential vote with 52.4 per cent 
to that of Mills with 44.6 per cent. 
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Table 12: Polling predictions versus Actual results 2004 Ghana election 
 Share of votes in presidential election (%) 
 Kufuor (NPP) Atta Mills (NDC) Mahama (PNC) Aggudey (CPP) 
Actual results 
 
52.4 
 
44.6 1.9 1 
Daily Dispatch 
November 2004 
53 – 55 37 – 39 2.5 – 3.5 1.5 – 2.5 
Primary Research 
Associates 
November 2004 
56 25 5 2 
4.2.1.4 Implications 
Following the 2004 elections, it was now clear that Ghana was a two-party state. The 
marginal parties made almost no impact on the presidential elections while the NPP 
and NDC similarly dominated the results in the parliamentary election. The 
implications for opinion polling were equally significant. As a source of political 
information, opinion polling was now achieving far wider coverage and far better 
integration into political analysis. Its ability to capture and elucidate the resurgence of 
the NDC mid-campaign also highlighted its potential for campaign strategy, both on 
the side of the leader and the chasing pack. The development of ‘skirt and blouse’ 
voting pointed to a very clear need for better information on voter aspirations and 
intentions that could be linked to constituency-specific campaign strategies. 
 All the while, opinion polling continued to battle against the entrenched conception of 
opinion polls as tools of propaganda. While the efforts of the political parties to inject 
life into their campaigns through commissioned polling did nothing to counter these 
impressions, the ability of more independent pollsters to predict accurately the final 
outcome of the race spoke well for the on-going growth and maturation of the opinion 
polling industry in Ghana. Indeed, as the hypothesis on elite perceptions would 
predict, as the opinion polls tightened in the middle of the race, the two parties moved 
toward more ethnic-identity style politics to energise support from among their core 
constituencies, raising concerns that the election would overheat. A steady stream of 
polls granting NPP the victory by a clear margin, however, took the competitive sting 
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out of the campaign. The political elite developed a consensus of expectations based 
on the polls, which was largely matched by the official result, translating into a 
relatively transparent and representative election. 
4.2.2 The 2008 Elections 
On 7 January 2009, John Evans Atta Mills of the NDC was inaugurated the new 
president of Ghana having narrowly won the 28 December 2008 runoff election with 
50.1 per cent of the vote. It was Ghana’s second such peaceful transition of power 
from incumbent party to opposition, an important milestone for the young democracy 
and one which further cemented Ghana’s reputation for political stability. The NDC 
also enjoyed success in the parliamentary elections, winning 114 of the 230 seats to 
the NPP’s 107 (Gyimah-Boadi, 2009). 
4.2.2.1 Polls Shaping Perceptions 
By 2008, political opinion polling was well entrenched in the political culture in Ghana. 
But its pattern of implementation remained somewhat random, with surveys springing 
up as and when they were commissioned rather than following a set schedule from 
which clear trends can be discerned. As a result, the polling information available 
throughout the 2008 campaign remained disjointed and partisan in composition, with 
institutions aligned with different parties alternating in their issuance of polling data.  
Among the first polls of the 2008 campaign came one under the auspices of 
Afrobarometer, conducted by the Centre for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana). 
The results immediately stirred up controversy as they put the New Patriotic Party 
ahead in the December elections. The results of the survey predicted that the NPP 
would win by 46 per cent if elections were held in March this year. The NDC garnered 
23 per cent, while the other opposition parties registered just over four per cent 
between them. 
Reaction from opposition parties was swift and incredulous: “The NDC and the CPP 
have questioned the poll. The General Secretary of the NDC, Mr. Johnson Asiedu-
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Nketia has dismissed the report ... According to him polls conducted by the NDC 
indicate that the party will win the December elections by more than 50 per cent…The 
General Secretary of the CPP, Mr. Ivor Greenstreet said he thought the NDC should 
have done better than the NPP. ‘I don’t know the basis upon which they made their 
calculation …. but if I was being entirely honest with you, I would say that from where I 
stand the figure should be the other way round. NDC should have 46 per cent and NPP 
23 per cent’” (Ghanaweb, 24 June 2008). 
In direct contradiction, the National Committee for Civic Education in Ghana released 
its own poll just six weeks later which found the race to be all but deadlocked. The 
opposition NDC was ahead of its closest rival the ruling NPP with 44.6 per cent, with 
the NPP pulling a close 44.3 per cent. Again, however, the parties were quick to 
challenge the veracity of the information. “The NDC's National Organiser, Ofosu 
Ampofo said that their own research shows that they would certainly breast the tape 
with a convincing straight victory, optimistically indicating that the NPP's one touch 
victory should be theirs, because they stand to win the race without a run off. The 
Campaign Director of the Campaign Team of Nana Akufo-Addo, Arthur Kennedy on his 
part said, NPP was not sure whether the survey was accurate, since their own study 
had proved that 27 per cent of the electorate were still undecided” (The Chronicle, 8 
August 2008). 
The exchanges continued deep into the campaign. The Danquah Institute, openly 
aligned with the NPP, released a poll in mid-November predicted a clear victory for 
Nana Akufo-Addo, the New Patriotic Party’s flag bearer, with a margin of 56 per cent 
to 33 per cent over the opposition NDC (Press release, 12 November 2008). In 
response, an NDC-aligned group released a poll four days later contending that “the 
NDC's Atta Mills enters the final month of the Election 2008 Campaign in a very 
favourable position to be elected President of the Republic of Ghana, having made 
significant inroads on formerly NPP turf, while NPP candidate Nana Akufo-Addo plays 
competitive defence. In a comprehensive survey and analyses of the polling data, the 
national average of all regional polls indicates 53.6 per cent of respondents favour the 
NDC's Atta Mills to be elected Ghana's next head of state as against 42.0 per cent that 
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favour NPP's Nana Akufo-Addo” (Policy and Strategy press release, 16 November 
2008). 
Muddying the waters still further, a government agency, Ghana’s equivalent of the FBI 
in the US, the Bureau of National Investigations (BNI), was rumoured to have 
conducted a survey which predicted a first round victory for the ruling New Patriotic 
Party (NPP) and its candidate Nana Akufo-Addo. It also predicted that the NPP would 
drop some seats, even though the party would maintain its majority in parliament (The 
Chronicle, 1 December 2008). While the leak was vigorously denied by the agency, the 
façade of authority given to the results by its association with the BNI meant the 
rumours were difficult to ignore. An analysis of the editorials of two key political 
commentators during this period reveals the extent to which political opinion polling 
was pervading political discourse. 
Table 13: Political Commentators in the Ghana 2008 Election Campaign 
 Kofi Akosah-Sarpong,  
freelance political columnist 
Ben Ephson,  
editor Daily Dispatch 
October 1 2007 “Added to the sophisticated 
campaign machine, most polls put 
Nana Akufo-Addo ahead of not only 
other NPP presidential aspirants but 
also the main opposition National 
Democratic Congress candidate, 
Prof. John Atta-Mills. In an opinion 
poll conducted by the respected 
Research International, an 
international research institute, and 
carried by the Ghanaian media, 
Nana Akufo-Addo led other three 
top presidential aspirants by 40%.” 
 
June 6, 2008  “Voter attitudes in opinions polls 
revealed an increasing tendency by 
voters towards relying on a 
Presidential candidate’s personal 
abilities, as against the person being 
the candidate of a political party. 
Opinion polls have revealed that the 
gap between the NPP and NDC has 
dwindled from 8% to 3%” 
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November 23 
2008 
 
“Opinion polls are everywhere in the 
run-up to the December 7 general 
elections. Overall, most of the polls 
point to Akufo-Addo and his NPP 
winning the December 7 presidential 
and parliamentary elections. 
The clash between the scientific and 
the 'spiritualists opinion' polls may 
explain the row between the ruling 
New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the 
main opposition National 
Democratic Party (NDC) over the 
various opinion polls that tell them 
that each will win the December 7 
elections. Scrambles everywhere but 
they reflect the real Ghana.” 
 
January 2009  “As far as August 2008, the 
newspaper’s opinion polls had a 
sense of the very high probability of 
a presidential run-off election. We 
had, in August, done an opinion poll 
in the constituencies where the CPP 
and PNC did very well, on which of 
the two main parties their 
supporters would support. The 
supporters, on the average, were 
split and based on the analysis of the 
results of the first round, we decided 
to publish an opinion poll on the 
run-off.” 
 
In the midst of this contentious exchange of contrasting information, the Ghanaian 
elite began searching for a stable source upon which to base their political analysis. By 
2008, Ben Ephson, independent pollster and newspaper editor, had emerged as the 
consensus choice, having accurately, if obscurely, predicted previous elections using 
his methodology, which, importantly, assessed parliamentary as well as presidential 
candidates. Throughout the campaign, his pronouncements came to be seen as the 
baseline against which all other opinion polls were measured, creating a credible 
source of political information for commentators across the political spectrum. This is 
not to say that Ephson was not accused of bias or alignments, but his perceived 
independence granted him greater sway than other institutions and media outlets that 
were publishing opinion polls at the time. 
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In the run-up to Election Day, Ephson predicted a presidential runoff following the 
December 7 election, estimating that the ruling New Patriotic Party would get between 
48.2 and 50.2 per cent of the vote and the opposition National Democratic Congress 
(NDC) polling between 44.7 and 46.7 per cent. His surveys also showed the 
parliamentary race tightening, with significant losses for the NPP and some gains for 
the NDC. He projected NPP with 106 definite seats (they held 128 seats going into the 
election) and NDC with 102 seats, up 8 from previously.  
With this source of detailed information established and proliferating through the 
Ghanaian press, it’s perhaps unsurprising that opinion polling in general begins to gain 
wider acceptance. As one commentator put it, “Opinion polls are increasingly serving 
as a useful guide for not only elections but for decision-makers generally. While 
Ghanaians must welcome the growth in surveys, especially for our political 
competition, we should also ensure that the pollsters respect the principles associated 
with it” (Daily Mail, 18 November 2008). This author’s review of over 6,900 newspaper 
articles published in Ghana between June 2008 and January 2008 revealed 39 
mentions of the term “opinion poll.” Normalised per 1000 articles, this results in 5.64 
mentions per thousand, almost double that of the previous election cycle. 
As in 2004, the confluence of opinion polling data in the final weeks before the 
election served more to obfuscate the political landscape than clarify it. Media analysts 
lamented that “at some moment it appears all the opinion polls coalesce, making them 
fuzzy and difficult to comprehend. Such polling behaviour may distort the politicians' 
sense of how Ghanaian voters are informed by their messages and how the politicians 
will respond to the voters' views and their will” (Modern Ghana, 23 November 2008). 
This uncertainty places a focus on the centrality of elite perceptions; the absence of 
reliable and stable information on the political campaign meant that opinion polls 
were open to interpretation by the political elite. 
4.2.2.2 Strategic Responses to Opinion Polling 
The 2008 campaigns followed familiar patterns. The leading parties campaigned 
nationally but tended to concentrate the bulk of their efforts on their respective 
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strongholds, indirectly courting ethnic votes. The NPP pinned its hopes on generating 
votes from the regions dominated by the Akan group—especially the Ashanti, Brong-
Ahafo, and Eastern regions—while the NDC systematically mobilised votes in its 
traditional centres of support, the Volta Region and the three northern regions, as well 
as in non-Akan communities in the other areas (Gyimah-Boadi, 2009). 
What differed in the 2008 cycle was the environment in which the campaigning was 
conducted. The election was highly competitive, but the parties faced few obstacles to 
their campaign strategies. Most parties had developed and publicised their manifestos, 
helping to make the elections relatively issue-based. Unexpectedly tense local disputes 
led to episodes of sporadic violence in the north of the country. Nevertheless, in the 
context of a hotly contested election, the major parties enjoyed relatively equal 
opportunities to pursue votes (ibid.) 
What also differed was the extent to which opinion polling was now driving the 
decision-making in campaign war rooms. Allegedly in July 2008, Arthur Kennedy and 
other members of the NPP Campaign Team met Professor Larry Gibson, a law 
professor from Maryland, who also did consultancy work as a political polling 
strategist. By August 2008, Gibson had analysed the data emerging from current 
opinion polls and had advised the NPP campaign that their candidate would fail to 
achieve an outright majority in the first round and that in the run-off the NDC’s Atta 
Mills would win (Daily Dispatch, 1 December 2009).  
Kennedy relates the conversation in a book he would later publish on the 2008 
campaign: 
“Larry told me he had informed Nana Akufo–Addo that he was waiting for the 
completion of a survey that would measure his favourability and disapproval ratings 
against that of Professor Mills. When the results came in, Professor Mills was slightly 
more popular than Nana Akufo-Addo. However, the NPP was more popular than the 
NDC. Reviewing the polls, he [Larry] indicated that Nana Akufo-Addo would win the 
first round but would not get an outright majority and, when pressed further, he said 
he would give the second round to Prof. Mills by a whisker. On support, he indicated 
that we were strong in Ashanti, Eastern and Brong Ahafo and nearly even in the north 
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but were not doing well at all in Volta, Central and Greater Accra. He indicated that we 
should write off the Central and Greater Accra regions. On this, virtually the entire 
group disagreed with him. We all agreed that conceding those regions would be 
tantamount to conceding defeat in the elections.” (Kennedy, 2009: 81) 
The proliferation of opinion polling led one commentator to opine that “opinion polls 
are everywhere in the run-up to the December 7 general elections. It appears all the 
political parties have certain polling organisations and spiritualists that help them 
manipulate Ghanaians' opinion to their advantage” (Modern Ghana, 23 November 
2008). Indeed, so pervasive was opinion polling in 2008 that it even allegedly led to 
bribery and corruption.  
Ben Ephson would later claim in an interview with a political officer at the US Embassy 
that the NPP, through an intermediary, Gabby Ochere-Darko, a cousin of the party's 
candidate, Akufo- Addo, had tried to bribe him with at least $20,000 to produce a poll 
favourable to them. He also claimed that the NPP was trying to get the names of 
polling agents for other parties in order to offer them $1,000 to collaborate with vote 
rigging. Over a six week period, using a very targeted approach in ten swing 
constituencies, the NPP had spent large sums of money trying to secure the 
parliamentary seats. Asked where the money was coming from, Ephson said it was 
coming out of the government's coffers, primarily from kickbacks on government-
awarded contracts (US Cable from Wikileaks, 2008). On December 7, the day of the 
first-round elections, voting was orderly and peaceful, and the results were generally 
credible. Akufo-Addo won 49.1 per cent of the vote and Mills won 47.8 per cent.  
Table 14: Polling Predictions versus Actual Results 2008 Ghana Election 
 Share of Votes in Presidential Election (%) 
 Akufo-Addo 
(NPP) 
Atta Mills 
(NDC) 
Nduom  
(CPP) 
Others 
Actual results 
 
49.13 
 
47.92 1.34 1.61 
Daily Dispatch 
November 2008 
48.2 – 50.2 44.7 – 46.7 5.3 – 7.3 1.8 
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 Share of Votes in Presidential Election (%) 
 Akufo-Addo 
(NPP) 
Atta Mills 
(NDC) 
Nduom  
(CPP) 
Others 
Primary Research 
Associates 
November 2008 
50.6 35.6 7 2.1 
Research 
International 
November 2008 
52 38 8 2 
 
By contrast, the December 28 presidential runoff — mandated by the constitution 
since no candidate had won a majority of the vote — proved far more contentious. 
Having won a plurality of parliamentary seats and having finished a close second in the 
first round, the NDC ticket possessed clear momentum heading into the second round. 
The Akufo-Addo campaign, for its part, blamed its failure to secure a victory in the first 
round on low voter turnout due to its supporters’ certainty of a win, on the popular 
outgoing president’s inadequate involvement in the campaign, and on weakly 
substantiated claims of NDC poll rigging (Gyimah-Boadi, 2009). 
During the campaign, concerns as to whether the election would be free and fair had 
led the opposition to threaten street protests if the results did not meet popular 
expectations. Such a threat illustrated the fine line between stability and violence that 
characterised politics in Ghana. Indeed, as the campaign had progressed, politics had 
become more polarised by ethno-regional animosities, culminating in several incidents 
of violence in the northern regions of Tamale and in parts of Accra, including the killing 
of supporters of the NDC and NPP (ISS Africa, 2009). 
The Electoral Commission took two days to announce the results of the election, 
further fanning the flames of an already tense situation in which supporters of the two 
main parties were taking issues into their own hands. “A group of NDC supporters, 
incited by a local pro-NDC radio station, marched on the Electoral Commission as it 
was in the process of certifying the votes and camped there overnight to demand that 
Mills be declared the victor. NPP supporters, meanwhile, besieged another local radio 
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station to protest its reporting of the NDC’s lead in the vote tally” (Gyimah-Boadi, 
2009: 144). 
Finally, after much delay, it was announced that neither candidate had won a sufficient 
number of votes to claim victory. Due to logistical problems, one constituency (Tain, in 
Brong-Ahafo Region) had not yet submitted its results; the outcome of the whole 
election hinged on these few votes. After another day of tensely watching the results 
filter in, the NPP’s Akufo- Addo conceded defeat to the NDC’s Atta-Mills on the basis of 
only the narrowest of victory margins. Atta-Mills had won by only 40,586 votes out of 
the 9,001,478 (0.46 per cent) valid votes cast (ibid.). 
The NDC victory was something of a surprise to those who had paid only cursory 
attention to the opinion polls throughout the campaign. Jerry Rawlings continued 
prominence within the NDC was seen as an insurmountable electoral liability for the 
relatively soft-spoken Atta-Mills to overcome. At the same time, it has been argued 
that “in the run-off, it became clear that Mills and the NDC benefited from the support 
of undecided voters who wanted to see another democratic change of government in 
Ghana, to prevent the NPP from becoming a hegemonic party, complacent and 
therefore running the risk of undermining the vibrancy of Ghana’s democracy” 
(Zounmenou, 2009: 11). 
4.2.2.4 Implications 
By 2008, political opinion polling is deeply entrenched in Ghanaian electoral processes; 
yet it remains deeply flawed in many respects. As a source of political information, it is 
still highly volatile, with pollsters flitting in and out of the industry, undermining 
attempts to gauge long-term political trends. When some continuity does emerge, 
particularly in 2008, it does so in the form of an almost one-man operation in Ben 
Ephson and his Daily Dispatch newspaper. While this concentration of information in 
the hands of one man may seem unstable, it is important to remember that many 
prominent pollsters in the US and Europe began in just the same way, with some 
highly regarded contemporary pollsters still operating as independent researchers. All 
this volatility, however, makes it difficult to assign a character to the influence of 
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political polling in Ghana. In the context of high political competitiveness, its 
ambivalence shapes its influence on elite perceptions. 
Indeed, the NPP had a strong incentive to use its power of incumbency to attempt to 
guide public opinion away from its preference for a change in government. If Ephson is 
to be believed, they did this through means of bribery and the manipulation of figures 
in polls and, perhaps, the ballot box. Interestingly, they felt the need to resort to these 
tactics based largely on the analysis of opinion polls conducted relatively early in the 
election campaign (Private interview, 22 May 2013). Faced with the ethno-regional 
realities that those polls depicted, their American strategist advised them to prepare 
themselves for defeat. Reflecting perhaps the stark contrast between the American 
data-centric campaigns and the African image-centric campaigns, the NPP campaign 
team refused to accept his advice to abandon huge swathes of the country and focus 
their efforts on key areas. The polls didn’t lie. In the end, the American strategist had 
called the outcome of the election precisely. 
This is an important finding in the context of this research. I have argued that in the 
context of high political competition opinion polling instigates elites to pursue 
strategies that undermine the transparency and representativeness of electoral 
processes. They do so based on their own perceptions drawn from uncertain polling 
data and due to the specific elite incentives that exist within the political system. In 
this case, the credibility of Ghanaian polls, even by 2008, is still mixed at best. The 
partisanship which pervades the production of the polls largely undermines the 
consumption of them, with media and readers unable to separate the legitimate from 
the suspect, the biased from the non-aligned (Private interview, 23 May 2013). 
Nevertheless, the NPP did not acquiesce to their political consultant’s request that 
they narrow their campaign to exclude NDC-favoured areas, choosing instead to try 
and appeal more broadly. That their strategy was ultimately unsuccessful suggests that 
this is the exception that proves the rule. Indeed, given the prescient predictions 
presented to the NPP in August 2008, it does not seem a stretch that these numbers 
were in the back of their minds when they ultimately decided to concede defeat, 
having lost in exactly the manner they were warned.  
134 
 
 
 
4.2.3 The 2012 Elections 
Ghana doesn’t do landslide elections anymore. To prove this point, the country 
endured yet another close contest, with an outcome that again surprised political 
analysts both in the country and abroad. While many election experts expected Akufo-
Addo to win, the 7 December 2012 elections played out differently. Out of the over 14 
million registered voters in Ghana, Mahama won an overall majority of 50.7 per cent of 
the vote and was declared the winner by the EC. Surprisingly, Akufo-Addo received 
only 47.7 per cent of the vote, far below what he got in the 2008 election. On the 
parliamentary front, the NDC took control of 147 of the 275 seats and now holds 
significant majority over all other political parties.  
4.2.3.1 Polls Shaping Perceptions 
The 2012 political opinion polling season began in abrupt fashion. According to local 
media, internal polling conducted by the ruling National Democratic Congress had 
struck fear into senior party officials. As it stood in March 2012, President Mills was set 
to become the first one-term President in Ghana’s history. The opinion poll, conducted 
by a South African PR firm, put the NPP’s Nana Akufo-Addo, at 49.07 per cent, ahead 
of Atta-Mills who could only manage 47.07 per cent (New Statesman, 22 June 2012). 
It presaged another frantic polling campaign for the myriad pollsters that continued to 
ply their trade in Ghana during election time. The persistent influence of opinion 
polling on the electoral campaign is particularly evident in the writings of two key 
political commentators in the chart below. Again, as in 2004, conventional wisdom 
which had come to accept that the NDC was headed for electoral defeat found their 
preconceptions turned on their heads with the death of President Mills in August. The 
contest flipped almost overnight with newly anointed President Mahama leading the 
NDC ticket. A poll by market and political researchers, Synovate (now Ipsos), issued a 
poll in early September showing that the NDC would obtain 34.2 per cent of the total 
votes cast with the opposition New Patriotic Party following closely with 31.8 per cent. 
(Ghanaweb, 5 September 2012) This was corroborated two days later, when a new 
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national poll suggested that Mahama held a six-point lead over NPP presidential 
candidate Nana Akufo-Addo (The Republic, 7 September 2012). 
Table 15: Political Commentators in the Ghana 2012 Election Campaign 
 Kofi Akosah-Sarpong,  
freelance political columnist 
Ben Ephson,  
editor Daily Dispatch 
9 November 
2011 
“The NPP, bent on wrestling power 
from Atta Mills and his NDC, isn’t 
joking. In Moctar Bamba, the NPP is 
playing the political spiritual games 
with the NDC. Such excessive 
concentrations on the spiritual 
games have made scientific opinion 
polls less listened to. Few scientific 
opinion polls are independent; 
most are conducted by the political 
parties. Like the spiritual 
predictions, each poll appears 
coloured by where the polling 
organisation is coming from. Each 
political party disagrees with any 
poll that doesn’t favour their 
forecasts.” 
 
19 September 
2012 
 “The December election is too close 
to call. We will have to wait until 
first or second week of November 
to be able to categorically state 
which party is most likely to carry 
the day. The selection of Vice-
president Amissah Arthur as 
running mate to John Mahama for 
the 2012 polls will have little 
influence over the people of the 
Central region. Let the NDC tickle 
themselves and laugh if they think 
Amissah Arthur’s selection will 
deliver to them Central region, the 
people don’t vote on tribal lines, 
that is why late president Mills lost 
in Central in 2000 and 2004. If the 
former first lady, Nana Konadu 
Agyeman Rawlings contests as flag 
bearer on the ticket of the newly 
licensed National Democratic Party 
(NDP), that will make victory for the 
NDC easier.” 
136 
 
 
 
Even as the numbers began trending in the direction of the NDC, prominent pollster 
Ben Ephson urged caution. Contrary to the recent opinion poll publications, he argued 
that results for the crucial upcoming December election were still too close to call. 
(Ghanaweb, 20 September 2012) Perhaps latching onto to this opportunity, new polls 
began quickly emerging throughout the autumn pointing to an NPP resurgence: 
“according to the latest opinion poll conducted by Research International, President 
John Dramani Mahama and his ruling NDC are destined to capture 46.9 per cent, well 
short on the 50 per cent plus one vote needed to remain at Government House” (The 
Chronicle, 20 November 2012). This author’s review of over 11,610 newspaper articles 
published in Ghana between June 2012 and January 2013 revealed 53 mentions of the 
term “opinion poll.” Normalised per 1000 articles, this results in 4.57 mentions per 
thousand, a small reduction on the previous electoral cycle but nevertheless still a 
newsworthy topic. 
Just days before the election, however, Ephson returned to prominence releasing a 
poll that countered all expert analysis offered to that point by indicating that the 2012 
Presidential election would not likely require a run-off. It predicted that President 
Mahama would win the ‘one touch’ victory with 52.2 per cent of the votes while Nana 
Akufo-Addo would win 44.7 per cent of the votes. (Daily Dispatch, 4 December 2012). 
Controversial though it was at the time, the polling would prove prophetic. 
Far from using the glut of opinion polling data to justify and support their electoral 
expectations, the political parties instead took great pains to distance themselves from 
the polls. “The Campaign Coordinator of the NDC, Elvis Afriyie Ankrah, says the NDC 
does not believe in polls. He is convinced that the party will win the elections 'one 
touch' due to the massive development projects undertaken by the government. The 
New Patriotic Party, NPP, has also rubbished the credibility of the polls. The Director of 
Research and Elections of the party, Martin Adjei Mensah Kosah, told GBC’s Radio 
Ghana that, the NPP does not believe in opinion polls.” (GBC, 9 November 2012) This 
clearly speaks to the partisan perspective in which opinion polling is held in the 
Ghanaian political elite. Neither side is willing to let the other hold the upper hand on 
information management. 
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4.2.3.2 Strategic Responses to Opinion Polling 
From a strategic perspective, 2012 was notable as the year in which democracy began 
to filter into the party structures themselves. Opinion polling data revealed that while 
the NPP was struggling to maintain its profile as a national party, the NDC was proving 
itself capable of winning votes across the country. Over the course of Kufuor’s 
presidency, the NDC had successfully rebranded itself from the party of 
authoritarianism to the party of the disenfranchised. By contrast, the NPP was 
increasingly seen as being the preserve of competing power blocs in the Ashanti and 
Eastern Region, leaving the rest of the country essentially spectators. 
During the 2012 campaign, there is evidence to suggest that both parties attempted to 
improve the transparency of their internal processes. “The NPP expanded the number 
of electors participating in the selection of their 2012 presidential candidate from 
fewer than 3,000 to over 110,000. This made the party’s presidential primary more 
democratic and enabled it to avoid repeating some of the mistakes of the previous 
cycle, when the primary involved lavish spending on campaign advertising and 
allegations of attempts to bribe delegates” (Gyimah-Boadi and Brobbey, 2012: 3). The 
NDC also made its primary process more accessible, allowing candidates from its 
various factions to participate in the party’s national executive elections. This resulted 
in vehement opponents of the incumbent president being elected to senior party 
positions. Indeed, Nana Konadu Agyeman-Rawlings’ (wife of NDC founder and former 
president Jerry Rawlings) attempt to unseat President Mills in the NDC primary 
demonstrated the growing acceptance of internal competition within the party (ibid). 
For the first time, opinion polling played a role in shaping the politics of candidate 
selection. Nana Konadu’s primary challenge was expected to cause Atta-Mills some 
serious concern. The Rawlings political machine remained very strong, and it was 
anticipated that the former president would be able to exert his influence over a 
sizable portion of the delegates. Before the primary, however, Synovate released a poll 
which revealed Konadu’s popularity among the party to be extremely low. The data 
undermined her attempts to paint herself as a serious contender and derailed any 
efforts to sway delegates to her side (Private interview, 24 May 2013). 
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Yet, for all the increasing openness internally, externally the strategy remained 
predicated on image manipulation and information control. The emergence of polls 
predicting healthy leads for the NPP over the summer, particularly those 
commissioned by the party, sparked panic in the NDC. According to news reports at 
the time, “this development did not amuse the NDC party hierarchy and therefore 
subsequently commissioned ‘pollster’ and Editor-in-Chief of the Daily Dispatch 
Newspaper, Ben Ephson, to conduct an ‘independent’ opinion poll in April on the 
chances of President Mills ahead of the 2012 poll. Ben Ephson’s poll, according to 
sources at the party office, killed the morale of the top functionaries of the NDC as the 
results made for grim reading.” (New Statesman, 22 June 2012) 
Yet, following President Mills’ death, the calculus of the election campaign changed. 
From the spent force described above, the NDC reenergised itself under Mahama, 
reclaiming the lead from the NPP. Forced to respond, the NPP sought opinion polling 
data that could buttress their own campaign. Finding none, they allegedly began 
creating their own. Research International, the firm producing many of the pro-NPP 
polls was rumoured to be closely connected with the NPP. Local media alleged that 
“the release of the NPP inspired survey was timed to come and neutralise the recent 
survey that put President Mahama ahead of their struggling torchbearer Akufo-Addo. 
If the NPP truly believes that report, then NDC should heave a sigh of relief because it 
indicates that the complacency and self-delusion within the opposition Party have 
reached such levels as to make the task of the NDC much easier in 2012.” (Ghanaweb, 
21 November 2012) 
Underneath this façade of public propaganda, however, there is evidence that political 
parties were taking the strategic value of polling seriously in the 2012 campaign. In one 
instance, the NPP commissioned a private poll from one professional pollster which 
revealed that they were underperforming their historical numbers in Greater Accra 
and Takoredi areas. The party quickly mobilised their candidate to begin a house to 
house campaign in those areas to drive base turnout and to convince undecided voters 
(Private interview, 22 May 2013). 
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Likewise a poll released by Synovate, focusing on the ‘swing’ areas in the election, 
sparked a great deal of interest in both political parties. While causation is impossible 
to prove, the NDC was clearly outspending its rivals on political advertising, aimed 
principally at winning over these swing areas. While the NDC relied more heavily on 
their own in-house research teams to guide their electoral strategy, it would be foolish 
to think that they discounted public polls which provided insight in potential electoral 
outcomes (Private interview, 23 May 2013). 
The 2012 campaign exhibited a number of unsettling characteristics. Both parties 
became more recalcitrant and uncompromising, with the rhetoric emanating from 
their representatives appearing increasingly partisan. This has been attributed to a 
belief among NPP supporters that the 2008 election was lost because the party did not 
adequately counter the NDC’s strong-arm tactics on election-day, convincing many of 
the need for greater vigilance in the run-up to the 2012 poll. Even Akufo-Addo, the 
leader of the NPP and usually a level-headed politician, exhorted his party’s supporters 
not to be intimidated by the tactics of the NDC, openly declaring that his supporters 
should be ready to “fight to the death.” (Gyimah-Boadi and Brobbey, 2012: 3) 
Impartial commentators, however, argued that an active opinion polling industry was 
necessary to prepare the electorate before the general elections. Polling information 
could ease tensions ahead of elections by giving the general populace a better idea of 
its likely outcome. “If we had a more active opinion poll system in this country on 
issues, on the candidates and their opinions and this is more regular, it will probably 
help tame the atmosphere so that Election Day will just be the icing on the 
cake”(Peace FM Online, 31 July 2012). 
4.2.3.4 Implications 
Opinion polling faced something of a backlash in 2012. Having become pervasive in the 
political media, the political elite began reacting negatively to their inability to control 
the numbers coming out of the polls. In some cases, this took the form of disputing the 
content of the polls, casting aspersions on the source and methodology of the data. In 
other cases, it meant issuing their own polls to try and control the messages emerging 
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in the media. In either case, the legitimacy of opinion polling as a source of reliable 
political information suffered.  
Strategically, polling became far less about the practicalities of the information and far 
more about reacting to the content of the polls, either positively or negatively. This 
was driven by the increasingly partisan nature of Ghanaian politics as the main political 
parties solidified their bases and consolidated their electoral positions. While polling 
continues to play in an important role in increasing the transparency of internal 
strategy of political parties, its ability to influence positively the quality of electoral 
processes in Ghana is highly compromised by the uncertainty of its profile and the 
competitively charged political atmosphere in which the polls are released. 
In spite of these difficulties, opinion polling, at least the reliable polls, seems to have 
got the prediction right in the end. While election experts fully expected the vote to go 
to a run-off, Ephson’s last poll correctly called a ‘one-touch’ victory for Mahama and 
the NDC. The NPP has taken the decision to court, but the weight of evidence is against 
them. People have been angry, but widespread violence has not ensued. While this 
can largely be credited to the politicians who have appealed for calm, there is also the 
possibility that the political elite were prepared to accept this outcome based on the 
information available to them prior to the vote. 
4.3 Conclusions 
This chapter offers some intriguing contributions to this thesis’s overarching question 
regarding the impact of opinion polling on electoral politics in sub-Saharan Africa. 
While highly relevant, highly sought after, and highly coveted, opinion polls are also 
publicly dismissed, mistrusted, and manipulated by the political elite. As a source of 
political information, Ghanaian opinion polling spans the spectrum from well-managed 
and accurate surveys to fly-by-night operations organised explicitly for the purpose of 
serving the interests of one political party over another. The media, craving anything 
that resembles a story or a trend worth analysing, are not always diligent in ascribing 
correct motives to the data they report.  
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Polling’s influence on strategy and expectations is likewise disparate, ranging from 
clear and incisive to vague and implied. There is first-hand evidence that political 
parties value polls for their campaign strategies, and yet, in the run-up to the election 
neither major party is ready to stand publicly by the opinion polls as an accurate 
representation of the electoral outcome (Private interview, 23 May 2013). The reason 
behind this, I argue, is the ever-increasing competitive profile of politics in Ghana, 
coupled with a general uncertainty related to the accuracy and impartiality of the 
opinion polling in the country. Political elites rely on perceptions of competition 
illustrated by opinion polls to shape their electoral strategies. Faced with uncertainty 
and high levels of competition, in the context of Ghanaian politics, the political elite 
have generally not chosen to broaden their appeal through issue-based campaigns as 
Gallup’s vision of polling intended. Rather, they retreat further to the clientelistic and 
patronage strategies that characterise ethnic-identity politics in sub-Saharan Africa.  
In Ghana, these divisions have been institutionalised in the form of political parties 
who pull from decidedly disparate constituencies. Whereas in previous elections, there 
remained a substantial number of unaligned voters whose preference could have been 
swayed by targeted campaigning (some 27 per cent of the electorate) in 2008, their 
number seems to be falling. As the party affiliations become more rigid, the emphasis 
turns from broad-based appeals to narrow voter turnout as the best strategy for 
electoral victory. The increasingly charged competition, fuelled by ever increasing 
polling, therefore, far from encourage more transparent and representative strategies, 
actively works against it, aligning incentives for elites to restrict, manipulate, and 
otherwise undermine the quality of elections in their interests. 
Polling’s shifting influence on political strategy during presidential campaigns in Ghana 
is clear in the cases presented above. In the 2004 election, public opinion polling, 
though a misunderstood newcomer on the political scene, nevertheless made a 
significant contribution to the political discourse that, in spite of NDC’s best efforts, 
was ultimately reaching a consensus of perceptions as to the NPP’s inevitable victory. 
Even in this case, however, it was evident that as the polls showed them narrowing the 
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gap, the NDC began shifting their strategies toward more ethnically-focused 
campaigning in an effort to energise voter turnout. 
 By 2008, opinion polling had become increasingly pervasive in Ghanaian politics, as 
evidenced by the inclusion of American polling experts in the campaign team of at 
least one of the major candidates. Opinion polling consistently pointed to a close race, 
and ultimately proved remarkably accurate in its predictions. Indeed, the NPP were 
counselled on the basis of the polling numbers to pull out of certain regions in 
preference of increasing their inputs into areas where they had a chance of improving 
their numbers. The strategy seemed counter-intuitive, abandoning whole regions to 
the opposition seemed ludicrous. In this case, in spite of the competitive landscape 
illustrated by polls, the NPP chose not to narrow their focus and remained committed 
to portraying themselves as a national party. While this does somewhat contradict the 
hypothesis of this research, it does reflect another prominent tendency within African 
politics of preferring anecdotal evidence over quantitative evidence. Again, old tactics 
are given greater credence than the novelty of opinion polling. 
By 2012, party competition had intensified. Political alignments were reifying and 
opinion polling could make little impact on the political discourse as partisan media 
and openly manipulated polls undermined their influence. Yet, opinion polling was 
able to capture the major shift in the competitive environment which occurred 
following the death of President Atta-Mills. For the NPP, which assumed it was 
coasting to victory, the turnaround was shockingly unwelcome. Again, this shift in 
competition sparked shifts in elite electoral strategies, marking a further departure 
from open and representative ideals. 
The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that the influence of opinion polling 
on elections in Ghana is highly contingent upon the perceptions and behaviour of the 
political elite. On the knife edge of modernity in terms of the technology and processes 
available to them, but still convinced of the predominance of image, personality, and 
personal ties in the minds of the voters. This transitional struggle is playing out before 
the backdrop of Ghana’s increasingly rigid and increasingly competitive two-party 
democracy.  
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Chapter 5. Public Opinion Polling in Nigerian Elections 2003–
2011 
Nigeria has long been a political enigma. Although endowed with a strong civil society, 
a vibrant press, and a relatively independent judiciary, it has never been able to 
maintain long-term stability. The 1999 Constitution created a basic foundation for 
constitutional and representative democracy, but it was the result of elite political 
calculation not an expression of public will. 
Public opinion is very much at the forefront of Nigerian politics in the aftermath of 
President Jonathan’s capitulation on the issue of the removal of fuel subsidies in the 
face of public outcry. Opinion polling had predicted that the move would be extremely 
unpopular, and, more insightfully, also predicted that people would be willing to take 
action to fight the proposal. (Leadership, 26 January 2012) The government’s decision 
to forge ahead and its subsequent quick reversal reflect the complex relationship 
between public opinion and politics in Nigeria. 
The use of opinion polling to capture public opinion is a relatively recent phenomenon 
in Nigeria. As late as 2006, a Nigerian academic writes: “The Nigerian press for instance 
is yet to realise the value and thus the necessity of carrying out credible and well 
conducted opinion polls on political parties, their programmes and candidates as well 
as their chances of success or otherwise in elections” (Adesoji, 2006: 46). The press 
themselves recognised their late entry into the field of scientific opinion polling in 
2007: “Apart from the online version of Punch newspaper, which had, rather 
unnoticeably, hitherto carried on a polling culture, polling was a relatively new 
phenomenon until a few years ago” (Vanguard, 10 April 2007).  
Since its introduction into Nigerian politics, however, public opinion research has 
proliferated, but very little research has been done into the extent to which it is 
influencing political attitudes and behaviours. Nor has there been much investigation 
into how this influence is contributing to or hindering Nigeria’s democratic transition. 
This chapter examines the emergence of public opinion polling in the Nigerian political 
context and assesses its influence on elite electoral strategies either as a substitute for 
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collective action, through instigating institutional adaptation, or by shaping elite 
perceptions around electoral competition to determine the likelihood that elites will 
more toward or away from more transparent and representative electoral processes. 
Contrary to the previous chapters on Kenya and Ghana, in Nigeria, the structure of 
political competition differs under a one-party dominant system. This clearly has 
repercussions on elite perceptions of competition, and this thesis would hypothesise 
that under reduced competition Nigeria is more likely to embrace opinion polling’s 
potential for contributing to transparent and representative elections. This hypothesis 
is further tested using gubernatorial contests in Nigeria where competition is invariably 
more intense than at presidential level. The evidence suggests that the hypothesis is 
more or less valid, although the size and complexity of Nigeria’s political system makes 
the emergence of new forms of political participation, such as polls, difficult to 
measure. At the presidential level, the 2007 and 2011 elections offer early signs of 
opinion polling’s influence on elite behaviour, both in the form of elite coalition 
building (and breaking) and in the form of issue-specific campaigning, even though the 
elections themselves could not be construed as transparent or representative. At 
gubernatorial levels, however, the evidence is far clearer that opinion polling amplified 
competition and compelled elite strategies more toward restriction and manipulation 
of elections. The only glimmer of hope is the emergence of opinion polling as a 
potential source of evidence for post-election court cases against blatantly rigged 
elections. 
5.1 The Context of this Research 
5.1.1 Historical Context 
Describing Nigeria as anything approximating a classical democracy faces strong 
historical opposition. Like many African states, Nigeria was a colonial creation. The 
resulting ethnic and regional tensions erupted in political violence and, ultimately, civil 
war in the late 1960s, an event which has coloured Nigeria’s politics ever since. The 
prospects for democracy faded still further in 1966 when the military overthrew the 
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first parliamentary government. Indeed, Nigeria’s political life has been dominated by 
military coups and extended periods of military-managed transitions, with the military 
ruling Nigeria for approximately 28 of its 50 years since independence. Even its 
democracy has been largely the result of elite political engineering.  
In August 1985, the then military leader General Muhammadu Buhari was deposed by 
another, General Ibrahim Babangida, who implemented a transition program that 
culminated in a general election in June 1993. While these were generally believed to 
have been won by Chief Moshood K.O. Abiola, General Babangida annulled the 
presidential election and scheduled a new election in which Abiola and his challenger 
were excluded from participating. The ensuing political turmoil provided an opening 
for another military leader, General Sani Abacha, to seize power in November 1993 
(Dagne, 2006). Abacha had been involved in several previous Nigerian military coups 
and presented himself as an authoritarian figure capable of ruling Nigeria with a strong 
hand.  
Nevertheless, in October 1995, under increasing pressure to reform, Abacha was 
forced to embark upon a programme that promised transition to civilian rule (Lewis, 
2011). Progress was purposely slow with Abacha tightly managing the programme until 
his death in June 1998. Following Abacha’s death, the Provisional Ruling Council 
quickly announced Major General Abdulsalam Abubakar as the new president. In 
contrast to Abacha, Abubakar set out a clear schedule for the transition to civilian rule, 
establishing an official hand-over date on 29 May 1999. Under the new political 
system, the three major parties became the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), the All 
People’s Party (APP), and the Alliance for Democracy (AD) (Dagne, 2006). 
Even under democracy, the long years of colonial and military authoritarianism in 
Nigeria have constricted political space. Prolonged authoritarianism has hindered the 
development of strong formal linkage between the elite and the masses in Nigeria. 
Nigeria lacks strong participatory (linkage through parties) and representative (linkage 
through elections) linkages, essential for citizens’ participation in the formal 
institutions of the political system (Orji, 2010). 
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5.1.2 Ethnicity in Nigerian Politics 
Ethnicity is a central theme to Nigerian political analysis. “The country’s turbulent 
political history spans two previously failed democratic regimes, six successful military 
coups, and a devastating civil war (1967–70) that claimed more than a million lives. 
Many of these pivotal events were instigated by ethnic rivalries or driven by communal 
conflicts” (Lewis, 2007: 1). 
Nigeria has approximately 374 ethnic groups that can be broadly divided into ethnic 
‘majorities’ and ethnic ‘minorities.’ The major ethnic groups are the Hausa-Fulani, 
based in the north (27 per cent), the Yoruba from the southwest (21 per cent), and the 
Igbo in the southeast (17 per cent) (see Map 3 below). These three principal ethnic 
groups constituted 57.8 per cent of the national population in the 1963 census. All the 
other ethnicities can be classified as being of ‘minority’ status. The dominance of these 
three ethnicities was codified under the colonial administration through a tripodal 
regional administrative structure in the 1950s that gave each majority ethnic group a 
region. On the basis of this social and political context, Nigeria has “evolved a tripolar 
ethnic structure, which forms the main context for ethnic mobilisation and 
contestation” (Mustapha, 2004: iv). 
Since the transition to democratic rule in 1999, this mobilisation along ethnic identity 
lines has become a principal characteristic of Nigerian politics, often undermining 
efforts to secure political stability. Peter Lewis (2007: 3) argues that patterns of group 
mobilisation have begun to change away in recent decades from the historical focus on 
the competition between the country’s three largest groups. “‘Minority’ groups are 
often regarded as being marginal to political competition. However, political action by 
communities in the Niger delta and the ethnically-diverse ‘middle belt’ of the country 
has been increasingly prominent in national politics. Also, religious mobilisation (both 
by Muslims and Christians) has often overshadowed ethnic solidarity, especially in the 
northern states.” 
Lewis further argues that major institutional changes have accompanied changing 
identities, creating new opportunities for political participation in Nigeria. “The central 
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features of Nigeria’s federal system have been repeatedly modified, shifting the 
political geography of the country from three regions at independence to 36 states 
today. Major regional blocks have been subdivided into discrete states, and many 
smaller minorities now constitute majorities within their states.” (ibid.) Fiscal 
decentralisation has also altered the pattern and distribution of funds from the central 
government down to the states. At a constitutional level, the formation of ethnic-
based parties has been banned and election laws put in place that make it more 
difficult for politicians to achieve national office based purely on ethnic qualifications.  
Map 3 Ethnic distribution in Nigeria 
 
Source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17015873 
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5.1.3 Media in Nigerian Politics 
Nigeria has a large and diverse media environment. There are, however, sharp divides 
within the sector. Geographically, the media is generally concentrated in the south of 
the country, particularly around Lagos. This is hardly surprising given the economic 
importance of Lagos as Nigeria’s financial capital, but it does sometimes present the 
false impression that the media is dominated by people from the southwest of the 
country. 
There are also differences between the media sectors. While the broadcast networks 
are predominantly state-owned, the print media is largely privately held, with private 
newspapers controlling not only market share but also the greater share of political 
influence. All this is in spite of relatively low circulation among all Nigerian 
newspapers. “Although there are no reliable data, no newspaper in Nigeria sells up to 
100,000 copies per day. The daily print-run of some is as low as 5,000 copies. And they 
all go by the description 'national newspapers'. Ironically, this does not affect their 
influence in the nation's politics and among politicians” (Oso, 2012: 8-9). 
While no newspaper is currently owned by any of the political parties, the main 
national newspapers make no secret of their political alignments. Similar to many 
other African media sectors, the principal owners of major media houses also tend to 
be politically active, either as politicians themselves or as high level functionaries 
within the main political parties. Nevertheless, Oso argues that “the degree of political 
partisanship has now been attenuated by certain factors. First, all the political parties 
are legally expected to be national in their structure. Related to this is the fact that the 
leading political actors with their eyes on the presidency, are trying to present 
themselves as ‘national leaders’ not champions of ethnic, regional or religious groups” 
(ibid.: 30).  
In contrast to the print sector, government ownership in the broadcast sector is 
pervasive. According to the National Broadcasting Commission (NBC), of 82 television 
stations in the country, the Federal Government owns 41; State Governments own 29; 
while private proprietors own 12. The Federal Government owns 43 radio stations out 
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of 121, while state governments own 54 and private proprietors own 24. While these 
ownership figures do impact the kind of coverage seen in the print and broadcast 
news, profit has become a decisive moderating force, ensuring that the ethnic, 
religious or political affiliation of their owners do not undermine the commercial 
viability of the media house. This has tempered the partisan predilections of the media 
and has generally improved the quality of the coverage (LeVan and Ukata, 2012). 
The content analysis that informs this chapter is drawn from articles published in five 
principal newspapers (those with the greatest circulation and popular prestige): 
Vanguard, the Guardian, This Day, Daily Trust and Leadership. The analysis follows two 
parallel tracks. The first quantitative track reviews articles over a seven month period 
around elections to determine quantity of opinion polling coverage. It records 
mentions of the phrase “opinion poll” or similar variations, normalised across 1,000 
articles, to get a picture of the frequency with which polling appears in major 
newspapers. The second qualitative tracks examines the writings of key political 
commentators across the entire period of 2003–2011 to determine shifts in 
perceptions and attitudes to opinion polling on the basis of content and tone. These 
are opinion writers, editors, and prominent journalists who represent an important 
subset of the electoral intelligentsia and can be viewed as a proxy for that group as a 
whole. Analysing their writings in greater depth provides important insights into the 
way in which polling is consumed, interpreted, and translated into the political 
discourse. 
5.1.4 Recent Political Context 
5.1.4.1 Flawed Elections of 1999 and 2003 
Political change came quickly to Nigeria following Abacha’s death. The initial transition 
toward civilian rule, that culminated in General Olusegun Obasanjo’s swearing in as 
president on 29 May 1999 took less than a year. In those twelve months, major 
institutional reforms took place: political parties were legalised, press and political 
freedoms expanded, and four rounds of elections were conducted.  
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Political change, however, wasn’t easy. Obasanjo’s initial election in 1999 suffered 
from some significant flaws, and it could be argued that each successive election since 
has deteriorated further. The second election of the new democratic regime took place 
in April 2003 with President Obasanjo again representing the ruling PDP. His 
competition included General Muhammadu Buhari, a former military leader; Emeka 
Odumegwu Ojukwu, a former secessionist leader from Nigeria’s civil war in the 1960s; 
and former foreign minister Ike Nwachukwu. PDP and Obasanjo swept to sizable 
victories. 
Both domestic and international observers criticised the elections on the basis of 
accusations of widespread fraud and rigging, due largely to poor election 
management. In some states, observers noted “systematic attempts at all stages of the 
voting process to alter the election results” (IRI, 2003: 65). While the incidence of 
rigging was uneven across the country and often highly localised, the extent of 
irregularities led the EU mission to assert that they “compromised the integrity of the 
elections where they occurred” (NDI, 2003: 7). 
Opinion polling played only a small role in these elections, with the industry centred 
almost exclusively around newspaper-sponsored polls in key political areas and on the 
presidential election. At gubernatorial level only a few states, mostly close in proximity 
to the media centres in Lagos, received opinion polling coverage. Independent 
pollsters, such as there were, seem to have largely been consulting organisations 
conducting polls on the behalf of individual candidates rather than sampling races in 
general. Indeed, in the run-up to the election some in the media were lamenting the 
lack of hard opinion polling data to back up prevailing wisdom of Obasanjo’s weakness 
heading into the contest. “If a poll analysis had been conducted at the onset of 
Obasanjo's administration compared with what exists today, his popularity would have 
been seriously deflated.” (Weekly Trust, 18 January 2002)  
Ironically, just a few days later, a competing newspaper did release a poll which 
suggested that Obasanjo was not heavily favoured to win the election the next year, 
with several of his colleagues ranking closely in popularity. It also suggested that “the 
outcome of the opinion poll carried out by the presidency ahead of the 2003 
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presidential election may have forced Aso-rock back to the drawing board to map out 
new strategies that would ensure the re-election of President Olusegun Obasanjo” 
(This Day, 25 January 2002). Based on the evidence from monitoring reports, it would 
appear that Obasanjo and his team decided at this point that they would not lose, no 
matter how the voting went.  
Speaking closer to the election, one of Obasanjo’s advisors felt it necessary to address 
the popular impression among the electoral intelligentsia that the president's 
prospects for re-election were waning. He was clear that "it is wishful thinking and not 
reality that the image of the president is dwindling. I have no evidence to support that 
claim. Reports of opinion polls show that there is no cause for alarm" (Vanguard, 30 
September 2002). Nevertheless, the perception certainly coloured the electoral 
landscape and cast significant doubt upon the veracity of the official result when 
Obasanjo was announced the winner with almost 62 per cent of the vote. For a 
president concerned with dwindling popularity, it was a prodigious victory. 
Scholars view the Obasanjo legacy as “a paradoxical one of both far-reaching reforms 
and anti-reformist actions” (Joseph and Kew, 2008: 167). He clearly deserves credit for 
moving Nigeria away from military rule, and he was the first Nigerian leader to hand 
over power to an elected successor after his two terms in office. But he did so 
begrudgingly, having attempted to force through a constitutional amendment that 
would have enabled him and state governors to serve more than two consecutive 
terms. The move brought out a major political crisis, while creating an opportunity for 
an emergent public opinion polling industry to assert itself into politics. 
5.1.4.2 The Third Term Crisis 
For a system to become truly democratic, officials “must give up the habit of placing 
themselves above the law” (Carothers, 1998: 100). Without this, a culture of impunity 
emerges among the political elite undermining not just the quality of democracy but 
also its stability. As Larry Diamond argues, for a democracy to be considered 
consolidated, political actors must “obey the laws, the constitution, and mutually 
accepted norms of political conduct” (1999: 69). 
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Overcoming a culture of impunity has been problematic in Nigerian politics. Lewis 
(2010) argues that Nigeria’s civilian regimes (like their military counterparts) reflect 
patterns of neo-patrimonial politics, marked by the influence of personal networks and 
distributional politics in a context of weak formal institutions. Clientelist relationships 
and the disbursal of patronage are dominant features of the system. In a state 
dominated by centralised petroleum revenues, struggles over the circulation of rents 
provide central goals in seeking and utilising public office. Nigerian law even shields 
elected officials from prosecution, allowing the political elite to openly ignore the law 
and for the political process to be manipulated at will. 
Nowhere was this better in evidence than during the months of political turmoil that 
characterised Obasanjo’s attempt to secure himself a third term as president. While 
Obasanjo stayed largely on the sidelines, his supporters within the ruling PDP party 
made moves to change the constitution to do away with term limits for the president 
and the governors of the states. According to sources, Obasanjo and his supporters 
were prepared to invest huge amounts of money in this endeavour, with bidding for 
legislators’ votes reaching 50 million naira each (about $400,000) and apparently more 
than 100 payments having been disbursed (Ademola, 2011). 
The effort proved hugely unpopular with the public. Polls by both the Guardian 
newspaper and the Afrobarometer revealed that 80 per cent of Nigerians opposed the 
change in the constitution. Nevertheless, the Guardian poll also showed that “A 
minimal one in every ten respondents (about 14 per cent) however expressed faith in 
the National Assembly to ward off any undue influence of the Executive towards the 
achievement of the third term gambit” (12 December 2005).  
Contrary to public expectation, the campaign for the third term galvanised resistance 
from diverse quarters in the Assembly (This Day, 21 April 2006). Opposition parties 
raised concern about the creation of a political oligarchy under the PDP, a party led by 
a former military ruler. Similar objections arose from within the PDP, especially the 
group arrayed around Vice President Atiku. The northern political establishment, 
anticipating the return of the Presidency to their region in 2007, feared that the third 
term was an effort to freeze them out of power. 
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Importantly, members were also aware of opposition from within their own 
constituencies. The Guardian poll reported its figures down to local levels, and 
senators were clearly also gauging public opinion through their own means as well. As 
one opposition leader put it: “They worked against it…because their constituents were 
opposed to it, and the media played a leading role in bringing home to the people 
what their representative was saying in Abuja” (VOA, 29 May 2006) In declaring their 
votes, several of them specifically referenced the outcomes of opinion polls as being 
decisive in their decision to reject the amendment (This Day, 15 May 2006).  
In the aftermath, the opposition made it clear to where they credited their victory, 
claiming that “public opinion polls showing a lack of support for changing the 
constitution combined with heavy media coverage of the parliamentary debate on the 
issue were behind the final tally against the measure” (VOA, 29 May 2006). In the 
aftermath of the defeat, while Obasanjo claimed it as a ‘victory for democracy,’ 
political analysts ascribed it political naiveté on the part of Obasanjo’s advisors who 
failed to comprehend the importance of public opinion and bringing popular will on 
their side before launching the third term campaign (This Day, 25 May 2006). In this 
example, outside the context of elections, opinion polling delivers solid proof of its 
ability to aggregate opinion and overcome collective action problems to influence elite 
behaviour in a positive fashion.  
5.2 Public Opinion Polling in Nigerian Elections 
This thesis emphasises the significance of elections. Elections have been presented as 
being central to competitive politics. A source both of political participation and 
competition, elections are also instrumental to an “orderly succession in a democratic 
setting, creating a legal-administrative framework for handling inter-elite rivalries” 
(Omotola, 2010: 537). Michael Bratton (1998: 5) observes that “the consolidation of 
democracy involves the widespread acceptance of rules to guarantee political 
participation and political competition. Elections — which empower ordinary citizens 
to choose among contestants for top political offices — clearly promote rules.” 
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The use of polls to measure public opinion has made a clear impact on political 
competition in Western democracies. Where politicians formerly had to rely on local 
officials, media and their own partisans for information, opinion polls can now serve as 
an objective source of information about voter preferences. Political candidates and 
their parties can use poll results to set and revise campaign strategies. Whether the 
same is true of developing countries like Nigeria is unclear. 
Following the emergence of opinion polling on the political stage through the Obasanjo 
affair, Nigeria’s burgeoning media discovered the merits of public opinion research as 
both commercial products and political tools. It was said of the 2007 electoral 
campaign that “it is the first time ever that national dailies are conducting independent 
surveys which, when removed from the malignant factor of corruption, have been 
accepted by the public as credible. It is the first time that politicians themselves as well 
as their parties are arranging for opinion polls to be carried out to the end of 
appraising their chances vis-à-vis those of their opponents” (Vanguard, 10 April 2007). 
The prominence of opinion polling in these elections brought more players to the field 
(Private interview, 5 February 2013), making the 2011 election the most researched in 
Nigeria’s history with regard to public opinion.  
Table 16: Pollsters in Nigerian politics 
Polling Organisation Elections Active Affiliation or other ties16 
International 
Republican Institute 
2011 US agency funded by USAID and affiliated 
with the US Republican party. Has extensive 
election programmes around the world. 
Ipsos/This Day 2003, 2007, 2011 Independently owned, now part of 
international brand. Has been variously 
accused of favouritism but no formal links 
NOI Polls 2011 Founded by Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, current 
Finance Minister. Have gone to great lengths 
to distance themselves from PDP but still 
assumed bias 
IFES 2007 US agency funded by USAID, broadly impartial 
RMS 2011 Independent, now part of global TNS brand 
                                                          
 
16
 This applies to the organisation only. It is not always possible to discern the data source or funding agent of 
individual polls released under the names of organisations or newspapers. Independent firms may be open to 
accusations of bias when they conduct and publish polls on behalf of particular parties or individuals. 
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African election campaigns have largely become “opportunities for politicians to 
engage in mass mobilisation and manipulation of electoral rules. All too often, 
campaign strategies feature material inducement and political intimidation” (Bratton 
2008: 1). This includes but is not limited to vote buying and electoral violence. Nigeria 
has a history of highly competitive elections. In all cases, three issues have been shown 
to persist: crises of political succession, zero-sum intra-elite battles for control of the 
resources of the state, and questions as to the credibility of the electoral process (Obi, 
2007). The scope of this study is limited to those elections where public opinion polling 
was prevalent and potentially influential, those of 2007 and 2011. 
Nigerians went to the polls for a third time since the democratic transition in the April 
2007 general elections. Following Obasanjo’s failure to obtain his desired 
constitutional amendment, these elections would witness the first transfer of power 
from one civilian president to another in the country’s history. Given the credibility 
issues around the results of the previous elections, the 2007 elections also provided an 
opportunity to restore public confidence in the country’s electoral institutions and its 
democratic process. 
The 2011 elections, by contrast, were generally anticipated with apprehension and 
mistrust. The poor experience of 2003 and 2007 meant that public and international 
opinion expected the worst. Moreover, the death of President Yar’Adua mid-term 
threw Nigeria’s power-sharing settlement off course, as southerner Goodluck 
Jonathan, vice president under Yar’Adua assumed the role and pledged his intention to 
run for office again. The stage was set for a showdown between the south and the 
north and a possible disintegration of the political arrangements that had held Nigeria 
together for more than a decade. 
The remainder of this chapter examines the influence and the growing force of public 
opinion research had on the electoral behaviour of the political elites and their 
supporters through a comparative study of electoral quality in 2007 and 2011. 
Reviewing evidence from both the presidential and the gubernatorial elections, it 
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assesses the relative importance of collective action theory, institutional theory, and 
this thesis’s own model of elite perceptions in explaining elite electoral strategies.  
5.2.1 The 2007 Presidential Elections 
In 2007, three issues dominated political discussion prior to the elections. Would the 
former Vice President Atiku Abubakar be allowed to compete in the presidential polls? 
Would the opposition unite in an alliance against the PDP in an effort to secure the 
presidency? Or would it call for a boycott of the elections in anticipation of electoral 
machinations from the incumbent PDP (Ibrahim, 2007)? The role of public opinion in 
determining the outcome of these questions is decidedly mixed. 
The third term debate led to major realignments within the Nigerian political 
landscape. Vice President Atiku Abubakar, who was widely tipped as Obasanjo’s 
successor within the PDP, felt aggrieved by Obasanjo’s attempt to retain power and 
vehemently opposed the third term amendment (EU, 2007). This ‘betrayal,’ however, 
was repaid when Obasanjo succeeded in having Atiku’s nomination as PDP’s 
presidential candidate blocked, forcing Atiku to abandon the party and move instead 
to the Action Congress (AC) party. In his place, Obasanjo manoeuvred the former 
governor of the Northern state of Katsina, Umaru Yar’Adua, to represent the PDP in 
the presidential poll. 
This feud between Atiku and Obasanjo did not end there; its ups and downs came to 
influence much of the election period. Likely at Obasanjo’s instigation, the electoral 
commission disqualified Atiku from participating in the presidential election, a decision 
that was only overturned five days before the poll by the Federal High Court. For such 
a momentous issue, public opinion is strangely muted throughout the process. 
Pollsters continued to include Atiku in their surveys on likely presidential election 
outcomes, but the only hint of protest appears in the Vanguard newspaper, with the 
author arguing that “in any democracy only the court of law, and the court of public 
opinion can determine the qualifications of candidates in an election” (Vanguard, 11 
March 2007) 
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This author’s review of over 18,400 newspaper articles published in Nigeria between 
October 2006 and May 2007 unearthed 42 mentions of the term “opinion poll.” 
Normalised per 1000 articles, this results in 2.38 mentions per thousand, a relatively 
insignificant number but pertinent nonetheless in the context of Nigeria’s extensive 
media market. The complexity of the Nigerian political system coupled with opinion 
polling’s slow penetration into lower level electoral contests, such as parliamentary 
and other state level votes, explains the small share of the market occupied by polling 
coverage. 
5.2.1.1 Polls Shaping Perceptions 
That opinion polling had become more prevalent since 2003 within the electoral 
campaign is indisputable. Newspapers throughout both of the elections carried opinion 
polling data as front page news whenever it appeared. “As the April polls edge closer, 
opinion polls have become popular as a yardstick to measure the level of acceptance 
of candidates (mostly presidential) vying in the upcoming elections” (Daily Trust, 24 
March 2007).  
Readers were regularly treated to polls giving them the latest trends in presidential 
electability or detailed analyses of the on-ground party politics in the various hotly-
contested states (Daily Trust, 14 March 2007; Daily Champion, 3 April 2007). This 
section addresses whether that growth in readership and prominence corresponded 
with an increased influence in politics and specifically a contribution towards 
democratisation. 
Opinion polling also guided media coverage of candidates, with those leading the polls 
receiving the lion’s share of the attention. An EU monitoring report found that 
“national broadcasters allocated the majority of their election coverage to the 
presidential elections and, in some instances to the governorship elections. News and 
current affairs programmes of private and state broadcasters focused on a limited 
number of parties: predominantly PDP, AC and ANPP” (EU, 2007: 24). That these three 
main parties received the bulk of the coverage was judged to have been based on their 
position in opinion polls.  
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This focus did result, however, in an imbalanced representation of the political 
landscape. While there were fifty registered parties, the media simply lacked the 
capacity and resources to cover them all. Therefore, in spite of their legal obligations 
to provide equal coverage, it seems only logical that the media chose those candidates 
and those parties that opinion polls said had the greater likelihood of winning. An 
analysis of the editorials of two key political newspapers during this period reveals the 
mixed feelings with which public opinion polling was received in the political media. 
Table 17: Political Commentators in Nigeria 2007 Election Campaign 
 This Day, editorial page Vanguard, editorial page 
October 29 2006 “Many Nigerians view Obasanjo as 
a "good president" because of his 
ability to take decisions and stand 
by them irrespective of public 
outcry. To change Nigeria, you must 
be stubborn and dead to public 
opinion, so says a school of 
thought. To put it crudely, you need 
a "mad man" in power if Nigeria is 
to be sanitised once and for all.” 
 
April 10 2007  “If anything is looking sure, it is that 
any politician with or without 
integrity looking for office in 2011 
will do himself a favour doing some 
professional research before he 
puts his hand to the plough, and 
those who do find themselves in 
office this year will do well for 
themselves by having regular polls 
done on their behalf to the end of 
appraising their performance vis-à-
vis that of their competition. Most 
importantly, this kind of 
independent study could be an 
almost fool proof way of reconciling 
public opinion with whatever 
figures a dependent INEC presents 
to us by way of results.” 
April 20 2007 
 
 “Before the election, commissioned 
hack professionals had conducted 
various laughable opinion polls 
showing that some candidates were 
leading others in the various 
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 This Day, editorial page Vanguard, editorial page 
elective offices to be filled. Anyone 
who is close to the grassroots needs 
not be clairvoyant to see the fallacy 
inherent in these opinion polls that 
were conducted in some air-
conditioned offices. In the law of 
evidence, a principle is called laying 
of foundation. And this is what that 
party did through these opinion 
polls; that is to lay foundation for 
the perceived rigging of last 
Saturday's elections.” 
April 29 2007 “Generally speaking, I believe PDP 
was in a position to win the general 
elections without the senseless 
rigging. But the margin wouldn't 
have been this scandalously wide. 
To the best of my knowledge, merit 
or performance occupies little or no 
position in the hierarchy of what 
influences the voting behaviour of 
the Nigerian populace. The real 
question, the real criterion that can 
make Nigeria a great nation, should 
be: who has the best ideas or 
programmes? Sadly, this question 
hardly gets asked and hardly plays 
any role in voters' behaviour.” 
 
 
One columnist encapsulated well the dual nature of opinion polling in Nigeria: “ The 
results of polls like these will help the ruling class to maintain course or change course 
in line with the overwhelming perception of citizenry” but “ it is self-evident the 
opinion polls [are] already being used to sell political candidates” (Daily Trust, 24 
March 2007). Indeed, the dominance of the PDP in the 2007 elections complicated 
polling’s ability to change the political state of play through increased information. The 
numbers merely reflected the superior appeal of the major parties and helped to drive 
further media coverage in their direction, effectively restricting rather than opening 
political space. 
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5.2.1.2 Strategic Responses to Opinion Polling 
Public opinion and polling did, however, contribute to other elite decisions with regard 
to electoral strategies. Looking at the electoral landscape in 2007, the All Nigeria 
Peoples Party (ANPP) candidate Muhammadu Buhari advised opposition parties to 
unite behind one candidate to avoid splitting the vote and handing the election to the 
PDP. Clearly based on analyses of opinion polling, the attempt to create a single 
candidate capable of winning by drawing from the strengths of the various disparate 
opposition parties is an important tactical shift. Opinion polls released before the 
elections suggest that represented a sound strategy and one which would yield a 
majority victory. Nevertheless, the alliance fell apart. Whether this is on the basis of 
further analysis of public opinion or simply the result of conflicting egos, the proposal 
itself shows that polling, however, nascent was beginning to inform political strategies. 
Public opinion also featured in Buhari’s decision in 2007 not to boycott the presidential 
elections. Following rampant reports of electoral fraud in the local and assembly 
elections, many opposition politicians, including Atiku who was at this time still 
technically disqualified from running, began calling for a boycott of the presidential 
polls to express their lack of trust in their legitimacy. The decision went right to the 
end, but ultimately Buhari opted to participate in the elections, writing in the Daily 
Trust the day prior to the vote: “Public opinion is urging candidates against any action 
that may stop the elections” (Daily Trust, 20 April 2007). 
The impact of public opinion on these examples of elite behaviour is mostly a matter of 
conjecture, but there is compelling evidence that opinion polling is becoming 
institutionalised in the selection process of candidates within political parties in Nigeria 
(Private interview, 6 February 2013). The example above illustrates PDP’s use of 
opinion polling on its website as part of its primary selection process. On the other 
hand, a decidedly negative side to opinion polling is the way in which its data can be 
operationalised in political campaigns. While in advanced democracies, this may be 
construed as a good thing, where politicians are better in tune with the particular 
needs of their constituents, in countries like Nigeria it can become a template for 
better targeting electoral manipulation through corruption and intimidation. 
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Nigeria’s political system is particularly open to this kind of manipulation at the 
presidential level due to its requirement that successful candidates not only win the 
popular vote but also win at least 25 per cent of the vote in 2/3rds of the states. Data 
for the 2007 presidential election was never released so it’s impossible to base any 
conclusions on that, notwithstanding the fact that it was largely fraudulent in any case. 
In analysing the 2007 Nigeria elections, Collier and Vicente (2008) found that parties in 
positions of strength, principally the PDP, but opposition parties in their power bases 
would typically opt for two strategies for winning elections: ballot fraud and vote-
buying. With resources scarce, the application of public opinion research may have 
facilitated this process in both the 2007 and 2011 elections. That the practice was 
widespread is well-documented. By February 2007, “some 12 per cent of Nigerians 
interviewed acknowledged that a candidate or a party agent had offered something in 
return for your vote” (Bratton, 2008: 4). 
Collier and Vicente’s analysis also found that where parties found themselves in 
positions of weakness, they often resorted to violence as a last ditch attempt to 
influence the electoral outcomes (Collier and Vicente, 2008). Indeed while initially a 
peaceful campaign, the incidence of violence increased as the elections approached. A 
monitoring report from the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa, 2007) found 
evidence that at least 200 people, including some police, had been killed in election-
related violence. Key incidents included clashes between ANPP and PDP supporters in 
Obasanjo’s home state of Ogun state and between Labour Party and PDP supporters in 
Oyo state. 
Another study found that threatened campaign violence has a more significant effect 
on election outcomes than actual violence. For an average Nigerian it was found that a 
threat of violence reduces the likelihood of intending to vote by 52 per cent. 
Moreover, intimidation’s effect appears to be persistent, carrying over between 
elections, and very effective, with many who faced threats withdrawing entirely from 
the election process (Bratton, 2008).  
The 2007 general election itself was dogged from the start with accusations of 
manipulation and political interference at the highest level. Obasanjo’s personal 
162 
 
 
 
selection of Yar’Adua as his successor rankled with those who considered Nigeria’s 
democracy compromised by such an obvious transgression of authority. Nevertheless, 
with Yar’Adua as its candidate the PDP pursued a vigorous national campaign. 
With Atiku Abubakar excluded for much of the campaign, Buhari of the ANPP was the 
only credible opposition to the incumbent party which had dominated Nigerian politics 
since 1999. But Yar’Adua proved an unpopular choice among the electorate, the 
relatively unknown governor of Katsina state failed to excite significant support from 
the PDP faithful, with polls as late as 9 April showing him to be in a statistically dead 
heat with Buhari. 
Yet, the PDP machinery was clearly making inroads into public opinion. Indeed, among 
the noteworthy features of the late polls at both presidential and gubernatorial levels 
is the disproportionately large number of undecided voters. With the trends moving 
marginally in his favour, Election Day arrived. On the basis of the polls below, Buhari 
and even Atiku, notwithstanding his late official entry into the contest, could go into 
the election with a degree of confidence, feeling that at least they would give Yar’Adua 
a genuine challenge. 
Imagine their surprise when the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) 
announced the results two days later, claiming that the PDP’s Umaru Yar’Adua had 
captured the presidency with 69.82 per cent of the votes. The All Nigeria Peoples Party 
(ANPP) under Muhammadu Buhari had secured 18.72 per cent of the votes while the 
Action Congress (AC) under Atiku Abubakar, polled just 7.47 per cent of the votes. The 
table below illustrates the disparity between the prevailing opinion polls in the run-up 
to the election and the official election results. 
Table 18: Polling Predictions versus Actual Results in Nigeria 2007 Election 
 Share of votes in presidential election (%) 
 Yar’Adua (PDP) Buhari (ANPP) Abubakar (AC) 
Actual results 69.82 18.72 7.47 
This Day polls 39.4 32 20 
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21 April 2007 
This Day polls 
9 April 2007 
29 27 24 
IFES polls 
February 2007 
25 28 12 
 
Opposition response was swift. Buhari refused to accept the results of the ballot and 
called on parliament to impeach Obasanjo for election manipulation. Buhari also 
threatened to organise mass protests if the PDP claimed victory. Atiku described it as 
"the worst election ever in Nigeria," declaring that the government had "no alternative 
than to cancel the election altogether … In fact, I have already rejected these 
elections" (Quist-Arcton, NPR, 23 April 2007). 
Criticism centred primarily on the Obasanjo government and the INEC which was 
deemed to have been corrupted by the PDP elite. Indeed, people expressed surprise 
that the final result of the presidential elections was available when a number of states 
had not finished voting and others had admitted to not having enough ballot papers to 
hold the election in all areas. Quick to react to the controversy, Obasanjo and his 
advisors fell back upon opinion polling to legitimise the election. 
Speaking with the media, one advisor argued that the election must be valid because 
all pre-election opinion surveys had predicted Yar’Adua victory, the margin was 
inconsequential. Obasanjo trotted out the same story presenting the straw man 
argument that some polls, mostly PDP sponsored, had predicted that the PDP would 
win by larger margins so how could the election have been a fraud? (Daily Trust, 26 
April 2007)  
One political insider confided later that “Shortly before the 2007 elections, a 
government cabinet minister came to see me with polling results that ostensibly 
showed overwhelming support for the governing People’s Democratic Party. In 
hindsight, the Obasanjo government’s sharing of poll results with the diplomatic 
community looks like it was part of an orchestrated campaign to try and give credibility 
to the electoral outcomes despite the massive PDP rigging of the elections.” (Campbell, 
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2011: 1) Yet, in spite of robust international condemnation and appeals to national 
protest, widespread violence in reaction to the fraudulent election failed to materialise 
(BBC, 1 May 2007). In the northern city of Kano, groups supporting the opposition 
candidate Buhari ignited bonfires in protest and threatened passing motorists, but the 
incidents were largely isolated.  
Under these conditions, it is understandable why opinion polling in Nigeria in 2007 was 
often dismissed as exercises in propaganda. As with most things, perceptions of 
credibility and impartiality are all relative and tied to where one sits in the political 
spectrum. PDP supporters viewed the huge victory as entirely feasible and considered 
the stream of polls predicting a close contest as the desperate attempts of an 
opposition and international community intent on breaking the PDP stranglehold on 
power. Opposition supporters, by contrast, viewed the independent polls as the true 
representation of the political landscape, believing the final tally to have been the 
result of massive rigging and co-option within the electoral institutions of Nigeria 
(Private interview, 6 February 2013). This lack of trust in these institutions adds a 
difficult obstacle to the idea of political polls setting more realistic expectations. If the 
relevant institutions cannot be relied on to deliver the election freely and fairly, then 
the introduction of polls does not promote acceptance of results but rather the 
opposite. It provokes those on the losing end to contest, usually to the detriment of all. 
In assessing opinion polling’s political impact at a strategic level, then, the evidence of 
2007 points to an elite dominant system, using polls to maximise personal gain over 
the needs/wishes of the electorate. While opinion polling played an important role in 
persuading the opposition to contest the elections and therefore preventing a PDP 
monopoly on power, once the campaign was joined the strategic calculus deteriorated 
considerably. In the personality-dominant arena of politics, the power of numbers lies 
not in convincing voters of your merit but in convincing voters of your ability to deliver, 
either to their benefit or to their detriment depending on how they choose to vote. 
While opinion polling may not directly contribute to the exercise of these tactics, it 
appears that the presence of hard data enabled politicians to be more ruthless and yet 
more selective in their application. While this may represent value for money for 
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Nigerian ‘big men’, it does not speak well for opinion polling’s ability to influence 
positively Nigeria’s quest for more transparent and representative elections. 
5.2.2 The 2007 Gubernatorial Elections 
The outcome of the presidential election was presaged by the conduct of the 
gubernatorial elections the previous week, which also ended in calls for rejecting 
results, re-runs, and long-running court challenges. As Obasanjo told the BBC, the 
PDP’s internal polls set a high bar for electoral success in 2007; in the case of the 
governor’s race, they predicted a clean sweep for the party. Independent polling 
predicted differently, setting up a keen political battle in some ‘swing states’ (BBC, 
2007). 
The gubernatorial elections were characterised by pervasive fraud that called the 
results of many states into question, undermining the legitimacy of a number of 
‘elected’ governors. These included, but were not limited to, the PDP candidate in 
Delta state being declared the winner of his by INEC headquarters before the 
tabulation of votes had finished; the results of gubernatorial elections in Imo State 
where APGA’s candidate was leading being annulled due to electoral violence while 
elections in states won by the PDP where similar violence was reported were allowed 
to stand; and the disqualification of the AC candidate in Adamawa State just 12 hours 
prior to the start of the elections when it became clear that he was the likely victor 
(NDI, 2007). 
After the polls, the election tribunals became inundated with petitions based on 
irregularities in the 2007 elections. 106 petitions were filed challenging gubernatorial 
outcomes, emanating from all but one of the federation’s states. The results had 
important ramifications for the country. While the presidential elections achieve 
greater notoriety internationally, for the Nigerian political elite, the gubernatorial 
elections almost equally significant due to governors’ access to the country's natural 
resource revenues and their position at the top of many important clientelistic 
networks. 
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5.2.2.1 Polls Shaping Perceptions 
Media reports suggest that opinion polling provides instructive information on 
questions of candidate selection and party participation, particularly at local levels. In 
the 2007, gubernatorial contest in Kwara state, one of the candidates interviewed 
revealed how he anticipated the process would pan out. “Let everybody express their 
intentions, from Kwara South, we are four major candidates, there are other people 
though, but the four major ones people are talking about are four. But out of the four, 
what my own party and my own person is saying is that, let everyone of us go out and 
sell ourselves to the electorates, because it is not just the party or the Kwara south 
that is going to elect us, it is the Kwarans. We hope by early March, there would be an 
opinion poll on who is more popular, it would be clear; then we can now say that let 
this person go” (Vanguard, 13 February 2007).  
The extent, however, upon which politicians at this level rely on opinion polling is 
restricted by the structure of the politics. The parties and the selection of candidates 
are dominated largely by political ‘godfathers’ whose preferences reckon far greater 
than those of the electorate in deciding who will contest the election (Private interview 
9 February 2013). In this context, polling may be a contributory factor in decision-
making, but it certainly does not open up political space in any meaningful way. 
5.2.2.2 Strategic Responses to Polling 
The content of political opinion polling does present some opportunities for strategic 
prioritising at the gubernatorial level. While not shifting the political reality in any 
meaningful way, the data provides measurable targets for those political operators 
looking to arrest opposition momentum or push voters in their candidate’s direction 
through strategic communication in the media and on the campaign trail. The 
gubernatorial race in 2007 in Ekiti is a good example. Throughout the campaign, 
political commentators believed the election to be securely in the hands of the Action 
Congress. Coincidentally, as the polls approached, reports began to leak about 
impending vote rigging and electoral fraud, forcing the PDP candidate Olusegun Oni 
and President Obasanjo to deny the accusations (This Day, 10 April 2007). Oni went 
167 
 
 
 
further accusing the AC of fraud: "In fact, it is the AC that has been inducing people 
with money to perpetuate fraud in the elections" (Daily Champion, 13 April 2007). 
Threats of corruption also hung over the gubernatorial election in Edo, where 
“suspicion of rigging in Edo has been heightened in recent times because of what many 
observers have seen as an indication that Oshiomhole [the Action Congress candidate] 
may win the election. Various opinion polls and reports have given the former labour 
leader the edge over Professor Osarhiemen Osunbor, the PDP candidate” (This Day, 5 
April 2007). The PDP countered that the AC were “sponsoring opinion polls through 
media and manufactured facts and figures all in a bid to create false alarm” (Vanguard, 
13 April 2007). 
Similar concerns faced opposition candidates in Imo state where APGA candidate 
Martin Agbaso enjoyed huge leads over his PDP opponents who were caught in a legal 
struggle of their own over who should represent the party. One commentator related 
a story of a visit to a friend in Imo who began “I can bet my life that Agbaso will win 
the governorship overwhelmingly, but … ‘But what?’ I asked. I knew where he was 
going. ‘PDP may rig it. You know our country’” (This Day, 1 April 2007). 
For opinion polling to have a hope in influencing elections in a positive way, certain 
assumptions must hold. First among these is that the electoral process itself will at 
least approximate the behaviour of the selected sample, through both good statistical 
design and through upright institutions. At the level of the gubernatorial elections in 
2007, Nigeria clearly fails to support this assumption. Political parties could not 
realistically use polls to craft strategy as there was no guarantee the numbers would 
bear any relation to the official results. Instead, polling could only be used by 
incumbent candidates and parties to determine the extent to which they need to 
adjust the final figures to ensure victory. The only compelling contribution therefore 
could be to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of election rigging. 
Yet, while polling had limited strategic effect before the election, it did have its uses 
after the election. As the only record of note, the polls were often used as justification 
for court challenges and subsequently produced as evidence of rampant rigging in 
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certain cases. In other states, polling which suggested a close race contributed to 
triggering violence when one party or another was declared the winner by significant 
margins.  
In Ekiti, Obasanjo’s strategy of personal intervention, discussed above, seemed to 
backfire as Olusegun Oni persistently trailed Action Congress’s candidate Kayode 
Fayemi in the opinion polls. On April 14, however, the INEC in Ekiti declared Oni the 
resounding winner. Protests broke out almost immediately led by thousands of women 
of the Ekiti Women’s Alliance who took to the streets to protest against the 
declaration of the PDP candidate as the winner, contending that the AC was “robbed 
of victory” (Daily Champion, 18 April 2007). The situation escalated to such an extent 
that Obasanjo was forced to declare a state of emergency following the total 
breakdown of law and order in the state as violent protests left many people dead and 
homes of prominent members of the ruling party destroyed (This Day, 19 April 2007).  
Confident that the official result had been fabricated, Fayemi appealed the result, 
winning a re-run in 2009. These polls, held on 25 April, were marred by violence that 
prevented a viable result from being achieved, forcing a further poll on 5 May 2009. 
After a series of dramatic incidents, including the disappearance of the Resident 
Electoral Commissioner, Oni was again announced the winner with 111,140 votes over 
Fayemi’s 107,011. Fayemi appealed once more and ultimately was awarded the victory 
on 15 October 2010 after over 41 months of legal battles. 
This story was repeated across numerous states in the south of the county. In Edo 
state, a south central state, again with a history of electoral dysfunction, violence 
erupted after the announcement of another PDP victory. In spite of opinion polls 
predicting a narrow victory for the AC candidate Oshiomhole, the INEC had declared 
PDP’s Osarihemen Osunbor as the winner by a margin of almost two-to-one, far 
beyond any realistic tally for the PDP candidate.  
In the immediate aftermath, three officials of the INEC in Edo State were killed by the 
protesters, with groups threatening further violence if the INEC did not reverse its 
verdict and announce the AC candidate the victor (This Day, 18 April 2007). Yet, while 
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Oshiomhole was arrested for inciting violence, the governor-elect declared the 
election to have been the ‘best ever.’ Osunbor said “The people have rejected the evil 
plans of the disguised enemies of democracy, whose pre-elections caustic rhetoric was 
targeted at inciting violence, disruption and unrest, which they will then use as a 
platform for protest" (Daily Champion, 17 April 2007). 
Following a long court battle, almost a year later in March 2008, the state election 
tribunal annulled the election results, declaring the AC’s Oshiomhole the winner. The 
decision was appealed again, with a final decision only emerging in November 2008, 
when a federal Appeal Court upheld the ruling of the state's elections tribunal 
installing Oshiomhole once and for all as the Governor of Edo State. 
The rigging reached its most blatant in Imo state in the southeast where opinion polls 
had long given the APGA candidate Martins Agbaso a substantial lead heading into the 
election. On the day of election, citing voting irregularities in some of the local 
districts, the INEC in the state cancelled the election, setting 28 April as the new date 
for the poll. This was met with protests from Agbaso supporters which urged the INEC 
to release the result of the polls. The National Labour Congress (NLC) released a 
statement: "We are rather astonished that after claiming that the widespread fraud 
and irregularities were prevalent in seven local government areas where voting for the 
two elections were held simultaneously, INEC still went ahead to cancel the 
gubernatorial election and accepted that of the House of Assembly" (This Day, 21 April 
2007). In the run-off, the PDP establishment in Imo supported a third party candidate, 
Ihedi Ohakim from the Progressive People’s Alliance (PPA), who won a resounding 
victory. Efforts to overturn the election proved fruitless and after almost four years of 
legal battles, Agbaso’s case was eventually thrown out. 
While the bulk of the irregularities occurred in the south of the country, the northern 
states were not immune from electoral violence. Violence was also reported in the 
northern state of Katsina, where opposition supporters torched government buildings 
while protesting the announcement of the PDP’s victory in the state’s gubernatorial 
polls. This followed reports of late opinion polls which had the two candidates running 
in a statistical dead heat. 
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These examples reiterate the potential that opinion polling has in competitive 
environments of instigating rather than reducing violence and conflict by establishing 
appropriate expectations of election results. This is rarely as a result of shortcomings in 
the polling but rather deficiencies in the electoral process which create vast chasms 
between the data presented in the pre-election polls and official election tallies. The 
pertinent question is whether the transparency that polls provide and the conflict it 
subsequently provokes is good for democratic development in the long-run, even if it 
is disastrous in the immediate aftermath of elections. Will it ultimately lead to greater 
accountability of politicians and state institutions to the electorate or will it simply 
engender a new generation of politicians more adept at manipulating polls in advance 
to conform to their electoral preferences?  
5.2.2.4 Implications for Research 
The record then for the influence of public opinion polling on political information and 
electoral strategies is decidedly ambivalent. On the one hand, it is credited with 
ensuring that the opposition took part in the 2007 general elections. Nigerian 
academics were now arguing that “a government that wants to remain in power and 
still have its popularity among the people needs to take public opinion into 
consideration…public opinion now plays an important role in politics. They are used 
throughout the course of election campaigns by candidates and by media to see which 
candidates are ahead and who is likely to emerge victorious” (Church and Onyebuchi, 
2012: 233). Yet, on the other, it seems to function more prominently as means for 
elites to present ‘consensus’ candidates to the electorates, using opinion polls as a way 
to presage the outcomes of the elections and ensure they are on the winning side 
(Private interview, 6 February 2013). In this context, participation is no longer 
representative of open and fair contestation but rather a pre-organised game, that 
while not necessarily rigged from start, does present Nigerian citizens with a reduced 
scope for choice (Private interview, 9 February 2013). 
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5.2.3 The 2011 Presidential Elections 
The 2011 general election was overshadowed by the political crisis brought about by 
the death of President Yar’Adua in 2010. The succession crisis with in the PDP that 
followed centred on the geographic origin of its preferred candidate for the 
forthcoming election. Following the country’s transition to democracy, the political 
elites had concluded an agreement that required the presidency to rotate between 
Nigeria’s north and south, an arrangement generally referred to as ‘zoning’ (Tayo, 
2011). 
Based on this agreement, there was a consensus, particularly in the north, that 
because Yar’Adua, a northerner, had died before completing his first term it remained 
the North’s turn to hold the presidency. Despite efforts of these northern elites to 
block him, Goodluck Jonathan, the vice-president and a southerner, assumed the 
presidency following Yar’Adua’s death. Undeterred, the focus of the northern coalition 
turned to preventing Jonathan’s nomination as the PDP candidate for 2011 to prevent 
what they saw as a southern usurpation of power. 
Returning to the PDP, Atiku presented himself as the Northern candidate that could 
smooth over the ethno-regional divide caused by Jonathan’s candidacy. In support of 
his campaign, he pointed to an opinion poll conducted on the PDP website which gave 
him a slim lead over Jonathan to become the party’s presidential nominee (Daily Trust, 
3 January 2011). Proving that popularity is not sufficient, the poll was hastily removed 
from the website, and legal proceedings began seeking his disqualification from the 
campaign. Jonathan with the support of the PDP elite sailed to victory in the PDP 
primary later in the year, and Atiku faded from the political scene. 
It was a similar story with Buhari, this time competing under the banner of the CPC 
(Congress for Progressive Change), seeking an alliance with the ACN and its candidate 
Nuhu Ribadu. In this case, the initial agreement on power-sharing collapsed following 
the results of parliamentary elections in which the CPC did not perform as well as 
expected (This Day, 14 April 2011). A possible interpretation of this outcome suggests 
that the original bargain was struck on the basis of anticipated results drawn from 
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opinion polls. When the final tallies emerged with CPC, and its senior statesman Buhari 
at a disadvantage, the power balance of the coalition became unmanageable, forcing 
dissolution.  
5.2.3.1 Polls Shaping Perceptions 
At a national level, opinion polling became a principal means for establishing one’s 
right to candidacy. As already discussed, Atiku frequently cited opinion polls in his bid 
to gain the PDP nomination. Other minor candidates also tried to use the tactic to ‘test 
the waters’ for their candidacy (Daily Trust, 17 November 2006). In 2011, public 
opinion data became a crucial element to the arguments of Goodluck Jonathan that he 
was capable of winning a national election, in spite of his southern heritage (Vanguard, 
19 February 2011). It remained a niche market though, targeted principally at the 
political elite. Indeed, this author’s review of over 28,000 newspaper articles published 
in Nigeria between October 2010 and May 2011 revealed only 72 mentions of the term 
“opinion poll.” Normalised per 1000 articles, this results in 2.57 mentions per 
thousand. A slight increase from the 2007 election, but opinion polling, while 
influential, was by no means a consistently popular news item. 
Reflecting the growing importance of public opinion in electoral campaigns, Jonathan 
had his Senior Special Assistant to the President on Research, Documentation, and 
Strategy doing his own independent polling in the run-up to the election. Defending his 
candidate’s ability to win, he claimed “From the analysis, internal and external, it has 
become clear to us that Dr. Goodluck will win the presidential election by as much as 
75 per cent of the total votes cast. You don’t need to look too far to see where the 
opinion polls are pointing towards” (Vanguard, 28 March 2011). Such a public 
statement may have done much to reassure any potential PDP voters who feared that 
Jonathan lacked the broad base of support necessary to win the presidential vote. 
Over the campaign, it became clear that Jonathan and his team were consuming and 
responding to the public opinion polls that were being released regarding the 
presidential race. When NOI Polls released a poll listing the electorate’s top three 
issues for their candidates to address, Jonathan’s speeches were adapted to ensure 
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that each issue was addressed in the exact order in which they had been listed in the 
poll. Even in an environment of low public accountability and limited political pressure 
from opposition, Jonathan and his advisors deemed it a necessary step to incorporate 
that information into their communication strategy (Private interview, 7 February 
2013). 
For 2011, it is interesting to note that while Goodluck Jonathan coasted to victory 
attaining the appropriate 25 per cent margin in 32 states (well above the requisite 24), 
there were a number of northern states where his vote tally came perilously close to 
falling short. Notably in Zamfara, Katsina, and Niger states where his share of the votes 
amounted to 25.35, 26.13, and 31.54 per cent respectively. In a closer election, those 
kinds of spreads could mean the difference between winning and losing. 
Information from public opinion polling, according to prominent newspaper editors, 
not only enriches the articles on the political campaigns, they sometimes serve as a 
“game changer.” Where the atmosphere is tense and political horse-trading has 
become the order of the day, the introduction of a demonstrative poll can shift the 
political calculus and begin to drive electoral intelligentsia opinion. Indeed, its 
credibility was such that local academics used public opinion polls to fashion a 
statistical model design to predict, ultimately incorrectly, the outcome of the 2011 
presidential election (Ojameruaye, 2011). Polling information, without doubt, had 
become a critical factor in any political analysis (Private interview, 7 February 2013).  
5.2.3.2 Strategic Responses to Opinion Polling 
By 2011, the PDP, while still the dominant party, was increasingly less secure in its hold 
over public opinion. Polling results on the eve of the gubernatorial elections 
threatened losses in up to nine states. Coupled with a tenser national electoral mood, 
it produced Nigeria’s most violent election to date.  
Jonathan’s victory over the northern alternative, Atiku, in the PDP primaries marked an 
important juncture in Nigerian politics, throwing a long-standing elite agreement into 
disarray. Opposition parties were eager to capitalise on PDP’s internal preoccupations 
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and build on the gains made at state level where opposition parties have made inroads 
into overturning PDP’s dominance. Buba Galadima, CPC national secretary, warned 
that the party would not accept the results should its candidate lose, because it had no 
confidence in the ability of the security agencies to oversee credible elections (This 
Day, 1 April 2011). 
Nevertheless, Jonathan never really trailed according to the national opinion polls 
conducted during the campaign. The PDP while struggling to maintain support in 
parliamentary and gubernatorial elections never looked like losing the presidential 
vote. Not that Buhari’s supporters weren’t above condemning this poll, with one 
claiming that Jonathan had “lost the perception war” (This Day, 5 April 2011). 
For example, the handlers of President Goodluck Jonathan framed a strategy where 
they urged Nigerian voters to desire “Fresh Air”. This was a deliberate strategy to 
deviate attention from the rancorous political campaigns which used to be the norm in 
the past. Most of the electorate that voted for candidate Jonathan voted based on 
their desire to see a clean break from the past and truly experience this ‘fresh air.’ This 
was something of an extraordinary feat for a candidate of Jonathan’s political 
credentials, but it reflected an appreciation of public opinion desire for something new 
(Agbo, 2013). 
According to local sources, polling’s place in Nigeria’s political system has now begun 
to solidify. While politicians may often feign that they do not rely on newspaper 
reports owing to misinformation and lack of credibility for some newspapers. The truth 
is that on a larger scale, strategies of politicians and their parties are fluid during the 
period and as such, they change depending on the prevailing political situation as 
indicated by the polling outcome (Private interview, 7 February 2013). 
Following the election, the official results confirmed the polls predictions, declaring 
Goodluck Jonathan winner with approximately 59 per cent of the vote, well within the 
margin of error for some of the major polls. Buhari managed 32 per cent, which was 
significantly higher than the opinion data suggested. His supporters were either 
significantly underrepresented in the sampling of the polls or were among undecideds 
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who ultimately decided to vote against the ruling party. The table below shows the 
correspondence between polls and official results. 
Table 19: Polling Predictions versus Actual Results in Nigeria 2011 Election 
 Share of votes in presidential election (%) 
 Jonathan (PDP) Buhari (CPC) Ribadu (ACN) Shekarau (ANPP) 
Actual results 
 
58.89 
 
31.98 5.41 2.40 
This Day polls 
7 April 2011 
62 23 n/a n/a 
This Day polls 
23 March 2011 
60.3 22 4.7 n/a 
RMS poll 
29 March 2011 
65 18 6 3 
NOI poll 53 N/A N/A N/A 
 
The relative accuracy of the other voting results supports a number of different 
conclusions relative to 2007. First, polling practice may have improved over the course 
of four years to better estimate trends. Second, the 2007 election was rigged beyond 
recognition such that no amount of opinion polling would have successfully predicted 
the outcome. Third, the 2011 election was perhaps manipulated with an eye toward 
matching opinion polling data to create a veneer of legitimacy.  
Buhari’s CPC certainly believed the latter to be case, rejecting results in 22 states on 
the basis of electoral fraud and intimidation. While such targeted rejections were to be 
expected, what surprised the security and intelligence communities was the intensity 
of violence that followed the announcement of the results of the presidential election. 
Violence erupted in fourteen Northern states with the worst effects felt in Adamawa, 
Kano, Kaduna, Nasarawa, Bauchi and parts of Niger states. According to reports, over 
1,000 people were killed and 74,000 people displaced. (Human Rights Watch, 2011) 
In a powerful argument against the contention that opinion polls help establish 
realistic expectations, some media reported that “some protesters believed that 
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because Buhari won in their immediate vicinities, he had become president. They 
equated victory in their own states to a Nigeria-wide victory” (Daily Sun, 29 April 
2011). On the whole, however, most observers attribute the violence to a combination 
of disillusioned youths and northern unease at being potentially frozen out of the 
Nigerian political system. Nevertheless, it supports the contention that no amount of 
opinion polling can undo expectations which are too fervently held as to withstand all 
evidence to the contrary. 
5.2.4 The 2011 Gubernatorial Elections 
It was in the wake of these violent clashes that the gubernatorial elections for 2011 
were held. Opposition optimism was nonetheless high on the basis of opinion polling 
which showed them making significant inroads into PDP’s dominant position. Bucking 
the national trend and following the pattern of the 2007 election, disputes in the 
gubernatorial arena were based exclusively on local issues, although the violent 
atmosphere in which they were conducted certainly added tension. 
5.2.4.1 Polls Shaping Perceptions 
The subtle but emergent trend in Nigerian politics is the weakening of the power of 
political godfathers with each passing election. The rapid growth in social media and 
opinion polling has shed far greater transparency on political information and political 
decision-making. Politics are still dominated by a small number of powerbrokers, but 
the tide may be turning (Private interview, 9 February 2013). 
In the 2011 Abia state gubernatorial race, the Conference of Nigeria Political Parties 
was said to be “perfecting arrangements to adopt a consensus candidate for the 
governorship election” by conducting an opinion poll (Daily Champion, 18 February 
2011). The Northern Youth Assembly undertook a similar exercise in the presidential 
contest, using an opinion poll of its delegates to decide which ‘consensus candidate it 
would endorse (Daily Independent, 8 April 2011). 
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This is not to say that everyone embraces the growth of public opinion polling. Even 
among civil society, there are grave doubts as to the veracity of the information 
obtained through polling. “Speaking yesterday on the backdrop of controversies 
surrounding opinion polls few days to the April general elections, President, Civil Rights 
Congress, Kaduna, Malam Shehu Sani said that Nigerian pollsters are paid fortune 
tellers, entrepreneurial seers and false prophets. ‘Nigerian pollsters imagine and 
coupled results in their offices and homes and churn it out as a product of a conducted 
survey. Over the years and prelude to elections, they have a consistent but fraudulent 
pattern of predicting victories for incumbents and their paymasters’” (Daily Trust, 29 
March 2011). 
Opinion polling at this level of election is fraught with difficulties. Conducting polls at 
state level requires far greater organisational capacity and resources than operating at 
national level only. Given the size of Nigeria both in terms of area and population, this 
precludes all but the largest and best financed polling outfits from attempting it. The 
appetite for public opinion polling is certainly growing both in the media and among 
the political class (Private interview, 6 February 2013). Social media regularly picks up 
polling data, and politicians have come to recognise its importance in shaping political 
discourse. In practice, however, this is not always sufficient. 
5.2.4.2 Strategic Responses to Opinion Polling 
Many politicians will pay for polling to improve their standing in an electoral contest 
(Private interview, 9 February 2013). And such is the dilemma for polling at the 
gubernatorial level. Trying to balance credibility and impartiality with the realities of 
polling expense create a tension that underpins much of opinion polling’s role in state 
level politics in Nigeria. 
In Edo state, Governor Adams Oshiomhole noted rising tensions in his state after 
troops, allegedly acting on behalf of the PDP, were said to have attacked potential 
voters during the parliamentary elections (This Day, 6 April 2011). In Benue state, 
spates of violence erupted throughout the election period. One commentator 
described the campaign: “The attempt on the life of a Senatorial candidate in the state, 
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Major-General Lawrence Onoja, is a clear testimony of the level of political violence in 
the state. One is not sure who it will be next. Political contenders in the state appear to 
be ferocious in their quest to be declared winners after the elections no matter the 
cost. The result will be more violence” (Vanguard, 1 April 2011). 
By contrast, in Imo state where opinion polls gave APGA candidate Rochas Okorocha a 
commanding lead of 64 to 18 per cent, the same commentator had this to say: “The 
personalities lined up for the gubernatorial and senatorial elections, present what is 
called the 'Group of Death' and this makes the elections to be more attention-
grabbing. Apart from criminal kidnapping and political intimidation and harassment, 
nothing has been reported in the area of a more life threatening political violence and 
killings as it was in the past” (ibid). 
These examples suggest that the opinion polling can influence strategic considerations 
in the sense that gubernatorial candidates will abstain from violence in contests where 
there is no chance for success. While sporadic violence may occur at any point, 
engineered violence such as was seen in the 2007 in Kenya or in these elections in 
Nigeria derives from a conviction that the violence will achieve a particular end. Thus 
where polling suggests a close race, pre-election violence may be considered more 
likely, given the right underlying conditions, while where a poll suggests a landslide, 
there may be little to be gained by strategic violence.  
Strategies may shift however in the aftermath of elections. Politicians and supporters 
operating under certain expectations will react differently, especially in politically-
charged environments. Indeed, several key governorships seemed to run counter to 
the prevailing climate of free and fair elections in 2011. 
In the south, Imo state was once again the centre of intrigue. With opinion polls giving 
APGA candidate a solid lead, the INEC within the state decided to delay his election on 
grounds of voting irregularities in certain districts. The delay sparked tensions 
especially around the office premises of INEC where angry partisans fashioned 
roadblocks to prevent vehicles entering or exiting the INEC compound (Vanguard, 29 
April 2011). Following a supplementary election, Okorocha of the APGA was ultimately 
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declared the winner, but with a far slimmer margin than pre-election polling would 
have expected. 
Further allegations emerged in Bauchi state, which had its election post posed due to 
the post-presidential election violence. Amid extraordinarily tight security, voter 
turnout was low, an outcome which likely favoured the PDP incumbent and 
contributed to his victory. Opposition CPC and ANPP candidates rejected the result 
citing electoral fraud on the basis of opinion polling conducted immediately prior to 
the election which suggested the election could go either way (Daily Trust, 30 April 
2011).  
The biggest surprise, however, came in another northern state, Katsina. The home of 
CPC candidate Buhari, it was seen as a CPC stronghold and certainly a state where 
opposition could gain ground in an election year where PDP was relatively weak. Pre-
election polling supported this assessment, giving the CPC candidate a nine point lead 
heading into the election. Official tallies, however, gave the victory to the PDP with the 
incumbent Shema accumulating 1,027,912 votes to the CPC's Bello Masari’s 555,769. 
Masari rejected the entire process of the poll: "We are totally rejecting whatever 
comes out of this election, because there was total disregard for due process in the 
conduct of the election” (Leadership, 28 April 2011). 
5.2.4.4 Implications for Research 
For many of the elections reviewed in 2011, public opinion polling did succeed in 
establishing the eventual winners. In a volatile political environment like Nigeria, such 
predictions may or may not have prevented rejections of elections and the further 
escalation of violence. It is clear, however, that the imperfections in both the science 
of polling in Nigeria and the Nigerian electoral system itself contrive to create 
situations where pre-election polling possibly exacerbates the problem of politically-
motivated violence. 
Broadly, there is growing evidence that the way in which Nigerians participate in 
elections is changing. Young people are voting in greater numbers; technology is 
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allowing the media and citizen groups to capture and share election data more quickly 
and easily; and there is an emerging capacity within the context of opinion polling to 
measure and analyse electoral behaviour and preferences (Campbell, 2011). In doing 
so, opinion polling can be seen to be working towards the greater good of removing 
electoral fraud and supporting more transparent and representative elections, but its 
short term contribution to Nigerian politics has been a reputation for igniting electoral 
controversies.  
Indeed, irrespective of opinion polling’s contribution, the electoral outcome was 
ultimately determined by the same elites who have always dominated Nigerian 
politics. Nevertheless, if these developments in public opinion research can persist and 
expand, they could have a significant and positive impact on the improvement 
electoral practice and outcomes. Whatever its influence, it cannot be denied that 
public opinion polling has made a forceful entry into the Nigerian political system, 
shaping elite behaviour both for the better and, unfortunately, often for the worse. 
5.3 Conclusions 
This chapter offers several new contributions to this thesis’s overarching question 
regarding the impact of opinion polling on electoral politics in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Opinion polls as a source of political information have clearly grown over the course of 
the past decade in Nigeria. Among the more convincing evidence that public opinion is 
considered pertinent by Nigerian political elites is the time and effort spent by 
politicians and the media in trying to ascertain the opinion of ordinary Nigerians. 
However, the connection between political outcomes and public opinion may not 
always be clear, leading some to doubt its relevance in the Nigerian context. It also is 
apparent that the current generation of politicians in Nigeria has been relatively slow 
in recognising the potential in opinion polling as both a source of information and as a 
means of managing it. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that opinion polls exert some influence over key segments of 
the political elite. The third term crisis amply demonstrates the potency of a ‘sudden’ 
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swing in popular opinion. While the anti-amendment campaign was already extant, the 
introduction of polling numbers gave it a potency it could not have mustered alone. At 
the same time, the evidence in this chapter has shown the negative side to political 
responsiveness in the form of strategic rigging and intimidation based on the targeted 
information provided by opinion polling.  
Indeed, in spite of the gains opinion polling has made in Nigeria, its influence is 
hampered by a number of structural factors. Nigerian politics have been, since the 
military dictatorships, largely non-ideological. As one Nigerian author noted, “rather 
than a battle of ideas, they are about who can pump in the most money and buy the 
most access. Debating ideas, spurred by youth participation, might bring more 
substance. Candidates will no longer merely hold colourful rallies, but will answer 
questions about important issues such as education and electricity.”(Adichie, 2011: 1)  
The story of opinion polling in Nigeria has largely been about expectations unmet. 
Whether as an electorate deprived of duly elected leaders or as pollsters and 
politicians deprived of legitimate numbers against which to base their projections, 
Nigeria’s experience with polling has developed far more slowly than its counterparts 
in this study. Barring a few notable successes, the political structure has restricted its 
ability to influence its elections in a systematic way. 
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Chapter 6. Public Opinion Polling in Ugandan Elections 2001–
2011 
Just four days before the 2011 presidential elections, controversy emerged regarding 
the likelihood of President Museveni’s re-election, an outcome that had been all but 
confirmed in the minds of most local and international observers. The source of the 
controversy was opinion polling. A local media source published an article questioning 
why Museveni’s rival was winning all of the major newspaper online opinion polls in 
the run-up to the election while independent face-to-face and telephone polling was 
calling for a large Museveni victory (Uganda Correspondent, 14 February 2011). 
Whether the item was written in earnest or designed merely to generate interest in an 
electoral contest long since decided, the article and its surrounding debates are 
representative of the opportunities and challenges facing opinion polling in Uganda. 
Political opinion polling is still in its infancy in Uganda. While it has been present in the 
country for well over a decade, the industry has focused its attention on the 
presidential elections, held every five years. This intermittent approach, coupled with 
the specific challenges of operating in a restrictive political environment, has stifled 
growth of an institution that may otherwise have developed into a more significant 
political force. As it stands, media, politicians, and pollsters are still locked in an 
ambivalent stance toward political opinion polling, where questions as rudimentary as 
the one posed above can still inspire argument and recriminations. 
This is not to say that political opinion polling in Uganda has not developed over the 
past 15 years, but its impact on Ugandan electoral politics remains controversial. This 
thesis tests three hypotheses related to the way in which opinion polling influences 
elite strategies and the quality of elections. Specifically, it attempts to determine 
whether it is opinion polling’s ability to substitute for collective action, to force 
institutional adaptation, or to shape elite perceptions around electoral competition 
that determines the likelihood that elites will more toward or away from more 
transparent and representative electoral processes. 
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This chapter reviews the evidence of opinion polling’s influence on Ugandan elections 
and finds that it is generally supportive of the third hypothesis. There is little evidence 
to suggest that shifts in elite strategies around elections over this time period had 
anything to do with opinion polling’s ability to aggregate opinion or to change 
institutions. There is, however, evidence that opinion polling’s ability to shape elite 
perceptions of shifts in political competition was influential in terms of altering elite 
electoral behaviour and consequently the quality of those elections. 
6.1 The Context of the Research 
The history of Ugandan politics is one of incomplete national integration and ever 
narrowing elite dominance. Ethnic, regional, and religious divisions fomented during 
the colonial era have often been intensified by post-independence politics. Having 
failed to address these fundamental issues, successive leaders relied on increasingly 
narrow sections of the population to sustain their power. Recent efforts to paper over 
ethnic divisions through various means have reduced the saliency of ethnicity in 
Ugandan elections. The strength of personality of President Yoweri Museveni has 
instead divided the political elite into pro- and anti-Museveni camps, a bifurcation 
which colours the context of Uganda politics through this period. 
6.1.1 Historical Context 
Conflicts that have their impetus in the colonial period continue to influence politics 
more than a century later. Indeed, failed policies designed to promote greater 
nationalism have often had the opposite effect of turning local conflicts into national 
disputes. The central government increasingly intervened in local affairs, mediating on 
issues over which it previously had no jurisdiction. Yet, even as the state inserted itself 
more and more in the lives of its citizens, it found itself relying increasingly on 
authoritarian policies to maintain order and coercion to ensure continued popular 
support.  
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In the 1960s, the complex federal arrangements implemented following independence 
provided ample opportunities for existing conflicts to fester. Milton Obote, a northern 
Protestant and Uganda’s first prime minister, chafed under the restrictions of its inter-
ethnic alliance and moved to consolidate power within the central government. In 
1966, Obote appointed himself president and abandoned the federal system and the 
bargaining it entailed on the basis that he would be able to govern more effectively 
through a unitary presidency. 
The move made Obote vulnerable. In 1971, General Idi Amin, Uganda's highest-ranking 
military officer and a Muslim from a different part of the north than Obote, seized 
control of the country. Quickly, it became clear that Amin's religion and regional origin 
would be distinct disadvantages in fashioning a sufficiently broad political base to 
enable him to rule effectively (Kasfir, 1998). Trying to unite Ugandans against a 
common enemy, in 1972, he expelled most residents of Asian descent, decimating the 
country’s merchant class and sending the economy into tailspin. Economic decline lend 
to food and supply shortages, sparking rapid increases in levels of corruption. Under 
pressure, Amin became increasingly erratic and ruthless in his rule, resulting in 
spiralling death tolls. 
Amin was eventually overthrown in 1979 by the Tanzanian army, which was 
accompanied by rival Ugandan factions headed by Obote and one Yoweri Museveni, 
following a botched invasion of northwestern Tanzania. An ineffective transitional 
government followed, composed of bickering factions whose disagreements brought 
the country to a standstill. Obote emerged victorious in the end having convinced most 
of the army to support him. He quickly organised the 1980 elections, which returned 
Uganda to ‘civilian’ rule, based on a multi-party ethos (ibid). 
6.1.2 Recent Political Context 
Uganda has held five post-independence national elections, in 1980, 1996, 2001, 2006, 
and 2011. The controversial 1980 elections sparked another wave of political 
instability. Obote, with the backing of the military, declared himself the winner, 
spurring Museveni and other small renegade groups to resort to guerrilla war. After 
185 
 
 
 
five tempestuous years, in July 1985, Obote was overthrown in a military coup. Six 
months later, the National Resistance Army (NRA), led by Museveni, vanquished all 
remaining military opposition, effectively gaining control of the country. 
6.1.2.1 The “No-party System”  
The capture of state power by the NRA, later renamed the National Resistance 
Movement or NRM, in 1986 marked the advent of the “no-party system” of 
governance (Crook, 1999). Museveni and the NRM initiated an ambitious programme 
designed to effect a “fundamental change in the politics of this country.” To do this, 
the NRM first established a four-year interim period during which it would brook no 
competition, later extending this to seven years and finally to eight. When the NRM 
allowed the first national legislative election to take place in 1989, it ensured that it 
was carefully managed. Nevertheless, there was optimism that its initiatives would 
ultimately bring democracy and an end to the divisions that had toppled previous 
regimes (ICG, 2012). As if to emphasise this commitment to unity, the 1995 
Constitution essentially banned political parties from contesting all elections in the 
country. 
The NRM, for its part, used this ban on political parties to entrench itself politically and 
to undermine the existing parties (Makara, 2010). In 1996, however, facing political 
uncertainty after he organised a presidential election, Museveni took the 
unconventional step of appearing in full military attire on national television on the 
eve of voting to declare that if he lost he was not going to hand over ‘[his] army’ to 
criminals, as he referred to the opposition. In spite of or perhaps due to this threat, 
72.6 per cent of registered voters cast ballots in a poll that a deputy electoral official, 
years later, confessed was rigged for Museveni at tallying centres (Mulumba, 2011). 
6.1.2.2 Advent of Multi-party Democracy 
The ban on political parties in Uganda ended with the 2005 referendum. Following the 
vote, the Political Parties and Organizations Act (PPOA) legalised the existence of 
political parties and reduced restrictions on their activities. Re-introduction of 
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multiparty politics was precipitated by both internal and external considerations. In 
2001, it became apparent that Museveni’s popularity was declining (Makara, 2010). His 
popularity had fallen from 76 per cent in 1996 to 69 per cent in 2001 and would fall to 
59 per cent in the 2006 elections. The intensity of competition he faced in the 2001 
national elections persuaded Museveni that the no-party system was no longer 
tenable (ICG, 2012).  
Museveni also faced domestic and international pressure (especially from the donor 
community) to implement political reforms that would create greater political space. 
Internally, the NRM began to recognise the weaknesses within their political 
organisation (Makara, 2010).  
Faced with these realities, key Movement members began to view the return of multi-
party politics as potential strategy for reinvigorating the party and strengthening its 
hold on power. Movement supporters used a variety of means to ensure that the 
constitutional term limits for presidents were removed. Indeed, it is hardly a 
coincidence that the return of multi-party politics “coincided with the termination of 
presidential two-term limits, which in effect gave Museveni indefinite eligibility to 
stand for the presidency” (ibid: 4).  
6.1.3 Ethnicity in Ugandan Politics 
Depending on the method of classification there are between 30 and 80 ethnic groups 
in Uganda. According to some calculations, it is the most ethnically diverse country in 
the world (Alesina et al., 2003). The southern half of the country, comprising 70 per 
cent of the population, is composed of groups from the larger Bantu ethno-linguistic 
family. Kampala and the rest of Central Region are dominated by the relatively large 
Baganda tribe. The West is populated by a closely related group of tribes, including the 
president’s tribe, the Banyankole. Those who live in the North/Northeast are of smaller 
and more varied tribes, including those more closely related to groups in Kenya and 
Sudan. No tribe in Uganda forms a majority. The largest tribe in Uganda are the 
Baganda, who comprise 17 per cent of the population. The president’s tribe, the 
Banyankole, are the second-largest, at 9 per cent of the population. 
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Map 4 Ethnic distribution in Uganda 
 
  Source: http://www.uganda-visit-and-travel-guide.com/lugbara.html 
 
In Uganda, there had always been a keen sense of local allegiance before 
independence. The most prominent cleavage divides the country between the north 
and south, essentially between the mix of ethnic groups hailing from the north and the 
Baganda in the south. While this dichotomy certainly existed prior to colonial rule, 
British policies that favoured the south over the north exacerbated the tensions. While 
the southern Baganda grew benefited from investments in infrastructure and 
education and prospered, the Acholi in the north were limited to producing raw 
materials for the south and serving in the army. 
The 1962 Independence Constitution, often referred to as the ‘compromise 
document’, was meant to resolve the myriad political issues that had stricken Uganda 
in the 1950s (Mutibwa, 1992). Desperate to maintain a single state, the drafters made 
concessions to all sides in an attempt to prevent ethnic secessions. These concessions, 
however, significantly weakened the document, creating a state that was neither one 
thing nor the other. Most critically, the new Constitution was unsuccessful in its effort 
to redistribute power among the smaller ethnic groups of Uganda, failing to stem the 
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growing dominance of the Baganda. That said, following its ratification, Obote made 
every effort to ensure that the balance of power was reversed (Sathyamurthy, 1986). 
Obote’s and Amin’s political strategies in the years following independence only served 
to exacerbate the political divisions inherited from British rule and, in some cases, 
created new problems. Their status as northerners engendered suspicion among the 
southern political elite that their policies were designed to favour the north and in 
particular their own ethnic group. While their ascent to power was built on the basis of 
ethnic coalition, once they attained power these alliances invariably disintegrated, 
causing both Obote and Amin to rely “increasingly on centralisation, patronage and 
coercion. The prospects for inclusion in each succeeding regime shrunk progressively” 
(ICG, 2012: 3). 
Upon coming to power, Museveni offered a solution that purported to overcome 
divisions by transcending them. The NRM’s Ten-Point Programme emphasised 
‘participatory democracy’ that prioritised ‘individual merit’ in elections (Kasfir, 1998). 
The stated intent was to resolve the ethno-regional cleavages that had brought down 
previous governments, although the NRM ultimately argued for the suspension of the 
activities of political parties (Mamdani, 1988). The measures, however, produced 
significant popular enthusiasm.  
The reintroduction of multi-party politics has re-ignited debates regarding the role of 
ethnicity in Ugandan politics. Indeed, historically, there is a link between ethnicity and 
the political parties of Uganda. After independence, two principal political parties 
emerged in Uganda: the DP (Democratic Party) and UPC (Uganda People's Congress) 
The DP traced its origins to the kingdom of Buganda, creating a stronghold for the 
party in the country’s Central region. The UPC was founded by former President 
Obote, who belonged to the Lango ethnic group from the north of the country. By 
consequence, the UPC was always more popular in Northern Uganda. The FDC (Forum 
for Democratic Change), the current principal opposition party, purports to be a 
national party but nevertheless generally finds the bulk of its support in the Eastern 
and Northern regions (Kim, 2012). 
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6.1.4 The Media in Ugandan Politics 
Given the emphasis placed on media in this research, some analysis is required as to 
the composition and quality of the institution in Uganda and its relationship with the 
political processes of the country. The lack of credible political opposition for the 
better part of Museveni’s time in power has meant that the media has become the 
principal resource for news concerning opposition politics. This has been beneficial in 
one sense in that the media has certainly played a key role in shaping and contributing 
to the political liberalisation achieved since the reintroduction of multi-party politics in 
Uganda thus far. At the same time, it has resulted in segments of the print media being 
branded “opposition mouthpieces” due to the tone and tenor of their reporting 
regarding government activities (Mutabazi, 2009).  
The increase in political reporting over the past decade has not necessarily been 
accompanied by a corresponding improvement in the quality of coverage. In the case 
of opinion polls, they are often reported in the media without analysis or explanation 
as to the context of the poll. As both sides of the political divide began to increase their 
usage of polling, the vastly different results emerging from the different surveys 
present a confusing picture of the political landscape. This wide variation, without 
explanation, does little to clarify the state of a race and can be used to discredit or 
undermine the reliability of opinion polls. 
According to Freedom House, there are more than two dozen daily and weekly 
newspapers and more than 180 private radio stations. New Vision is government-
owned and while it is capable of demonstrating editorial independence at times, it 
reverts to being decidedly pro-government during election campaigns. Private print 
media, such as the Monitor, the Observer, and the Independent, are considered to be 
aligned with the opposition and are often critical of the government. Radio is 
considered to be the most widely accessed news source, and as a result, the number of 
community stations has expanded in recent years (Kasfir, 2012). 
Although radio and TV play a major role in disseminating information, print media 
remains the likeliest outlet for political discourse, especially among elites living in 
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urban areas (BBC, 2012). One potential concern is that newspaper circulation remains 
rather low, but the national press play a critical role for two reasons: first, because the 
Kampala press sets the agenda for national conversations and second, many radio 
stations across the country review the national papers and discuss their major stories 
with listeners who call in. 
The content analysis that informs this chapter is drawn from articles published in all 
four principal newspapers listed above and follows two parallel tracks. The first 
quantitative track reviews articles over a seven month period around elections17 to 
determine quantity of opinion polling coverage while the second qualitative tracks 
examines the writings of key political commentators across the entire period of 2001–
2012 to determine shifts in perceptions and attitudes to opinion polling on the basis of 
content and tone. 
6.2 Public Opinion Polling in Ugandan Elections 
As in previous chapters, this chapter begins with the premise that electoral politics is 
principally about elite strategies and behaviour. Therefore, for opinion polling to 
influence the quality of elections, it must first influence political elites. Using the same 
two stage approach employed in previous case studies, this chapter reviews three 
electoral periods between 2001 and 2011. It first locates public opinion polling within 
prominent news media to assess its integration within political discourse. Based on this 
analysis, the chapter proceeds to examine the various possible avenues through which 
opinion polling has influenced elite electoral strategies in Uganda, testing the validity 
of the three hypotheses. 
The evidence from Uganda complements that of the Nigeria case study in so much as it 
contradicts prevailing theories as to the way in which opinion polling should influence 
elite electoral strategies in one party dominant states. Consistent with the findings of 
previous chapters, this chapter presents evidence that the principal mediating factor 
                                                          
 
17
 Articles selected covered the period of six months before election day and one month after to 
cover the campaign period and the immediate aftermath of the voting. 
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for opinion polling’s influence on the quality of elections is elite perceptions of 
competition. After a tumultuous start, polling in Uganda has begun to gain a foothold 
in terms of contributing to more transparent and representative electoral strategies, 
but the movement is incremental and tied directly to the level of political competition 
observed by elites. 
Public opinion polling’s ability to shape perceptions becomes evident quite early on, 
but as in the other case studies, the political elite adopt an ambivalent posture to the 
emergence of polling. In the case of Uganda, this often takes the form of candidates 
belittling polling numbers while directing their campaign officials to commission ever 
more surveys to try and ascertain their relative position within the political landscape. 
Again, the public/private divergence speaks to the importance of elite perceptions in 
determining their strategic behaviour.  
Table 20: Pollsters in Ugandan politics 
Polling Organisation Elections Active Affiliation or other ties18 
International 
Republican Institute 
2006 US agency funded by USAID and affiliated 
with the US Republican party. Has extensive 
election programmes around the world. 
Daily Monitor 2001, 2006, 2011 Independent newspaper; generally 
considered to favour the opposition 
Ipsos/Synovate 2006, 2011 Independently owned, now part of 
international brand. Has been variously 
accused of favouritism but no formal links 
New Vision 2001, 2006, 2011 State-owned newspaper; generally 
considered to be NRM controlled 
Wilsken Agencies/ 
Afrobarometer 
2006, 2011 Independent agency contracted by 
Afrobarometer to conduct polls; accused of 
anti-opposition bias but no real evidence 
 
Uganda’s media environment is far less diverse than that of Kenya or Nigeria, 
resembling more closely the partisan alignment of Ghana. This has an inevitable 
impact on the quality of polling commissioned by those media houses and also on how 
                                                          
 
18
 This applies to the organisation only. It is not always possible to discern the data source or funding agent of 
individual polls released under the names of organisations or newspapers. Independent firms may be open to 
accusations of bias when they conduct and publish polls on behalf of particular parties or individuals. 
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it is analysed and interpreted. While ethnicity plays little role in the coverage, regional 
tensions and pro- or anti-Museveni ideologies colour the political media. Even non-
partisan pollsters find themselves tarred as biased based on the coverage or 
presentation of their findings (Private interview, 15 May 2013). Alliances with 
international polling firms provides much needed credibility for pollsters, but the 
consistent divergence between polling results and the official election tallies have 
undermined their case, even if the official results have likely been doctored. All of this 
speaks to the relative uncertainty of both the politics of Uganda and the opinion 
polling that covers it, an uncertainty that can only be mediated through elite 
perceptions. 
2001 was a pivotal year for Ugandan elections. The introduction of multi-party politics 
meant that they were no longer stage-managed affairs but were imbued with real 
competitive spirit. This institutional change was accompanied by the emergence of 
public opinion polling, which also contributed to changes in elite calculus. What follows 
is a narrative that charts the emergence of opinion polling in 2001; follows it through 
the violently competitive 2006 election; and ends with the comparative landslide of 
2011 in which Museveni seems to have got everything right. 
6.2.1 The 2001 Elections 
In March 2001, Museveni won a second term in an unusually contentious presidential 
election. This time, rather than facing an opponent drawn from one of the ailing 
historical political parties, the challenge emerged from within Museveni’s own inner 
circle. Colonel Kizza Besigye, a former friend of Museveni’s, put himself forward as an 
alternative to five more years under Museveni. While he clearly belonged to the 
Movement camp, Besigye sought to portray himself as a reformer operating from 
within the Movement itself, campaigning vociferously against corruption and 
nepotism. 
While there were to be no formal endorsements within the “individual merit” system, 
the Movement and its state institutions, to all intents and purposes, endorsed 
Museveni’s candidacy. Nevertheless, there were reasons to believe that the election 
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would be competitive. Besigye’s ethnic ties to Museveni’s strategic voter base in the 
southwest threatened to split the president’s main area of support. Informal support 
from some of the moribund political parties also suggested Besigye would poll well in 
the Buganda region and in the north. With four other candidates also drawing votes 
away from Museveni in their specific local constituencies, Besigye’s prospects seemed 
hopeful. A run-off was viewed a serious possibility. 
Public opinion polling throughout the campaign confirmed these conclusions, 
suggesting a tight race between the two candidates. Opinion polling, however, was still 
in its early days in Uganda, and while its coverage became almost immediately 
prominent in the daily newspapers, polling’s place as a source of political information 
remained largely superficial. Nevertheless, the scale of Museveni’s final victory, 
however, did surprise local and international media, based principally on trend 
analyses of the opinion polling conducted throughout the campaign. In being ‘wrong,’ 
the polls established themselves as far more credible than if they had been ‘right.’ 
6.2.1.1 Polls Shaping Perceptions 
This author’s review of over 5400 newspaper articles published in Uganda between 
September 2000 and April 2001 unearthed 36 mentions of the term “opinion poll.” 
Normalised per 1000 articles, this results in 6.36 mentions per thousand, a not 
insignificant number, given the relative novelty of opinion polling to Ugandan politics. 
Yet, in spite of this prominence of coverage, the depth of analysis of these results 
remained low throughout the campaign, with media satisfying themselves with 
promoting the ‘horse race’ nature of the election. Below is a sample drawn from the 
writings of Charles Onyango-Obbo, a prominent political editor and analyst, 
demonstrating the limited scope opinion polls played in examining the politics of 2001. 
Any reference to opinion polls is merely implicit, suggesting prior to the election that 
Museveni lacked the necessary votes for a clear victory and after the election that the 
results did not match expectations.  
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Table 21: Political Commentators in the Uganda 2001 Election Campaign 
Date Charles Onyango-Obbo, Daily Monitor editor 
29 November 2000 “Word is that the Museveni camp has decided that having many 
candidates helps greatly because, as the most recognisable figure in 
the field, he is likely to come on top in that situation, although without 
the 51 per cent of the vote required to win outright. The election would 
therefore go into a second round, and the president's team is hoping 
that if they can strike a deal with some of the other candidates, they 
could shift their support to Museveni and he would win with over 51 
per cent in the second round.” 
19 March 2001 “All parties agree on one thing; the election was stolen. The 
disagreement is over the ‘theft margin’ and, to use the expression 
recently made famous here by a flamboyant army officer, Col Kasirye 
Gwanga, "whodunnit." In many ways, Ugandans were unprepared for 
the pre-election violence, and the low road that the campaign took.” 
 
The first victory in the statistical battle was won by Museveni, as a donor funded poll 
conducted by the US-based International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) 
revealed the president’s approval rating to be at 93 per cent as of June 2000, prior to 
Besigye’s announced candidacy in October. The new entrant made a significant impact, 
as by January 2001 the percentage of Ugandans supporting Museveni had dropped to 
54 per cent in a poll sponsored by the state-owned newspaper New Vision (14 January 
2001). While a decided drop, these numbers nevertheless meant that Museveni would 
carry the vote in the first round, eliminating the need for a run-off. 
In February, The Monitor, a privately held paper, responded with its own opinion poll, 
claiming that Museveni’s share of the vote had dropped still further, below the 50 per 
cent mark to 47 per cent, while his main challenger, Besigye, was garnering 43 per 
cent. The race was well and truly joined. Museveni’s supporters were quick to dismiss 
the poll, arguing that “we are sure that candidate Y.K Museveni will win the March 
presidential elections [in] the first round with more than 70 per cent" (The Monitor, 14 
February 2001).  The 70 per cent figure would prove significant. 
New Vision again responded four days later with a poll that placed the race at 57 per 
cent for Museveni and 34 per cent for Besigye (New Vision, 18 February 2001). If this 
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poll was designed to assuage fears in the Museveni camp, however, it apparently did 
no such thing. It was reported that in a closed door meeting pro-Museveni “MPs said 
that The New Vision opinion poll which showed Museveni in a relatively weak position 
captured the reality on the ground adding that the situation could even be worse than 
the poll reflected” (The Monitor, 25 February 2001). In the final run-up to the election, 
both daily newspapers ran opinion polls that gave the margin between Besigye and 
Museveni as about 12 percentage points. The Daily Monitor poll had 50.6 per cent for 
Museveni and 38.3 per cent for Besigye, while New Vision gave Museveni 52.9 per cent 
and 39.4 per cent to Besigye.  
The evidence from this section supports the notion that political opinion polling is 
shifting political discourse, opening up new sources of information that counter the 
prevailing wisdom espoused by the government or other elite interest groups. 
Museveni’s hope that the 2001 election would be a mere formality was belied by the 
evidence emerging from the polls. This belief that Museveni might be vulnerable 
pervaded the political media, particularly those aligned with the opposition (Private 
interview, 22 March 2011).  That this forced Museveni to act is clear; the question that 
remains is through what means this impact is channelled. 
6.2.1.2 Strategic Responses to Opinion Polling 
Museveni and his supporters were clearly concerned, and their campaign strategy 
reflected these worries. Interestingly, angry as Museveni was over the perceived 
betrayal by Besigye in declaring his candidacy, his advisors allegedly “counselled him 
not to use ‘hard words’ against Besigye as it could be counter-productive; they advised 
him instead to conduct a survey and gauge Besigye's popularity in the central region” 
(The Monitor, 6 November 2000). As the campaign reached its climax, the Movement 
went so far as to issue its own internal poll, just days before the election, declaring 
that Museveni would capture 70.6 per cent of the vote. While widely at odds with 
existing polling, this final poll, which also gave Besigye just a 24 per cent share of the 
vote, would ultimately prove accurate. 
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These early forays in opinion poll politics, however, were but a small part of 
Museveni’s re-election strategy in 2001. These elections were also characterised by 
considerably more violence and intimidation than previous ones, much of it ascribed to 
‘illegal involvement of some agents of the state.’ According to ICG, the police reported 
1,216 arrests for violent election offenses, including seventeen deaths. The 
parliamentary committee reviewing the elections unearthed several examples of 
corruption and poor electoral commission planning. In spite of the violence, the 
Electoral Commission reported that 70.31 per cent of registered voters had turned out. 
The electoral campaign, marked as it was by numerous instances of intimidation and 
violence, however, gave Museveni an easy victory, with no need for a second round 
run-off. With an almost 70 per cent share of the vote, Museveni fell just 5 points short 
of his performance in 1996, while Besigye only garnered 28 per cent. 
The result was unexpected: “The big surprise about Uganda's just-concluded 
presidential elections is not so much that Yoweri Museveni won, but that he did it on 
the first ballot and by such a huge margin (70 per cent), against his nearest rival, Col 
Kizza Besigye, who had 25 per cent. Political observers and opinion polls had agreed 
before the election that the race between Museveni and Besigye was too close to call. 
There was a distinct possibility that none of the two main contenders would garner 50 
per cent of the vote. Indeed, just before the election, reports indicated that the 
Uganda Electoral Commission was already preparing for a re-run.” (The Daily Nation, 
15 March 2001) 
Efforts to estimate the effects of violence and fraud on the electoral outcome have 
calculated that around 10 per cent of the president’s vote might have derived from 
these strategies (Carbone, 2003). This suggests that Museveni still enjoyed significant 
support across Uganda and may not have needed to resort to such electoral tactics. 
Clearly, the opinion polling results had unnerved him and forced his hand. Others later 
used the opinion polling data to supplement their evidence that the election was 
rigged, going so far as to say that the polls may have actually accurately predicted what 
a free and fair election would have looked like (The Monitor, 15 February 2006). 
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Besigye appealed to a five-judge Supreme Court panel that agreed there had been 
serious violations. The election was so chaotic and openly rigged that even the largely 
pro-Museveni Court judged the victory substantially flawed. Nevertheless, it voted 
three to two to sustain Museveni’s victory on the grounds that the irregularities were 
not decisive.  
6.2.1.4 Implications 
2001 was extremely early days for the Ugandan opinion polling industry. Generally 
confined to newspaper-commissioned polls, the sector lacked experience and 
credibility to support the claims presented in the data. The partisan nature of the 
media meant that numbers could be easily dismissed as propaganda. In terms of 
coverage, the polls received little analysis in the print media beyond a basic 
presentation of the facts, which were also often conflated or misconstrued.  
In spite of these limitations, the coverage does illustrate the rapidity with which polling 
penetrated the perceptions of the political elite in Uganda. This is equally encouraging 
and alarming. On the one hand, the readiness with which the political elite were willing 
to embrace polling data suggests a latent regard for the power of public opinion. On 
the other, their willingness to accept and even act upon largely unverifiable data 
suggests a lack of understanding which could ultimately lead to a backlash against 
public opinion research. 
It is clear from their rhetoric that Museveni’s camp was caught off-guard by the polls 
that placed Besigye in such competitive positions during the 2001 campaign. Their 
initial response was to obfuscate the picture through counter-claims of their own, 
citing ‘internal’ polls or their own predictions based on crowds at rallies or whistle stop 
tours of the country with the president. Failing this, they reverted to a strategy of 
rigging the election to ensure that Museveni would win with a large majority, 
eliminating a need for a run-off. In both cases, the effect of a perceived increase in 
competition was a move toward less transparent and representative electoral 
strategies. 
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Interestingly, the 2001 Ugandan elections illustrate a potential role opinion polling can 
play in providing a ‘sense-check’ for official election results, particularly in contexts 
where trust in the electoral institutions is low. While there was little doubt that 
Museveni would win re-election, the sizable discrepancy between his polling trends 
and his final tally fuelled opposition claims of vote manipulation. Indeed, journalists 
from The Monitor took the extraordinary step of using the opinion polls as supporting 
evidence for their calculations of fraud that had befallen the 2001 elections. Their 
analysis argued that were the elections actually free and fair, the result would have 
looked very much like the independent opinion polls circulating at the time. In this 
way, while opinion polling in competitive settings is unlikely to deliver more 
transparency and representativeness during the electoral period in question, it could 
have potential influence on institutional change in the future. 
6.2.2 The 2006 Elections 
Following his defeat in the 2001 elections, Besigye retreated from the political scene, 
leaving Uganda in the August. His return from South Africa in 2005 can be said to mark 
the beginning of the 2006 campaign. Almost from the start, Besigye was beset by 
obstacles set up by Museveni and his supporters and designed to prevent him from 
successfully competing in the 2006 elections. Chief among the strategies employed 
was the use of criminal cases that pulled Besigye’s attention away from the campaign 
trail and often entailed long stints in prison during key periods of the campaign. 
In the 2001 presidential campaign, Besigye had been charged with ‘seditious intent’ 
and in the run-up to the February 2006 elections, he was charged again, this time with 
treason and terrorism charges, resulting in Besigye’s arrest. Later, a rape charge was 
also added that was based on weak evidence and was clearly politically motivated. 
Besigye’s arrest fits a pattern of arresting political opponents on ‘un-bailable’ charges 
such as murder, treason and terrorism, whereby they can be kept imprisoned for 
extended periods, particularly prior to elections (Gloppen, Kasimbazi, and Kibandama, 
2008).  
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On appeal, the High Court decided to grant bail to Besigye on the basis that bail is a 
constitutional right, irrespective of what subsequent legislation may prescribe. To keep 
Besigye and his political allies in jail, the government re-charged them with terrorism 
under the military court system. By detaining Besigye, the government had intended to 
prevent his being nominated as a presidential candidate, but the electoral commission 
undermined their strategy by accepting his nomination anyway. When the NRM 
protested, the Constitutional Court upheld the nomination, at the same time re-
confirming the independence of the electoral commission. Nevertheless, Besigye 
remained in prison until six weeks before the elections after which he was released on 
‘interim bail’ but still required to appear at court hearings in between campaign 
events. This severely limited his ability to campaign effectively throughout the country 
(ibid). 
6.2.2.1 Polls Shaping Perceptions 
The highly contentious atmosphere around the election fuelled demand for opinion 
polls within the news media. Polls began appearing with greater frequency and 
featured more prominently in both the political coverage and the political analysis 
coming out of the two main daily newspapers. This author’s survey of over 10,000 
articles published during the campaign and immediately after the elections yielded 94 
articles mentioning the term “opinion poll.” At a rate of 8.98 articles per thousand, this 
represents a significant increase in exposure from the 2001 election.  
Indeed, the evidence suggests that opinion polls became a key battleground as the two 
sides jostled for media attention and voter momentum. The excerpts of analysis, again 
drawn from the writings of analyst Charles Onyango-Obbo, demonstrate the subtle 
shift away from an emphasis on crowds (a crude predictor of voter support) to more 
substantial evidence taken from the prevailing opinion polls. The decreasing 
discrepancy between Museveni’s official tallies and those of the final opinion polls 
underpins the hypothesis that Museveni’s power to manipulate elections is weakening.  
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Table 22: Political Commentators in the Uganda 2006 Election Campaign 
Date Charles Onyango-Obbo, Monitor editor 
1 November 2005 
 
“In one-party systems (which Uganda was from 1986 to a few weeks 
ago) people tend to support the ruling party for tactical reasons - to 
keep away its wrath. In these circumstances, the level of support for 
the regime is always far less than it would seem from the percentage of 
the vote the president gets at elections. It would seem the large crowds 
that turn out for opposition leaders are fairly representative of the 
level of their support.” 
13 December 2005 
 
“After Museveni has gone as far as he has to have the Constitution 
changed so that he might run again, it's impossible that there can be a 
free election that allows Besigye, who is leading the president 
nationally in opinion polls, to win. Today, an election in which both 
men are running begins with Besigye as a favourite. Therefore, the 
whole purpose of such an election is to prevent him from winning.” 
6 January 2006 
 
“The latest Daily Monitor opinion poll showing President Yoweri 
Museveni is leading Dr Kizza Besigye, and that the two men are the 
main contenders, is not surprising for this stage of the campaign. 
With Museveni at 47.1 per cent, and Besigye 31.9 per cent, if the 
pattern holds and there is no rigging, then there is a real possibility that 
we might have a run-off as the victor wouldn't garner the required 51 
per cent in the first round. The results also suggest that for Besigye to 
win, the most important thing he has to do is to mount a robust 
operation to protect his and FDC's votes. 
This opinion poll suggests that the election is going to be quite volatile. 
Uganda, then, has become like many an African country, where it's not 
the voting that determines the winner, but the counting.” 
 
8 February 2006 
 
“We wake up on the morning of February 24, and Dr Kizza Besigye has 
won the election! No laughing matter. He and his Forum for 
Democratic Change are President Yoweri Museveni's and NRM's main 
rivals, and indeed some opinion polls last year put them ahead. A 
Besigye victory is therefore possible. Whether it will actually happen 
depends in part on whether, unlike 2001, the elections will this time be 
truly free and fair.” 
28 February 2006 
 
“My sense is that what these numbers tell us is something more 
structural - the ability of the NRM government and President Museveni 
to use state power to influence election outcomes. Put more crudely, 
the ability Museveni and NRM have to rig is gradually deteriorating.” 
 
The uptick in quantity of polls, however, was not necessarily accompanied by a 
corresponding improvement in the quality of coverage. In many cases, the opinion 
polls are reported in the media without analysis or explanation as to the context of the 
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poll. As both sides of the political divide began to increase their usage of polling, the 
vastly different results emerging from the different surveys present a confusing picture 
of the political landscape. This reality points to the inherent difficulty opinion polling 
has in terms of effectively aggregating public opinion or catalysing institutional change; 
there is too much uncertainty as to the content of the polls to make a significant 
impact. Elite perceptions, however, already contextualise the polls, discounting for 
various factors, to inform their behaviour. Whether they get their perceptions right or 
wrong goes a long way to determining the relative success of their chosen strategies. 
One of the first major polls of the 2006 campaign, interestingly, came from the 
government-owned Sunday Vision. It garnered big headlines from opposition aligned 
newspapers as it revealed that Besigye was leading Museveni in a head-to-head race 
46 per cent to 32 per cent. Buried in the article, however, the key information that the 
poll covered only urban areas could be easily missed by less discerning readers. Sunday 
Vision’s editors chose to lead with the result that Museveni was leading Besigye 43–37 
in Kampala, generally considered an opposition area. This example was emblematic of 
the kind of coverage polls would receive throughout the campaign. 
At this stage, there remains a general distrust of polling in Uganda. Overwhelmingly, 
this emanates from the political class which has conditioned ordinary citizens to 
believe that political manipulation drives opinion polls, regardless of political 
affiliation. Part of this is derived from a conscious strategy to discredit polling, unless it 
is favourable to your cause, but it also reflects a lack of statistical education even 
among the political elite which leaves them unable to accept the credibility of sampling 
techniques and other methods for capturing public opinion (Private interview, 16 May 
2013). As a result, this attitude filters down through society, leaving opinion polls’ 
status in political discourse decidedly ambiguous but no less influential. 
6.2.2.2 Strategic Responses to Opinion Polling 
In spite of these issues, it is clear that once the campaign was in full swing opinion 
polling had become an integral element of both candidates’ strategy for the elections. 
In January 2006, The Monitor released its first poll of the campaign, which gave 
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Museveni a healthy 47.1 to 31.9 per cent lead over Besigye (The Monitor, 5 January 
2006). Importantly, Museveni again was failing to achieve the 50 per cent total that 
would guarantee victory in the first round. Polling in a head-to-head race gave 
Museveni a much slimmer lead of 45.5 to 38.2, reinforcing the importance for 
Museveni in winning the election outright on the first ballot. 
NRM immediately disputed the findings contending that “this opinion poll result has 
been calculated to show that candidate Museveni is weak, and to prepare the public 
mind and grounds for…rejection of the election in future.” The NRM spokesman went 
on to claim that the party had its own election research department which was 
employing professional pollsters to ascertain Museveni’s support. These efforts 
revealed support of “between 67 and 75 per cent countrywide” (The Monitor, 6 
January 2006). The FDC spokesman countered this by also assuring voters that they too 
tracked opinion polls “to understand the issues” (New Vision, 15 January 2006). The 
government’s Information Minister confirmed the rising importance of opinion polls in 
Ugandan politics by later claiming that the NRM conducted weekly polls, all of which 
pointed to a resounding victory for President Museveni (New Vision, 10 February 
2006). 
Yet, for all their prevalence in the political media and on the lips of party 
representatives, politicians in Uganda continued to treat opinion polls with 
ambivalence. While it is unsurprising that politicians trumpet polls that favour them 
while eschewing those which do not, Ugandan politicians, like many of their African 
counterparts, appear to have a distinct reluctance to abandon the personal style of 
politics that relies less on numbers and more on relationships. Museveni, in particular, 
represents this love-hate relationship with polling. While he is clearly happy to have his 
campaign team conduct and publicise opinion polls which support his candidacy, the 
President himself labelled opinion polls “opinion jokes” (The Monitor, 21 February 
2006). The ambivalence is even more pronounced, if less caustic, among less popular 
opposition candidates. Their spokesmen were keen to declare that the opinion polls 
are underrating their candidate or that their campaigns have yet to hit full swing, 
suggesting, no doubt correctly, that opinion polls are as much about name recognition 
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as they are about voter preferences. Yet, at least one political analyst decried this 
refusal to adapt strategy to the polling data, claiming “if the recent opinion poll is a 
broadly accurate reflection of the national mood, then the opposition may suffer 
worse for their immature defiance of a popular wish that they get behind a single 
candidate” (The Monitor, 16 January 2006). 
The final month of the campaign saw a flurry of opinion polls flying back and forth 
between the two camps, interspersed with independent polls sponsored by local 
newspapers. The discordance was significant. In early February, the NRM released a 
private poll which suggested they would win the election with 60 per cent of the vote; 
a number they would continually revise upwards in the final weeks of the campaign: 65 
per cent on 7 February and 75 per cent on 10 February. Meanwhile the FDC was also 
releasing private polls which claimed that Besigye was ahead with 56.5 per cent of the 
vote against 30.1 per cent for Museveni. To its credit, The Monitor did point out to its 
readers that this poll represented only 27 districts of the country and differed starkly 
from existing polling data (The Monitor, 21 February 2006). These final polls pointed to 
a close race, with Museveni holding an 11 per cent lead but still short of the numbers 
needed to win on the first ballot. 
The need to secure the necessary votes in this competitive atmosphere resulted in 
widespread intimidation and violence. The campaign had been characterised by 
threats, personal attacks, and growing resentment among voters, and election day was 
no different. There were irregularities in the counting and tallying of results, and 
bribery, intimidation, violence, multiple voting, and vote stuffing compromised the 
election in parts of the country. In spite of all these challenges, the official tally 
declared that 69 per cent of registered voters had turned out to cast ballots. The final 
outcome was victory for Museveni with 59 per cent of the vote, a 22 point spread over 
his nearest rival Besigye. 
Local and international press again expressed surprise at the margin of victory, noting 
that Museveni had rarely registered such a lead in independent polling carried out 
during the campaign. This discrepancy fuelled the indignation of the opposition who 
felt that another election had been stolen from them, but international observers, 
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while noting obvious problems, nevertheless gave their blessing to Museveni’s victory. 
Again, perceptions played a key role in determining elite behaviour. Museveni, 
insecure in his victory, appeared to resort to violence and manipulation, while the 
opposition were forced to reconcile their perceptions of a close contest with the 
official results or else challenge the results as fraudulent. 
10 days after Museveni’s victory was announced, Besigye filed his second presidential 
election petition in the Supreme Court. President Museveni’s margin was narrower in 
2006 than it was in 2001, and based on the Court’s ground for upholding the 2001 
election, the opposition sought to demonstrate that this time the scale of irregularities 
was sufficient to affect the outcome. The Court agreed that the Electoral Commission 
had disenfranchised voters by arbitrarily removing them from the voters’ register or 
otherwise preventing them from voting and that problems had occurred during the 
elections both in the voting process and in the tallying of the votes. Yet, on a 4–3 
majority decision, the court concluded that “it was not proved to the satisfaction of 
the Court, that the failure to comply with the provisions and principles … affected the 
results of the presidential election in a substantial manner,” once again confirming 
Museveni’s victory (Gloppen, Kasimbazi and Kibandama, 2008). 
6.2.2.4 Implications 
The content analysis demonstrates that both the quantity and penetration of opinion 
polling coverage increased during the 2006 electoral campaign. The period saw 
political commentators incorporate polling data far more readily in their opinion 
pieces, and the political parties themselves began to engage with polls as viable 
political information, even if that engagement was outright dismissal. Indeed, by 2006, 
both campaigns were more savvy about their use of opinion polls. The NRM became 
less reactionary in their polling strategy, choosing instead to issue their own polls at 
regular intervals as well as reinforcing those of the state-owned New Vision 
newspaper. Yet, in spite of their growing role in his campaign, Museveni remained 
removed from the polling war of words and numbers. Whether this was a calculated 
strategy or merely the reluctance of an old politician to adopt new methods, the 
dichotomy within the campaign was very marked.  
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Indeed, the 2006 campaign became a war of perceptions, with opinion polling as the 
weapon of choice. The opposition, for their part, also adopted a more proactive 
approach, feeding the media with positive polling stories at critical junctures in the 
electoral season. These numbers would be used to undercut news stories hyping 
alternate, more traditional measures of popularity: numbers of people at rallies, key 
informant interviews with political power brokers within certain regions, etc. For 
Besigye, given the challenges he was facing in terms of sustaining his campaign in the 
face of the repressive tactics of the Museveni regime, the key was to appear as a 
credible alternative to the president (Private interview, 25 March 2011). Opinion 
polling gave him that ability, without requiring the kind of national campaign that the 
government prevented him from implementing.  
At the same time, Museveni perceiving his margin of victory to be shrinking resorted to 
violence and the physical incarceration of his opponent. Ironically, these old tactics 
backfired to a certain extent, with evidence to suggest that Besigye’s popularity only 
grew following his arrest, as his media profile consequently increased (Private 
interview, 28 March 2011). Ultimately, Museveni and his team, having eliminated the 
hope of a transparent election, went a step further to ensure that the result would also 
be unrepresentative. These outcomes are strongly supportive of the hypothesis that 
opinion polling shapes elite perceptions of competition, engendering negative strategic 
reactions in the face of increased competition. 
6.2.3 The 2011 Elections 
As the 2011 elections approached, Uganda’s political landscape was decidedly 
ambiguous. On the one hand, Museveni had never seemed weaker; his downtrend 
over the past three elections looked set to continue, threatening his hold on power. 
His old alliances were pulling apart; intermittent urban and rural violence underscored 
the failure of his policies to resolve old ethnic tensions. While Museveni could claim 
victory of sorts over the LRA, the forced resettlement of almost two million displaced 
persons created new pressures and reignited old debates about ethnic and regional 
marginalisation.  
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At the same time, the opposition was similarly weak. It had not been able to fashion a 
viable alternative to the NRM in the five years since the 2006 elections. With at least 
one political commentator declaring the opposition to be ‘dead’: “according to recent 
opinion polls, the prevalent public sentiments confirm that the opposition is not ready 
to lead” (New Vision, 1 September 2010). Indeed, throughout the majority of the 
campaign the question was not whether the opposition would win but whether 
Museveni could once again crack that 51 per cent barrier in the first round. The lack of 
a credible competition led to a dip in opinion polling coverage from the previous 
election with 95 mentions (7.38 per thousand articles published) recorded over the 
seven month period before and after the election.  
6.2.3.1 Polls Shaping Perceptions 
The coverage the opinion polls received, however, was frenetic and tinged with 
controversy. In December 2010, Afrobarometer and its local partner Wilsken Agencies 
released a poll that gave Museveni 66 per cent of the vote while Besigye only garnered 
12 per cent. It directly contradicted an earlier Monitor poll which had suggested 
Museveni only leading 43–35 and ignited intense debate in the local media. Some 
observers had thrown their lot in with polling, in general, irrespective of its findings: 
“Politicians must know that polls only tell the public which way the cat is jumping. It is 
the work of the politician to sway public opinion in their favour” (New Vision, 7 
September 2010). Others sought to discredit the Afrobarometer survey, questioning its 
methodology and most significantly drawing attention to another of its key findings: 
that 63 per cent of those polled thought the poll was being conducted by the 
government. That this figure almost identically matched the percentage voting for 
Museveni was not lost on commentators who attributed his high numbers to 
respondent fears of reprisals.  
Subsequent independent polls published in January also gave Museveni healthy leads, 
although not always with such a high percentage of the vote. Then, on 11 January a 
minor scandal hit the polling sector. New Vision, the state-owned newspaper, alleged 
that it had obtained the results of a Synovate poll commissioned by the FDC that put 
Museveni’s support at 67 per cent (New Vision, 11 January 2011). Almost immediately, 
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Synovate officials dismissed the New Vision story and claimed no knowledge of such a 
poll (The Monitor, 13 January 2011). The controversy sparked claims of foul play, with 
the FDC asserting that the poll was “concocted by the NRM to psychologically prepare 
the voters for rigging.”  
The furore ultimately abated as still further polls from Afrobarometer and others 
continued to place Museveni at 65 or above per cent of the vote. As stated above, the 
static nature of the race was reflected in marginally less coverage of polls in the print 
media, but the depth of coverage was far superior to that of previous elections, with 
political journalists often referencing polls as part of their assessment of electoral 
prospects and trends. Excerpts from two prominent journalists are included below to 
demonstrate the changes in tone over the course of the campaign. 
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Table 23: Political Commentators in the 2011 Uganda Election Campaign 
Date Timothy Kalyegira, Daily Monitor 
columnist 
Eriasa Mukiibi Sserunjigi, columnist 
for The Independent 
December 2010 “While the western donors who 
commissioned it had intended it to 
be an opinion poll in the 
professional, informative sense of 
the word, somebody might have 
got wind of it and possibly 
pressured or threatened 
Afrobarometer to falsify the 
results. 
It will be a most interesting irony 
that what started out as a poll 
intended to create the impression 
of an inevitable Museveni victory 
and have a demoralising effect on 
the millions of opposition voters 
will turn out to be the very catalyst 
not only to greater watchfulness 
during the voting and counting. It 
could be one of many sparks for 
violence that might erupt should 
such obvious efforts at fraud 
happen on and after February 18.” 
“To correctly appreciate the survey 
findings, however, it must be noted 
that it was conducted just a few 
weeks after the presidential 
candidates were nominated on 
October 25-26. In the preceding 
period, the opposition candidates 
remained invisible to the electorate 
as President Museveni, who has 
been in power for 24 years, hogged 
all the visibility and freely 
campaigned. 
The results of the poll couldn't have 
been shocking only to Besigye's 
team. Even NRM, which was busy 
thinking up ways to invigorate its 
campaign when the poll results 
came out, could have been both 
pleasantly surprised and disturbed. 
The Independent is aware that 
NRM's internal projections indicate 
that Museveni wouldn't win 
outright if voting took place today. 
The state-run daily conducted a 
survey last August that placed 
Museveni at 52 per cent. The 
parties have limited time to 
reconcile the poll results with the 
objective reality on the ground.” 
January/February 
2011 
“By publishing this fraudulent poll 
that Synovate publicly dismissed, 
the election is back into the 
territory of the unknown. 
The mid 60s percentage points 
that had started taking shape in 
people's minds as a figure to 
believe or dismiss or at least 
debate, are now irrelevant. We are 
now back to the place where we 
do not know anything about who 
is in the lead, which is next and by 
what percentage points. 
This frenzy over opinion polls and 
with it the vast sums of money 
reportedly being offered to 
opposition figures and activists is a 
“The controversy over the 
misrepresenting or outright faking 
of opinion poll results involving 
Synovate, which disavowed a poll 
attributed to it by the New Vision 
newspaper, threatens to suck the 
entire coming election into a 
downward spiral of mendacity. 
The history of opinion polling is 
littered with scrupulously fair and 
accurate polls which did not predict 
an election result. That's because 
there's a lot more to an election 
than voting, and because it's 
impossible to know and therefore 
measure with a poll all factors 
which can influence an election's 
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Date Timothy Kalyegira, Daily Monitor 
columnist 
Eriasa Mukiibi Sserunjigi, columnist 
for The Independent 
subtle indicator that within itself 
the NRM might not necessarily 
believe it has the mid-60s per cent 
lead it is trying to project.” 
result. At the end of the day, trust 
the polls but realise they aren't the 
end of the story.” 
February 2011 “After all the anticipation that 
started as soon as the 2006 
general election ended, February 
18 has come with much less drama 
than had been anticipated.” 
“Not even the rigorous campaigning 
the candidates have done, shows 
the poll, has led to significant 
change on voter choices. Only 10 
per cent of the respondents say 
they have changed their choices 
since the campaigns began. 
The pollsters, however, have a 
window to be absolved by the 
actual final election results coming 
on Feb. 20. But if the results don't in 
any way reflect the results of 
Afrobarometer's two polls, then the 
future of opinion polling in Uganda 
could be thrown in jeopardy.” 
 
Throughout, however, the focus remained largely on the presidential race. Citing 
resource constraints, local pollsters argue that it’s simply too expensive for them to 
sample the breadth and depth necessary to poll elections at lower levels. This remains 
the exclusive remit of better funded international outfits whose forays into Uganda 
tend to be sporadic (Private interview, 15 May 2013). This lack of grassroots 
information actually serves to undermine further the efforts of the opposition to 
unseat the NRM regime. Lacking the NRM deep political structures, reaching into the 
district and local levels and feeding the national machine with voter data, the FDC and 
others are almost completely dependent on independent polling as their source of 
reliable information. This reduces their ability to target their strategies and perhaps 
denies them the chance to exploit the latent potential of local level politics as a means 
of encouraging regime change (Private interview, 12 May 2013). 
6.2.3.2 Strategic Responses to Opinion Polling 
From an opinion polling perspective, the 2011 election was strategically significant for 
two reasons. The first was the infiltration of opinion polling into party primaries. 
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Previously, polling had been limited to the presidential race and some other major 
contests such as the Kampala mayoral race. In 2011, polling became institutionalised 
enough to feature in NRM primary races (New Vision, 7 September 2010) and evidence 
suggests that it also played a controversial role in the selection of NRM’s party 
Secretary General. In a heated battle, the incumbent Amama Mbabazi overcame his 
two opponents with a little help from polling and technology. “Prior to and during the 
voting, phone text messages were sent to delegates claiming NRM opinion polls had 
put Mbabazi in the lead with 72 per cent followed by Bukenya 15 per cent and Otafiire 
13 per cent. At 7:00 pm another text message was sent to the delegates that 
provisional results now showed Mbabazi in the lead. Yet at this time, voting was still 
going on in all polling stations. These text messages swung the voters' mood. It would 
be futile to vote a losing candidate” (The Independent, 22 September 2010). 
Secondly, NRM appears to have finally learned how to adapt their strategy in an era of 
opinion polling. Moving away from merely producing self-aggrandising polls, the NRM 
began to exert greater control over the opinion polling industry and began using polls 
more effectively to target constituencies and voters that needed persuading. In the 
first instance, the government introduced new regulations to restrict the content of 
opinion polls, requiring that all pollsters obtain permits prior to surveying the general 
public. Opposition leaders contend that these proposals are forwarded to the 
President’s office for approval, giving Museveni undue influence over the content of 
the polls. Moreover, even in the field, pollsters are required to report to the Resident 
District Commissioner (often an NRM party man) who approves the conduct of the poll 
under the auspices of ‘national security.’ The interests of these local officials often rest 
squarely on Museveni’s achieving a good level of support within their regions, so 
pressure can be brought to bear (The Observer, 22 December 2010). 
There is also evidence to suggest the Museveni and his campaign team used the 
information gleaned from their regular opinion polls to support a more efficient 
patronage system to deliver the necessary votes (The Independent, 22 February 2011). 
Sometimes the bribery was direct, such as with cash inducements. At other times the 
bribery was institutionalised. Prior to the elections, Uganda increased the number of 
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sub-national units, effectively expanding the already bloated patronage system at 
whose helm Museveni had sat for a quarter century. Since Museveni came into power, 
Uganda’s sub-national units or districts have grown from 33 to 112. Districts are 
staffed with ruling-party loyalists, led by presidentially appointed resident district 
commissioners, and each adds a new representative to parliament. Whereas in 
Nigeria, for instance, a member of parliament represents about 430,000 people, the 
same MP in Uganda represents about 89,600 people. 
As the opinion polling industry in Uganda has grown more sophisticated, its ability to 
provide more strategic useful data has developed as well. Polling data from the major 
pollsters in the 2011 campaign was generally disaggregated by region, gender, etc. This 
trend is instructive when analysing the way in which Museveni and the NRM 
conducted their campaign. While it’s impossible to be certain, there is a high likelihood 
that Museveni’s strategy targeting northern voters was based on polling which showed 
that the NRM had a chance to break the FDC stronghold there. In comparison to 
previous elections, NRM allocated far more campaign resources to the north, 
blanketing it with polling agents. Similarly efforts to engage specifically the youth 
populations in the major urban areas (again a traditionally FDC-leaning sub-group) 
were strategic forays by the NRM into FDC strongholds which must have been based 
on some kind of information (Private interview, 15 May 2013). 
The general trend is that, while politicians remain publicly underwhelmed, for political 
operatives opinion polls are shifting priorities of campaigns. Contrary to previous 
election cycles, 2011 saw the NRM and Museveni adjust their campaign to meet 
people’s preferences, almost certainly drawn from polling data. Recognising that public 
expressions of dissatisfaction provide the grist for the opposition mill, the NRM began 
responding directly to the issues raised in polls in its campaign platforms, promising 
improvements in areas highlighted as underperforming by citizens. Whereas in the 
past, they were likely to ignore such data, experiences from the past few elections 
have taught them that polls and clear responses to them can be an effective 
instrument to drive voter turnout (Private interview, 12 May 2013). 
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Nevertheless, 2011’s presidential polls were Uganda’s most peaceful post-
independence polls. The 2011 campaign is the first in which government has defeated 
opponents without resorting to massive violence and massive rigging. President Yoweri 
Museveni convincingly overcame his main opponent, Dr Kizza Besigye, and six other 
presidential candidates with more than 68 per cent of the vote. In addition, the ruling 
party won a convincing number of seats in parliament, 295 out of 365, to set up a fail-
proof majority. Yet, despite a return of peace to former Lord’s Resistance Army 
affected regions, the turnout fell drastically to 59 per cent.  
A post-mortem article dissecting Besigye’s defeat had this to offer: “Opinion polls 
played an important part in this election, and they consistently showed Museveni in 
the lead. But the opposition buried their head in divisions. Unfortunately for Besigye, 
his team missed even the well-known view that polls, even bogus ones, create the so-
called ‘herd’ mentality of voters swing to the side of the one reported to be winning. 
Besigye's should have countered them by commissioning a more respectable firm to 
do a poll in his favour. Why didn't he? Possibly it is because he commissioned the 
Synovate one, which also showed he was trailing. All this confusion worked on the 
mind of the voter” (The Independent, 22 February 2011).  
Moreover, Besigye was fighting against the full force of the Ugandan government, with 
the President, his staff and some family members regularly using state facilities, such 
as planes, choppers and vehicles on campaign trails. In effect, the state bankrolled 
Museveni’s campaign. While an Afrobarometer study after the election asserted that 
money in the form of bribes did not play a significant role in determining the outcome 
of the election, it could not deny the overwhelming power of incumbency that 
Museveni brought to bear on the 2011 campaign (Conroy-Krutz and Logan, 2012).  
Yet, some international election monitors gave Uganda’s 2011 election a clean bill of 
health. Other observers, such as the Commonwealth, avoided tagging the polls as 
being free and fair or not. Some labelled the election anything but credible: “The 
Presidential and Parliamentary Elections of February 2011 were by all standards not 
free and fair. There were numerous cases of illegal detention of opposition supporters 
on trumped up charges and the Electoral Commission was not independent but 
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appointed and controlled by President Museveni” (IDU, 2011: 1). Yet, in spite of this, 
the broad margin of victory was convincing for many that whatever the irregularities, 
there was no denying that Museveni had won the electoral battle once again. 
6.2.3.4 Implications 
The 2011 campaign differed from its predecessors in many significant ways. For one, 
Museveni and his campaign team recognised the power of perceptions early on and 
worked hard to control the perception battle in the media. The government enacted 
laws which restricted the conduct of opinion polling, requiring that pollsters obtain 
government permission and approval before entering the field. Secondly, the NRM set 
up a strong internal research department, whose job it was to conduct and analyse 
opinion polls about the state of the race.  
More importantly in the context of this research, Museveni’s initial electoral advantage 
and the persistent publications of these polls, which all but precluded the likelihood of 
anything but another Museveni victory, set the tone of the race before it even got 
started. 2011 saw Museveni and his party launch a media offensive, with opinion polls 
as their principal weapon. Wielding data which pointed to a convincing Museveni 
victory from the get-go, they drained the campaign of any competitive zeal. This ability 
to quash competition early had important implications for Museveni’s strategic 
responses and his electoral behaviour. First, he was able to turn polls to his advantage, 
rather than constantly battling against their impact. NRM used the information 
gathered from extensive polling to allocate their campaign resources more 
strategically to ensure that the election result was beyond doubt. At the same time, 
the NRM used polls and media monitoring to assess how their politicians and the party 
were being perceived on radio and in newspapers. This seems to be part of the trend 
of political parties starting to come to grips with brand strategy and the role polling 
can play in defining their identity in the minds of voters (Private interview, 15 May 
2013). 
The reduced competition also meant that Museveni could avoid heavy-handed tactics 
such as violence, using more covert methods to ensure clear victory. Following the 
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2007/8 Kenyan electoral disaster, many pundits believed that similar tensions would 
simmer over during the Ugandan campaign. Previous elections had seen violence, and 
there were real fears as Uganda approached 2011 that should the outcome have been 
similar to 2006 that opposition supporters would take the streets. In the end, the 
violence never materialised. Opposition politicians and their campaigns rejected the 
election result, but unlike previous elections, they had precious little hard evidence on 
which to mount a serious case for victory. Of course, there may have been 
malfeasance and intimidation, but the margins were so great and so in line with all 
media predictions that their complaints fell largely on deaf ears. 
 Instead, the violence and the outrage were postponed until later in the year when 
huge crowds took to the streets to protest fuel and food prices. This mass mobilisation 
indicates that the potential was there for opposition politicians to build a viable 
campaign but that the odds, at least during the campaign, were never in their favour. 
Indeed, the FDC appears to have learned some lessons from the 2011 campaign. Far 
from shying away from opinion polls, the party has embraced them, engaging 
independent pollsters to investigate issues related to leadership, voter expectations, 
and key vote drivers (Private interview, 12 May 2013). The recent FDC leadership 
election was polled throughout to give delegates a chance to gauge trends among the 
competing candidates. This points to a future in which opinion polling is far more, 
rather than less, institutionalised within Ugandan politics. 
6.3 Conclusions 
This chapter offers some intriguing contributions to this thesis’s overarching question 
regarding the impact of opinion polling on electoral politics in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Opinion polls as a source of political information have clearly grown over the course of 
the past three elections in Uganda. This can be traced using the content analysis 
presented above, capturing the number of mentions opinion polls received in major 
newspapers in the country. While overall mentions were down in 2011 as compared 
with 2006, they are still above 2001 levels when the competitiveness of elections and 
thus demand for opinion polls were far higher.  
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More importantly than quantity of mentions, the quality of coverage also improves 
over time. While in 2001 the mentions are generally restricted to short articles merely 
reporting the results, by 2011, opinion polls regularly feature in the columns of 
political analysts and elicit immediate and substantial responses from political party 
spokespeople. This increasing profile of polls speaks to, at least, a superficial shift in 
Ugandan politics, whereby political debates move into the open, based on statistical 
data rather than just hearsay and gossip.  
At the same time, the Synovate polling fiasco in 2011 demonstrates how far Uganda 
has to go in terms of accurately and impartially presenting opinion polls in its media. 
Journalists are still far too likely to report opinion polls without comment and to 
attempt trend analysis of different polls, conducted by different pollsters using 
different methodologies. Juxtaposing polls in this way, often focusing on the vastly 
different outcomes, undermines the credibility of polling as a profession, as ordinary 
voters begin to view opinion polls as arbitrary and volatile when in reality they are 
relatively stable.  
Uganda is fortunate to have escaped, for now, the ethnic dimension which has crept 
into polling in Kenya and, to some extent, Nigeria. The limited political landscape in 
Uganda allows only for two sides of the political divide: pro-Museveni or anti-
Museveni. While other ethnic divisions certainly exist and are critical to the 
assumption and retention of political power, Museveni’s longevity has become such a 
polarising issue that in the politics of opinion polling these other issues take second 
position. Indeed, one of the major takeaways from the Afrobarometer poll conducted 
in 2010/2011 was the reluctance the Ugandan people had in speaking about politics. 
Critics of Museveni seized on the finding that some 63 per cent of Ugandans felt they 
had to be careful talking about politics to dismiss the poll’s other results which heavily 
favoured Museveni. This inconsistent level of political competition has had a clear 
impact on the influence of opinion polling on elections in Uganda. 
Just as opinion polling as a source of political information has witnessed a tumultuous 
journey over the past decade or so in Uganda, so too has polling’s influence on political 
strategy during presidential campaigns. Under the no-party system, the opinion polling 
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that was carried out was largely irrelevant due to Museveni’s control of ‘party’ 
resources to manage the electoral process. By 2001, Museveni’s power had waned to 
the extent that competition within the ‘Movement’ was viable, encouraging a number 
of challengers and sparking political opinion polling in Uganda into life. Indeed, this 
chapter has argued that the emergence of polling quantifiably demonstrated the risks 
Museveni faced in a transparent and representative election, providing justifiable 
evidence for his implementation of tactics to ensure that the election would be 
anything but. 
 By 2006, opinion polling had become increasingly pervasive in Ugandan politics, 
inspiring public wars of words between the opposing campaigns whenever a new poll 
was released. Anticipation was heightened by a series of polls pointing to a close race. 
The competitiveness of the race again prompted a clear strategic response from 
Museveni and the NRM, ensuring that the election would be neither transparent nor 
representative. While Museveni was ultimately declared the clear winner, it spoke to 
the growing credibility of polling that most media credited the discrepancies to fraud 
and corruption rather than polling inadequacies. Indeed, its prominence in 2006 seems 
to have convinced important members of the ruling party of the merits of engaging 
pollsters in their campaigns.  
In the absence of a counter-factual, it is impossible to assess the real impact of these 
strategic moves. The opposition in 2011 were fractured and weak, while Museveni was 
riding a wave of relief at the cessation of hostilities in the north, so an NRM victory was 
always the most likely occurrence. But Museveni’s seemingly interminable reign as 
president was beginning to grate on many within the country, and it is likely that had 
an opinion poll appeared showing an opposition candidate with a realistic chance of 
unseating the president, the campaign could have taken an entirely different 
trajectory. Indeed, in light of limited competition, Museveni was able finally to 
operationalise his opinion polls, adjusting his speeches to include items highlighted in 
public surveys and adjusting his campaign to maximise his appeal to voters across 
regions, not just his core constituencies. 
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The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that in spite of the gains opinion 
polling has made in Uganda, its influence is hampered by a number of structural 
factors. Recent efforts notwithstanding, political party identity is still low, given the 
relative novelty of multi-party politics. As a result, personality politics still dominate — 
a holdover from the “merit-based” system of the previous political system — which 
often means that the selection of the candidate is infinitely more important than the 
issues/party platform in determining voter decision-making. Moreover the lack of 
credible alternatives means that opinion polling’s ability to aggregate opinion and 
point to possible opposition coalitions is also abrogated. This undermines opinion 
polling’s strategic influence for change.  
Moreover, trust in institutions remains low, complicating efforts to set realistic 
electoral expectations. Polls may be accurate, but if electoral institutions fail to deliver 
free and fair results, the relevance of polling data is somewhat moot. Trust in polls 
themselves also remains an issue. As one interviewee quipped, “Opinion polling and 
politicians in Uganda are like a lamppost and drunken man; it’s used far more often for 
support than for illumination” (Private interview, 14 June 2013). Until the public 
strategy of politicians matches their private interest in opinion polls, people will 
continue to believe that polls should be discredited. Opinion polls will only become an 
instrument for systemic change when the political elite fully embrace its potential 
publicly, driving a sea change in demand for and perceptions of public opinion 
research. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion 
To what extent is public opinion polling changing electoral politics in sub-Saharan 
Africa? I have argued that public opinion polling has made a significant impact on the 
way in which electoral politics is conducted in sub-Saharan Africa; not by changing the 
nature of political participation or by changing political institutions, but rather by 
shaping elite perceptions, particularly in the media, of the nature of political 
competition during key election periods. I have proposed a two-stage model for 
analysing this impact, with corresponding hypotheses for each stage. 
In my framework, opinion polling shapes electoral dynamics by changing the kinds of 
information underpinning political elite decision-making and by changing the locus of 
political calculus from the private to the public. As the demand for political information 
grows and deepens, electoral politics gets played out less in the backrooms and more 
on the front pages of the daily newspapers. Opinion polling quickly becomes the 
dominant source of campaign information, often eclipsing older methods of gathering 
information. In this way, opinion polling concentrates and intensifies the political 
information that would otherwise have reached the political elites and public in a more 
diffuse way. However much they may try and avoid it or suppress it, opinion polling 
ultimately forces political elites to adapt their electoral strategies in some tangible 
way. 
How the political elite change their behaviour is far more complex, and this research 
only addresses a small subset of elite electoral behaviour. Nevertheless, this thesis’s 
model predicts that once polling has infiltrated elite perceptions it influences 
principally their impressions of political competition. Given the concentration and 
intensity of opinion polling data, elites form far more extreme perceptions than they 
would previously, which in turn triggers more extreme electoral strategies. A finding 
which supports the contention made by Jacobs and Shapiro (2005) in the United States 
that polling can have a restricting rather than inclusive effect on political strategies. In 
the context of these cases, the model predicts that where opinion polling shows a 
narrowing of competition, elites react to restrict and manipulate the election in their 
favour, falling back on strategies of core mobilisation rather than broad-based appeal.  
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This prediction is predicated on two assumptions of political conditions prevailing in 
sub-Saharan Africa. The first relates to the uncertainty of political information, of 
which opinion polling is a part, in the context of poor media coverage of political 
issues, inexperience of pollsters, and a general scepticism around quantitative 
research. These factors clearly had not changed, even in Kenya where polling has a 
longer history; if anything the fallout of the 2007 elections had exacerbated them.  
The second assumption, however, is that the nature of ethnic-identity politics is such 
that increased political competition; rather than prompting strategies that broaden 
electoral appeal (as theorised in Western democracies) actually induces the political 
elite to cling still more strongly to patterns of clientelistic and patronage politics. In the 
face of a new form of political participation in the form of polling, political elites do not 
adapt positively but rather retrench into tried and trusted tactics.  
This thesis has had three goals: first, to ask whether there is evidence that public 
opinion polling in Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria, and Uganda is changing the way in which 
politics is conducted around elections; second, to develop a theoretical framework to 
understand the underlying characteristics that shape the interface between polling, 
the political elite, and electoral politics in sub-Saharan Africa; and third, to determine 
whether polling has contributed to more transparent and representative electoral 
processes in these selected countries. 
Influential Opinion Polling 
This research has argued that public opinion polling should not be considered only in 
its abstract form or in isolation. Rather, it should also be examined within the political 
context in which it is operating. This means engaging with the realities of political 
change and electoral politics in the African countries now adopting opinion polling. 
Proponents of public opinion polling contend that it can have a liberalising effect on 
political systems, delivering more transparent and representative governance, but this 
contention puts the cart before the horse. Given the particularities of sub-Saharan 
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African politics it must first be established that public opinion polling can actually make 
an impact on the structure or character of these systems. 
In Uganda, I documented how the quality of coverage improves over time. While in 
2001, the mentions are generally restricted to short articles merely reporting the 
results, by 2011, opinion polls regularly feature in the columns of political analysts and 
elicit immediate and substantial responses from political party spokespeople. This 
increasing profile of polls illustrates a small but significant shift in Ugandan politics, 
moving political debates into the open, based on verifiable information rather than 
rumours.  
Largely limited to newspaper-commissioned polls, the polling sector in Uganda in 2001 
lacked experience and credibility to support the claims presented in their data. The 
partisan character of the media led to polling results being equated principally with 
propaganda from both the state and the opposition. In terms of coverage, the polls 
received little analysis in the print media beyond merely described the results, which 
were also often incorrectly presented and analysed.  
Yet, in spite of the limitations of polling in 2001, the coverage presented in the case 
study illustrated the rapidity with which it penetrated the perceptions of the political 
elite in Uganda. This presented opportunities and challenges for the political system. 
On the one hand, the readiness with which the political elite were willing to embrace 
polling data suggested a latent recognition of public opinion’s potential. On the other, 
the elite’s willingness to believe and even act upon largely unverifiable data exposed a 
lack of statistical nous which ultimately led to a backlash against public opinion 
research. 
The content analysis from my research demonstrates that both the quantity and 
penetration of opinion polling coverage increased during the 2006 Ugandan electoral 
campaign. Political analysts quoted polling data with increasing frequency in their 
opinion pieces, and the political parties came to accept polls as viable political 
information. Both campaigns were more tactical with their use of opinion polls 
throughout the campaign. The NRM pursued a less reactionary polling strategy, 
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publishing their own internal polls at regular intervals to validate those of the state-
owned New Vision newspaper.  
The 2006 campaign became a war of perceptions, with opinion polling central to each 
side’s cause. The opposition, for their part, became more assertive with their use of 
data, feeding the media with positive polling stories at key points in the campaign. 
These numbers would counter state-sponsored news stories promoting more 
traditional measures of popularity: numbers of people at rallies, key informant 
interviews with political power brokers within certain regions, etc. For Besigye, given 
the challenges he was facing in terms of sustaining his campaign in the face of the 
repressive tactics of the Museveni regime, the key was to appear as a credible 
alternative to the president. Campaigning through the medium of opinion polling gave 
Besigye that ability, precluding the need for the national campaign that the 
government prevented him from implementing.  
By contrast, in the 2011 campaign, it was Museveni and his campaign team that 
acknowledged the power of perceptions from the outset and implemented a strategy 
to dominate the perception battle in the media. New laws were enacted that restricted 
the conduct of opinion polling, requiring that pollsters obtain government permission 
and approval before entering the field. The NRM also established an internal research 
department, tasked with conducting and analysing opinion polls about the state of the 
race.  
Museveni’s initial electoral advantage and the persistent publications of these polls, all 
of which pointed to sizable Museveni leads, drained the campaign of any competitive 
spirit. Pertinent to this thesis’s hypotheses, these moves to minimise competition 
enabled Museveni’s strategic responses and his electoral behaviour to differ from the 
previous two elections. For one, polls became an advantage, rather than a hindrance 
to his victory. Political analysts noted how NRM was able to use the information 
gathered from extensive polling to allocate their campaign resources more 
strategically. At the same time, the NRM used polls and media monitoring to assess 
how their politicians and the party were being perceived on radio and in newspapers. 
This seems to be part of the trend of political parties starting to come to grips with 
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brand strategy and the role polling can play in defining their identity in the minds of 
voters. 
In Ghana, the influence of opinion polling on elections is highly contingent upon the 
perceptions and behaviour of the political elite. Despite advances in the technology 
and processes available to them, politicians remain convinced of the predominant role 
that image, personality, and personal ties play for voters’ opinion formation. Ghana’s 
increasingly rigid and increasingly competitive two-party democracy exacerbates the 
tensions between the old- and new-style politics. 
The results of the 2004 elections affirmed that Ghana was a two-party state, with the 
NPP and NDC dominating both the presidential and parliamentary elections. The 
arrival of opinion polling onto the political scene served as a means of capturing this 
phenomenon and its associated effects on the political system. As a source of political 
information, opinion polling was now achieving far wider coverage and far better 
integration into political analysis. All the while, opinion polling continued to confront 
the entrenched impression of opinion polls as instruments of propaganda. While the 
efforts of the political parties to stimulate their campaigns through commissioned 
polling did nothing to counter these conceptions, the ability of more independent 
pollsters to predict accurately the final outcome of the race spoke well for the on-
going growth and maturation of the opinion polling industry in Ghana.  
By 2008, political opinion polling had become deeply entrenched in Ghanaian electoral 
processes; yet it remained deeply flawed in many respects. As a source of political 
information, it was still highly volatile, with pollsters entering and exiting the industry, 
complicating attempts to judge long-term political trends. One constant throughout, 
however, particularly in 2008, was the almost one-man polling operation, Ben Ephson 
and his Daily Dispatch newspaper. Though not an ideal structure, it is not uncommon 
even in developed countries to see small scale but influential polling operations 
fronted by charismatic personalities. Nevertheless, the general inconsistency of the 
pollsters belied any attempt to characterise political polling in Ghana. In the context of 
high political competitiveness, its ambivalence shaped its influence on elite 
perceptions. 
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Hostility around opinion polling escalated in 2012. Having become pervasive in the 
political media, the political elite grew increasingly uncomfortable with their lack of 
control over the numbers coming out of the polls. Reactions varied from disputing the 
content of the polls based on accusations of bias in sources or methodologies to 
issuing competing polls to try and control the messages emerging in the media. 
Consequently, the legitimacy of opinion polling as a source of reliable political 
information deteriorated.  
In Nigeria, the case study also showed that opinion polls as a source of political 
information have clearly grown over the course of the past decade in Nigeria. This is 
perhaps most apparent in the time and effort spent by politicians and the media 
attempting to gauge the opinion of ordinary Nigerians. That said, a consistent link 
between political outcomes and public opinion is often elusive, leading some to doubt 
relevance of opinion polling in the Nigerian context. The current generation of 
politicians in Nigeria has been slow to acknowledge the potential of opinion polling as 
both a source of information and as a means of managing it. 
Given the prevailing political conditions in Nigeria, critics’ dismissal of opinion polling 
following its emergence in 2007 as an exercise in propaganda is understandable.  
Specifically, perceptions of credibility and impartiality were highly correlated with 
political dispositions. PDP supporters considered the emphatic victory fully justified 
and rationalised the polls predicting a close contest as the desperate attempts of an 
opposition and international community intent on undermining the PDP’s dominance. 
Opposition supporters, by contrast, viewed the independent polls as an accurate 
reflection of the political reality, believing the final tally to have been the result of 
massive rigging and co-option within the electoral institutions of Nigeria. This lack of 
trust in these institutions adds a difficult obstacle to the idea of political polls setting 
more realistic expectations. If the relevant institutions cannot be relied on to deliver 
the election freely and fairly, then the introduction of polls does not promote 
acceptance of results but rather the opposite. It provokes those on the losing end to 
contest, usually to the detriment of all. 
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Broadly, there is growing evidence that the way in which Nigerians participate in 
elections is changing. Young people are voting in greater numbers; technology is 
allowing the media and citizen groups to capture and share election data more quickly 
and easily; and there is an emerging capacity within the context of opinion polling to 
measure and analyse electoral behaviour and preferences. In doing so, opinion polling 
can be seen to be working towards the greater good of removing electoral fraud and 
supporting more transparent and representative elections, but its short term 
contribution to Nigerian politics has been a reputation for igniting electoral 
controversies. 
In 2011, public opinion polling was largely successful in predicting the eventual winners 
across the elections reviewed. In a volatile political environment like Nigeria, these 
prognostications have an ambiguous impact on the likelihood of election rejection and 
violence. The data presented in this research supports the contention that no amount 
of opinion polling can undo expectations which are too fervently held as to withstand 
all evidence to the contrary. It is clear that the imperfections in both the science of 
polling in Nigeria and the Nigerian electoral system itself contrive to create situations 
where pre-election polling possibly exacerbates the problem of politically-motivated 
violence. 
While in Kenya, where polling is most developed, with a political system in which 
parties are increasingly fluid and predominantly personality or ethnically composed, 
opinion polling’s role has become less about setting realistic expectations and more 
about reinforcing preconceived expectations, whether accurate or not. The impact of 
the introduction of a nascent and still under-developed public opinion research 
industry into a competitive and constantly shifting political environment appears to 
hinge on the perceptions of political elites driving their strategic responses. If anything, 
it has served merely to amplify the weaknesses in Kenya’s on-going political 
development, surfacing most acutely the underlying tensions and power struggles that 
have long characterised the political system. 
For Kenya, the 2002 election was a key moment in the way in which the political elite 
perceive political opinion polling. When first introduced into electoral politics, it 
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challenged existing elite strategies to managing expectations and information. In the 
face of rapid adoption from media and opposition candidates, KANU refused to adapt 
to the changing electoral landscape, convinced that they would be able to control 
perceptions as they had previously. Moi and his team were confident the party 
election machine could build support around Uhuru and crowd out Kibaki, relying on 
the public’s faith in the credibility of the voice of the President and the state 
apparatus. Opinion polling broke down this asymmetry and set new terms for the 
electoral contest, undermining Moi’s ability to drive popular opinion. The general 
expectation was for a Kibaki win, and the effort required to reverse that perception 
proved impossible. 
Perceptions remained important in 2005 but with increased competition came 
increased uncertainty. In spite of opinion polling’s growing profile in Kenyan politics 
the information it provided was always tinged with ambiguity or dogged by potential 
bias. The proliferation of polling was not matched by a similar improvement in media 
coverage. Numbers were printed unfiltered, combining the data from reputable polling 
firms with dubious organisations and juxtaposing transparent statistical techniques 
with unreliable survey methods. The overall effect was to undermine polling’s strength 
as a purveyor of political information, a realisation that would not become truly 
apparent in the next election. 
Having grown in prominence over the inter-election period, opinion polls became 
pervasive in the 2007 campaign season. Their influence became too prevalent, with 
every poll released receiving extensive, if almost universally superficial, attention and 
analysis. The political discourse became inundated with numbers, which could vary 
substantially at times and which starkly reflected the inherent divisions within Kenyan 
society. The persistent reiteration of these ethno-regional fissures heightened the 
atmosphere of the election and exacerbated the ‘winner-take-all’ mentality that 
already pervaded Kenyan presidential politics. Strategically, the inevitability and 
rigidity of quantitative polling almost certainly contributed to over-confidence in the 
Odinga camp, which in turn influenced the expectations of their supporters and 
created an environment conducive for violence. 
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Corresponding to the influence stage of my two-stage model, the evidence presented 
demonstrates clearly that public opinion polling is shaping political discourse in the 
four cases, as represented in the mainstream media in each country. Across the four 
cases, there is broad similarity in the way in which polling emerges and ultimately 
comes to pervade the political sphere. Generally, it is opposition parties that first 
recognise the potential of opinion polling, both as a media instrument and as a 
campaign technique. Political commentators closely follow these early adopters, 
legitimising what may otherwise have remained an obscure political tool. 
The political opposition faces a challenge in the early days, however, given their initial 
weakness relative to the ruling party in many of these cases. They must adopt an 
ambivalent stance of embracing the potential of polling while refusing to acknowledge 
the data it produces, which often shows them trailing by large margins. Only once they 
can demonstrate strong gains in their support can they fully condone the veracity of 
the polling. 
The broad similarity in the integration of opinion polling into political culture across 
the four cases is strong evidence of its increasing influence in sub-Saharan African 
politics. Political elites are seeking out the information that opinion polling offers on 
the electoral state of play, and they are adjusting their perceptions of the political 
dynamics of the campaign as a result of the data they receive through polling19. This 
substantiates my first stage hypothesis and opens the door to the further question of 
explaining the variation in reactions to opinion polling exhibited by political elites 
across these countries.  
                                                          
 
19
 This is consistent with Hedman’s (2010: 106) findings in the Philippines where “the growing practice 
of would-be candidates and their handlers commissioning their own surveys has also revealed an acute 
appreciation of the significance of public opinion polls for influencing the prospects of any given election 
campaign, by establishing candidates as genuinely ‘bankable’ in the eyes of prospective supporters.”  
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The Power of Perceptions 
Having established that public opinion polling is having an impact on the way in which 
elites perceive electoral politics, I proceeded to analyse whether that impact led to 
better quality elections, as the proponents of polling would suggest. Beginning from 
the premise that electoral quality is a function of elite strategies, I have hypothesised 
that elite perceptions of competition are the most likely pathway to predicting elite 
election strategies.  
Under the classical model of opinion polling conceived by George Gallup, opinion 
polling provides clear and impartial evidence as to the state of the electoral race, 
providing candidates with the information they need to tailor their strategies in order 
to attract the greatest number of voters and win the election. As competition 
increases, the importance of polling increases as politicians seek to attune themselves 
ever closer to the preferences and interests of the highest proportion of the 
electorate. In this way, the election becomes more transparent in its conduct and 
more representative in its outcome. 
This classical model, however, is not what is observed when reviewing the four cases 
presented here. Indeed, this research suggests that opinion polling’s ability to 
influence elite perceptions and behaviour does not necessarily bring with it a 
concomitant improvement in democracy. I theorise that this is due to two contextual 
factors: uncertainty of polls and media and ethnic-identity politics in a ‘competitive 
elitist’ system. Ultimately, the transparency and representativeness of elections is 
contingent upon elite perceptions of levels of competition. Where polling shows a 
marked increase in competition, strategies will inhibit transparency and 
representativeness; where polling shows stability or decreases in competition, 
strategies are more accommodating of transparency and representativeness 
In Kenya, polling’s influence on strategy and expectations thus is constrained by the 
character of the political system. There is first-hand evidence that political parties 
value polls for their campaign strategies, but the focus is not on attuning party 
platforms to public preferences but rather on the usefulness of polls as a means of 
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identifying target areas for ‘get out the vote’ campaigns. In this, Kenyan politicians are 
not substantially different from their Western counterparts, but the consequent 
hardening of ethnic cleavages as a result of these targeted forays further exacerbates 
electoral tensions.  
Moi’s apparent capitulation in 2002 in the face of overwhelming numbers argues 
strongly for opinion polling’s ability to contribute to more transparent and 
representative elections. In the context of this thesis’s hypotheses, this example 
supports the theory that polling’s ability to mobilise collective sentiment against Uhuru 
compelled Moi to accept an outcome he would not normally have been willing to 
accept. There is also evidence of the centrality of elite perceptions here. Moi had 
challenged popular sentiment before as president. What differed here was that Moi 
(and the general public) was able to perceive clearly Kibaki’s insurmountable lead and 
made a strategic decision to renege on any attempts to restrict or manipulate the 
electoral process. 
In 2005, opinion polling featured significantly throughout the referendum campaign. 
The politics of perception were played out daily across the front pages of the 
newspapers. With politicians able to base their projections on publicly available 
information rather than conjecture, elite perceptions came to play an important role in 
driving elite electoral strategies. The government, perceiving themselves to be on the 
losing end of the referendum, conceded defeat at an early stage to preserve political 
capital for future contests. Rather than persisting with a campaign they knew they 
could not win, they regrouped and prepared themselves instead for the 2007 
elections, a competition that was ultimately far more important for them to win.  
Indeed, by 2007, the strength of convictions among the competing parties was such, 
buttressed by the consistent leads in the public polls, that it is little surprise that the 
expectations of Odinga’s supporters were artificially high. In this highly charged post-
election environment, their unmet expectations proved the necessary provocation to 
ignite tensions and provoke violence. In this, the influence of perceptions rather than 
collective action or institutional mechanisms is readily apparent. The polls were not 
systematically manipulated to create a situation of chaos. Rather it was the political 
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system itself that proved ill-equipped to accommodate the rapid influx of public 
opinion data. Elite perceptions of increasing competition led to the adoption, not of 
more transparent and representative strategies, but rather of strategies that focused 
on ethnic mobilisation and clientelistic relationships. 
In Nigeria, it is clear that public opinion exerts influence on key segments of the 
political elite. The third term crisis corroborated theories espousing the power of a 
‘sudden’ swing in popular opinion. While the anti-amendment campaign was active 
prior to polling, the publication of opinion data gave it a potency it had not previously 
demonstrated. At the same time, the evidence from Nigeria illustrated the negative 
side to political responsiveness in the form of strategic rigging and intimidation based 
on the targeted information provided by opinion polling.  
In assessing opinion polling’s political impact at a strategic level, the evidence of 2007 
points to an elite dominant system, where politicians use polls to maximise personal 
gain over the interests of the electorate. While opinion polling played an important 
role in persuading the opposition to contest the elections and therefore preventing a 
PDP monopoly on power, once the campaign was joined the strategic calculus 
deteriorated considerably. In personality-dominant politics, data is used not as a 
means of convincing voters of the ideological merit of the candidate but as a means of 
proving the ability of the candidate to deliver tangible benefits. Opinion polling may 
not directly contribute to the exercise of these tactics, but it appears that the presence 
of hard data enabled politicians to be more ruthless and yet more selective in their 
application. While this may represent value for money for Nigerian clientelist 
politicians, it does not speak well for opinion polling’s ability to influence positively 
Nigeria’s quest for more transparent and representative elections. 
The examples from 2007 and 2011 in Nigeria reiterate the potential that opinion 
polling has in competitive environments of instigating rather than reducing violence 
and conflict by establishing appropriate expectations of election results. This is rarely 
as a result of shortcomings in the polling but rather deficiencies in the electoral 
process which create vast chasms between the data presented in the pre-election polls 
and official election tallies. The pertinent question is whether the transparency 
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provided by polls and the conflict it subsequently provokes is good for democratic 
development in the long-run, even if it is disastrous in the immediate aftermath of 
elections.  
While opinion polling’s contribution remains limited in terms of shaping electoral 
outcomes, public opinion research has the opportunity to make a significant and 
positive impact on the improvement electoral practice and outcomes in future 
elections. If existing gains can be built on and expanded, there is potential that those 
political personalities that currently dominate Nigerian elections can be counteracted. 
Whatever its influence, it cannot be denied that public opinion polling has made a 
forceful entry into the Nigerian political system, shaping elite behaviour both for the 
better and, unfortunately, often for the worse. 
The influence of public opinion polling on political information and electoral strategies 
in Nigeria remains uncertain. This thesis argues that it can be credited with ensuring 
that the opposition took part in the 2007 general elections. At the same time, it seems 
to function more prominently as a means for elites to present ‘consensus’ candidates 
to the electorates, using opinion polls as a way to presage the outcomes of the 
elections and ensure they are on the winning. In this context, participation is no longer 
representative of open and fair contestation but rather a pre-organised game, that 
while not necessarily rigged from start, does present Nigerian citizens with a reduced 
scope for choice. 
In Ghana, polling’s influence on strategy and expectations has been likewise disparate, 
ranging from clear and incisive to vague and implied. Personal interviews conducted 
for this research have shown that political elites rely on perceptions of competition 
illustrated by opinion polls to shape their electoral strategies. Yet, faced with 
uncertainty and high levels of competition, in the context of Ghanaian politics, the 
political elite have generally not chosen to broaden their appeal through issue-based 
campaigns as Gallup’s vision of polling intended. Rather, they retreat further to the 
clientelistic and patronage strategies that characterise ethnic-identity politics in sub-
Saharan Africa.  
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The ability of opinion polling to capture and elucidate the resurgence of the NDC mid-
campaign in 2004 highlighted its potential for campaign strategy, both on the side of 
the leader and the chasing pack. Moreover, the development of ‘skirt and blouse’ 
voting, where a voter votes for one party’s presidential candidate but votes for a 
different party’s parliamentary candidate, illustrated the potential importance of 
better information on voter intentions that could be linked to constituency-specific 
campaign strategies. Indeed, as the hypothesis on elite perceptions would predict, as 
the opinion polls tightened in the middle of the race, the two parties moved toward 
more ethnic-identity style politics to energise support from among their core 
constituencies, raising concerns that the election would overheat. A consistent series 
of polls assigning a clear victory to the NPP, however, undercut the NDC’s efforts to 
maintain the competition. A consensus of expectations based on the polls emerged, 
later validated by the official result, translating into a relatively transparent and 
representative election. 
In 2008, the NPP had a strong incentive to use its power of incumbency to attempt to 
guide public opinion away from its preference for a change in government. According 
to pollster Ben Ephson, this was done through means of bribery and the manipulation 
of figures in polls and, perhaps, the ballot box. Interestingly, the NPP were compelled 
to resort to these tactics based largely on the analysis of opinion polls conducted 
relatively early in the election campaign. Faced with the ethno-regional realities that 
those polls depicted, their American strategist advised them to prepare themselves for 
defeat. Reflecting perhaps the stark contrast between the American data-centric 
campaigns and the African image-centric campaigns, the NPP campaign team refused 
to accept their strategist’s advice to abandon huge swathes of the country and focus 
their efforts on key areas. The polls were proved correct. In the end, the American 
strategist had called the outcome of the election precisely. 
This outcome is an important finding in the context of this research. I have argued that 
in the context of high political competition opinion polling instigates elites to pursue 
strategies that undermine the transparency and representativeness of electoral 
processes. They do so based on their own perceptions drawn from uncertain polling 
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data and due to the specific elite incentives that exist within the political system. Even 
by 2008, the credibility of Ghanaian polls was mixed at best. The partisanship which 
pervaded the production of the polls largely undermined the consumption of them, 
with media and readers unable to determine which are credible and which 
propaganda. Perhaps based on this uncertainty, the NPP rejected proposals to narrow 
their campaign to exclude NDC-favoured areas and chose to fight as broadly as 
possible. That their strategy ultimately failed to deliver victory makes this the 
exception that proves the rule. Knowing the predicted outcome August 2008, these 
numbers likely played a role in expediting their conceding defeat. 
By 2012, polling at a strategic level, became far less about the practicalities of the 
information and far more about reacting to the content of the polls, either positively or 
negatively. This was driven by the increasingly partisan nature of Ghanaian politics as 
the main political parties solidified their bases and consolidated their electoral 
positions. While polling continued to play in an important role in increasing the 
transparency of internal strategy of political parties, its ability to influence positively 
the quality of electoral processes in Ghana became highly compromised by the 
uncertainty of its profile and the competitively charged political atmosphere in which 
the polls are released. 
In spite of these difficulties, opinion polling, at least the reliable polls, seemed to get 
the prediction right in the end. While election experts fully expected the vote to go to 
a run-off, Ephson’s last poll correctly called a ‘one-touch’ victory for Mahama and the 
NDC. The NPP has taken the decision to court, but the weight of evidence is against 
them. People have been angry, but widespread violence has not ensued. While this 
can largely be credited to the politicians who have appealed for calm, there is also the 
possibility that the political elite were prepared to accept this outcome based on the 
information available to them prior to the vote. 
Finally, in spite of the gains opinion polling has made in Uganda, its influence is 
hampered by a number of structural factors. Recent efforts notwithstanding, political 
party identity is still low, given the relative novelty of multi-party politics. As a result, 
personality politics still dominate — a holdover from the “merit-based” system of the 
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previous political system — which often means that the selection of the candidate is 
infinitely more important than the issues/party platform in determining voter decision-
making. Moreover the lack of credible alternatives means that opinion polling’s ability 
to aggregate opinion and point to possible opposition coalitions is also abrogated. This 
undermines opinion polling’s strategic influence for change. 
Museveni’s campaign was clearly caught off-guard by the polls that placed Besigye in 
such competitive positions during the 2001 campaign. Their initial response was to 
obfuscate the picture through counter-claims of their own, citing ‘internal’ polls or 
their own predictions based on crowds at rallies or whistle stop tours of the country 
with the president. Failing this, they allegedly reverted to a strategy of rigging the 
election to ensure that Museveni would win with a large majority, eliminating a need 
for a run-off. In both cases, the effect of a perceived increase in competition was a 
move toward less transparent and representative electoral strategies. 
Consequently, the 2001 Ugandan elections demonstrate how opinion polling can 
provide a ‘sense-check’ for official election results, particularly where trust in the 
electoral institutions is low. While there was little doubt that Museveni would win re-
election, the sizable discrepancy between his polling trends and his final tally fuelled 
opposition claims of voter manipulation. Indeed, journalists from The Monitor took the 
extraordinary step of using the opinion polls as supporting evidence for their 
calculations of fraud that had befallen the 2001 elections. Their analysis argued that 
had the elections actually been free and fair, the result would have looked very much 
like the independent opinion polls circulating at the time. In this way, while opinion 
polling in competitive settings is unlikely to deliver more transparency and 
representativeness during the electoral period in question, it could have potential 
influence on institutional change in the future. 
2006 followed broadly similar lines. Museveni perceiving his margin of victory to be 
shrinking resorted to violence and the physical incarceration of his opponent. 
Ironically, these old tactics backfired to a certain extent, with evidence to suggest that 
Besigye’s popularity only grew following his arrest, as his media profile consequently 
increased. Museveni and his team, having reduced prospects for a transparent 
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election, acted emphatically to ensure that the result also would be unrepresentative. 
These outcomes are strongly supportive of the hypothesis that opinion polling shapes 
elite perceptions of competition, engendering negative strategic reactions in the face 
of increased competition. 
The reduced competition throughout the 2011 campaign meant that Museveni could 
adjust his tactical techniques, using more covert methods to ensure clear victory. 
There were fears that if Museveni pursued strategies similar to those he had used in 
2001 and 2006 Uganda could erupt into the same political violence that followed the 
2007/8 Kenyan elections. Museveni’s persistent superiority in 2011, however, defused 
any potential tensions. While opposition politicians publicly rejected the election 
result, their arguments of voter fraud and manipulation lacked conviction. With the 
margins of the victory so great and so consistent with all media predictions, their 
complaints were largely ignored. 
This is not to say that there is not potential for opposition politicians to build a viable 
campaign. The FDC appears to have learned some lessons from the unsuccessful 2011 
election. Far from shying away from opinion polls, the party has embraced them, 
engaging independent pollsters to investigate issues related to leadership, voter 
expectations, and key vote drivers. The recent FDC leadership election was polled 
throughout to give delegates a chance to gauge trends among the competing 
candidates. This points to a future in which opinion polling is far more, rather than less, 
institutionalised within Ugandan politics. 
My hypothesis for this second, decision stage of the model was that opinion polling 
changes elite perceptions of the state of competition within the electoral process, 
necessitating a change in electoral strategy. Where competition is seen as stable or 
reduced, elites can adopt strategies that are more conducive to transparent and 
representative elections. Where competition is seen to be increasing, elites choose to 
adopt strategies that ensure victory, which in the case of sub-Saharan Africa are rarely 
transparent or representative.  
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The evidence from the cases broadly confirms this hypothesis while lending little 
support to the collective action models or institutional models previously proposed in 
the literature. In Ghana and Kenya, increasingly competitive electoral processes saw 
opinion polling used not as a means of channelling policy messages or opening up 
political processes but rather as a means of targeting ethno-regional party blocs or 
obfuscating the state of the electoral contest. In Uganda, likewise, Museveni viewed 
opinion polls showing a narrowing race as sufficient justification to pursue 
manipulative and coercive tactics to ensure victory. Only when that threat of 
competition faded did he give opinion polling the political space to inform policy 
platforms and more open campaign strategies. 
This is not to say that opinion polling has made no impact. Evidence from Nigeria 
shows how opinion polls can be used to counter electoral fraud in the aftermath of 
flawed elections, and all cases showed the potential it has for making African politics 
more data-driven. However, opinion polling has done little to force change in the 
political or electoral institutions of sub-Saharan Africa. While other scholars have 
found transformative, liberalising effects of opinion polling in cases in Latin America 
and Asia, in Africa public opinion polling is very much defined by the institutional 
context rather than shaping it. Opinion polling has certainly shifted the locus of 
political gamesmanship from the private to the public in the cases observed, but it has 
done little to change the rules of the game. 
Likewise, opinion polling in sub-Saharan Africa has not been the rallying instrument for 
opposition and civil society that some proponents had hoped it would be. While 
shaping the political discourse, it is not changing the protagonists. The greatest success 
for this model observed in this research actually occurred outside the context of 
elections. The defeat of President Obasanjo’s attempt to rewrite Nigeria’s constitution 
to allow himself a third term in office is an example where civil society was able to use 
opinion polling to set the agenda and turn collective wisdom to their point of view. 
Indeed, that these kinds of successes were not readily observed during the period of 
research does not imply that they are not possible, given the appropriate conditions. 
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The Potential for Polling and Civil Society 
Kenya is something of a crucible for research into opinion polling in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The nature of its media, its politics, and its burgeoning opinion research industry puts 
it at the forefront of issues of polling and elections, both positively and negatively. 
Trends which emerge here may portend the future of other African nations grappling 
with the emergence of this new phenomenon in electoral campaigns. It is therefore 
useful to examine the recent Kenyan election in light of this research’s conclusions as a 
precursor for the future of opinion polling in Africa. 
In March 2013, Kenyans went to the polls again in the first presidential election since 
the violence of 2007-8. Many things had changed. The new law referenced in the 
introduction to this thesis had taken effect, restricting the publication of opinion polls 
in the days immediately before the election. Electoral institutions had been reformed 
to try and dispel the mistrust that pervaded electoral politics following the debacle of 
the previous cycle. A new constitution was in force which changed the rules of the 
game. But most importantly, the political climate was imbued with an overwhelming 
commitment to avoid violence and ensure peace, almost at any cost.  
In spite of the new restrictions, opinion polling nevertheless continued to feature 
prominently in the media coverage of the campaign. Using the same frame of analysis 
as in previous cases above demonstrated that at approximately nine mentions per 
thousand articles, opinion polls remained very much a newsworthy feature of the 
campaign. The results of the polls bore an eerie resemblance to those of 2007. Raila 
Odinga, running again, jumped out to an early lead which he maintained throughout 
much of the race. Toward the end of the campaign, however, Uhuru Kenyatta’s 
numbers began creeping up, eventually placing the race into a statistical dead-heat 
going into election-day. 
Voting itself was peaceful, and, in spite of numerous technical failings and delays, 
Uhuru was eventually announced as the new president of Kenya, having achieved not 
just a comfortable margin of victory but also having surmounted the constitutionally 
required 50 per cent plus one milestone. Odinga and the opposition were again 
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incredulous and took their case to court, but throughout, peace was declared to be 
paramount. Following an unsuccessful appeal, Odinga conceded the race without fuss 
and appealed to all his supporters to abide by the new constitution and accept Uhuru 
as their new president. 
How does this electoral episode fit within the model proposed by this research? At first 
glance, elite strategies here appear to contradict the hypothesis that heightened 
political competition will instigate elite behaviour detrimental to the conduct of 
transparent and representative elections. The opinion polls were consistently tight, 
mirroring the competitive atmosphere that existed during 2007. While the ethnic 
coalitions were drawn differently, the perceptions of much of the media suggested 
that this would be a very tight race. Under these conditions, one would expect to see 
the two campaigns moving toward restricting political space and manipulating voter 
opinion in their core constituent areas to ensure maximum voter turnout. 
Yet, Odinga, even as the polls pointed to a strong surge in support for Kenyatta, stuck 
doggedly to his strategy of issue-based campaigning and national appeal (VOA, 25 
February 2013). Kenyatta likewise struck a nationalistic tone through his campaign, 
appealing to all Kenyans to rally to him in the forthcoming election. And when the 
results came through, Odinga and his supporters strictly followed the guidance against 
violence, pursuing instead a transparent judicial process. Failing in that, Odinga 
publicly declared the election to be representative of the wishes of Kenyans. 
In Kenya in 2013, I would argue that contextual factors emerged which temporarily 
suspended the rationale for restricting the political space, changing the elite calculus 
and thus the influence of elite perceptions of competition and opinion polling. The first 
was the issue of the International Criminal Court indictments hanging over Uhuru and 
his running mate William Ruto. The instrumentalisation of this issue by Odinga’s 
campaign appears to have backfired against them. Kenyatta’s appeals to nationalism 
around this issue appear to have resonated with unaligned voters, essentially trumping 
any efforts to mobilise them along ethno-regional lines.  
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Secondly, and more importantly, the spectre of 2007 and the need for peace 
essentially changed the character of competition in the race. The political elite could 
not be seen to be stoking the same fires that had sparked the post-election violence in 
2007. Likewise, the media self-censored themselves to avoid any accusations of stirring 
tensions. Opinion pollsters, already restricted, feared still further backlash if their data 
were seen to be used for the wrong means. Even international organisations took their 
polls behind closed doors, choosing to engage the political elite privately rather than 
risk the public side of public opinion polling (Private interview, 20 May 2013). 
Thus in Kenya in 2013, public opinion played a key, but unexpected, role in 
determining the character and outcome of the election. The fear of a repeat of 2007/8 
was such that a collective movement, not necessarily organised but nonetheless 
effective and visible through opinion polling, was able to shape political dynamics in 
such a way as to force the political elite to adopt more transparent and representative 
electoral strategies. This success gives hope that while opinion polling is currently 
constrained by the contextual factors influencing sub-Saharan African politics, there 
are circumstances in which the relationship between polls, elites, and elections can 
more closely approximate the ideal envisioned by George Gallup over seventy years 
ago.  
Opinion Polling and Elites 
The Kenya example suggests that there is a growing realisation among donors that 
public opinion polling is strongly shaping electoral politics in the countries in sub-
Saharan Africa where it has been introduced. It has become the principal source of 
electoral information for political elites, particularly in the media, and colours 
significantly the way in which they view politics and the way in which they behave. 
Contrary to expectations, however, the influence of public opinion polls has not been 
particularly positive on the quality of elections, giving cause for reflection on how 
public opinion polling is actually influencing elite perceptions and behaviour around 
elections in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Democratic politics is very much a learning process, with all actors trying to determine 
the appropriate role for them to play. The introduction of opinion polling into this mix 
adds a new element for those involved to accommodate. Politicians must choose how 
to engage with political opinion polling. 
At the outset, I argued that opinion polling is a form of political participation and 
should be modelled as such. This was based on previous theorists who contended that 
it must be construed as more than just an aggregation of attitudes or opinions. In the 
act of capturing and publishing this data, pollsters actually introduce a new kind of 
political participation that is capable of shifting elite understanding of politics. This is 
not to say that opinion polling fundamentally changes the political dynamics of 
elections, but it certainly changes how elites perceive and react to those dynamics. 
In Chapter 2, I noted the argument that public opinion polling could be considered “the 
handmaiden of modern democracy,” providing citizens with an essential alternative to 
voicing their opinions on key issues in between relatively infrequent elections 
(Bradburn and Sudman, 1988). While this research focuses almost exclusively on the 
impact of polling within the context of those ‘infrequent elections,’ it does contribute 
something to the debate regarding the locus and relative value of the influence of 
polling within these, at least nominally, democratic systems.  
The four cases studied here have revealed an industry that reflects and amplifies 
rather than transforms the nature of the political system in which it exists. Yet, 
however critical politicians or analysts may be of the data that emerges, they are still 
obliged to react to it, due to the sheer force of popularity these numbers carry among 
voters. Opinion data is political information of high priority that, whether good or bad, 
must be interpreted and strategised around. For the political elite, opinion polling has 
become equal parts indispensable and incensing. It is a balancing act that neither the 
politicians, the media, nor the pollsters have fully mastered.  
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Opinion Polling and Elections 
Earlier in this thesis I presented two contrasting perceptions among scholars as to the 
likelihood of African elections ever consistently meeting external criteria for freeness 
and fairness. The pessimistic view contended that existing elites are just adapting to 
changing realities, adjusting their strategies only in order to maintain their economic 
and political power. More optimistic observers note the growing pressure, both 
internationally and within countries, on elites to change, to become more ‘democratic’ 
in their behaviour around elections. 
Underpinning this expected movement toward more democratic elections are two 
core attributes that were the focus of the second stage of this research. The first was 
transparency, a level of openness and availability of information about the electoral 
process, which is crucial to avoiding basic electoral fraud and to informing citizen 
decision-makers about their electoral choices. The second was representativeness. The 
term was chosen deliberately to encompass two distinct though related concepts in 
electoral quality. One, elections are meant to be representative of citizen interests and 
preferences, meaning that politicians should be responsive to these and adjust their 
strategies accordingly. Two, elections should be representative of the true outcome of 
citizen voting, meaning that results should reflect actual vote tallies rather than those 
manufactured or manipulated by political operatives.  
Analysing the impact of public opinion polling on elections through these two variables 
revealed the potential and the limitations offered by polls in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Knowing through the first stage of the research that polls have become an influential 
source of political information for elites in the four countries, it was left to discern the 
extent to which that new knowledge shaped decision-making and, more importantly, 
behaviour with regard to electoral strategies.  
The evidence suggests that polls are indeed capable of changing elite behaviour but 
not their underlying motivations. Opinion polling forces elites to recognise and 
respond to public sentiments that would otherwise have been silent or easily muted, 
but the presence of these new voices does not fundamentally change the rules of the 
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political game or the actors that play it. In one sense, it can make the electoral process 
more transparent, through more open candidate selection and through putting 
pressure for improved tallying and reporting of official election results. It can also 
make the process more representative by allowing easier correlation between pre-
election predictions and official election tallies and by encouraging elites to focus their 
campaigns more on issues than on identities. 
But this capability is contingent upon factors outside the control of public opinion 
polling itself. The example of Kenya in 2013 demonstrates the potential of collective 
public opinion when channelled appropriately, but it stands out as an exception to the 
general rule of sub-Saharan African politics where the politics of personal survival 
trump that of national interest. In this context, opinion polling’s most likely 
contribution correlates more closely to the pessimistic view espoused above where 
elites use the new information to adjust to new circumstances. This does not imply a 
universally negative view of opinion polling — some of these adjustments may 
ultimately lead to greater rather than less political liberalisation — but it does suggest 
that the benefits of public opinion polling in sub-Saharan Africa are more context-
specific than initially understood.  
Indeed, an anecdote from Tanzania further emphasises this point. For decades, the 
ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party has dominated the country’s politics with a 
varying, but always significant, majority in both presidential and parliamentary 
elections. In 2010, rumours began to circulate that the party might be vulnerable to an 
electoral challenge from the opposition CHADEMA party. As if to confirm this, in 
October, a poll emerged, conducted by a small NGO called the Tanzania Citizens 
Information Bureau (TCIB), which predicted victory for the opposition in the upcoming 
election. The poll, however, only sampled a selection of the country’s districts, many of 
which were known to be opposition strongholds. Nevertheless, news of the poll 
exploded in the media, and the ruling party, far from engaging with the idea of 
increasing competition, ordered a media blackout, compelling their candidates to 
refuse all interviews and all appearances. The election atmosphere immediately 
intensified, and the quality of the election suffered. Only the appearance of 
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competition, in the form of a very suspect poll, had motivated complete panic on the 
part of the ruling party with clear repercussions for the electoral process in Tanzania 
(Makulilo, 2011). 
In short, at this stage, public opinion polling in sub-Saharan Africa is not a 
transformative instrument; rather it is a tool of amplification. It intensifies politics, 
exposing institutional weaknesses rather than reforming them. It shapes elite 
perceptions of political dynamics without forcing them to alter fundamentally the 
assumptions upon which those perceptions are made. Nevertheless, it has cast the 
light of transparency on certain aspects of electoral politics in sub-Saharan Africa. 
While this has occasionally had short-term negative repercussions in the form of 
violence and rigging, it is likely to have a longer term beneficial impact on the quality of 
elections on the continent. 
Implications for Opinion Polling 
This research was motivated by a desire to understand how the proliferation of public 
opinion polling in sub-Saharan Africa was changing the way elections in those countries 
were contested. It has shown that polling has become an indelible feature of these 
elections, irrespective of the recriminations and critiques that have been thrown its 
way. The political elite now consider public opinion polling as an integral part of their 
electoral strategy, even if some are more willing to own up to it than others.  
The research has also suggested that opinion polling’s ability to contribute to better 
quality elections is contingent on the competitive environment into which it is 
introduced. Given the incentives facing contemporary African political elites, increased 
competition does not imply a greater need to connect with individual voters; rather it 
implies a greater need to connect with core constituencies whose trigger issues are 
less likely to be policy-based and more likely to be identity-based.  
What does this mean for public opinion polling in sub-Saharan Africa? Above it was 
noted that in Kenya, significant amounts of opinion polling is now commissioned by 
donors in private, conferring only with the political parties themselves rather than 
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publishing the findings in the media. This supports the contention that opinion polling 
is influential on elite perceptions and that it is the ‘public’ nature of the polling that 
skews elite behaviour. By working with the political parties in private, the donors are 
hoping to avoid the negative repercussions of increasingly competitive polling by 
allowing them to adjust their electoral strategies outside of the glare of the media. 
The evidence presented here suggests there is some rationale for this approach. 
Removed from the competitive atmosphere of the media horse race, opinion polling 
can potentially better serve its function of informing more representative strategies 
from elites. It certainly can reduce the prospects of conflict around opinion polling data 
itself. But in keeping the surveys confidential, one also loses the transparency of 
information they afford by throwing the race open to even casual observers. Far from 
revealing more about elite decision-making, limiting the results of polls to behind 
closed doors further distances elites from citizens who will not necessarily know the 
content of the polls or understand the direction that policy is now taking.  
This caution on the part of donors, however, does not imply anything inherently wrong 
with public opinion polling in the sub-Saharan African context. Indeed, like any new 
addition, it may simply require time for the systems to adjust to the new information. 
The rapidity with which opinion polling has been adopted by the political media and 
increasingly by the campaign operations in the four case studies is remarkable. Indeed, 
while a consistent undercurrent persists contending that opinion polling is ill-suited to 
African politics and will not make an impact (Private interview, 14 June 2013), the 
preponderance of evidence suggests otherwise. It is being embraced, and the battle is 
not to get the political elite to react to the polls; they are already doing that. The next 
battle for proponents of opinion polling in Africa is to ensure that the polls are used to 
enhance political freedom rather than restrict it. 
Prospects for Polling 
Public opinion polling in sub-Saharan Africa is only likely to expand. Both politicians 
and the media, two prominent actors in all countries’ electoral processes, have 
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embraced it, in spite of its flaws and its detractors. For all its weaknesses, it has gained 
a foothold in the collective consciousness of many democratic societies, including an 
increasing number of transitional and emerging democracies in developing countries. 
Just as the industry of opinion polling has evolved over the decades it has been active 
in Western democracies, it is likely to change and adapt to meet the needs of new 
consumers of political information.  
This research has shown the challenges faced by public opinion polling in the context 
of sub-Saharan African politics. I have argued that it has surmounted the first challenge 
in overcoming institutional reluctance to quantitative research to become a principal 
source of information for the political media and political campaigns alike. Its second 
challenge is to overcome the institutional aversion to open competition that instead 
sees elites restricting and manipulating elections when faced with potential defeat. 
While opinion polling may in the short term trigger such activity from elites, there 
seems no better antidote to this kind of political activity than increased information 
and pressure based on that information. In Nigeria, we’ve already seen opinion polling 
used in court cases to overturn obviously fraudulent election results. It may be 
contentious at the outset, but this is a potentially beneficial way in which polling can 
improve the quality of elections in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Opinion polling also has the potential to be transformative of the structure of political 
competition in the long-run as well. In Kenya and Nigeria, we saw fleeting glimpses of 
political party coalitions coalescing and/or crumbling on the basis of data from public 
opinion polls. This is particularly encouraging in the one-party dominant states of 
Uganda and Nigeria where the official opposition has little hope of overturning the 
large majority on its own. Using the numerical strategy provided by opinion polling, 
opposition parties can build viable coalitions, changing the political dynamics of 
elections. This is also true in the more competitive arenas of Kenya and Ghana where 
in spite of distinct cleavages among the elites, coalitions are often more important 
than they first appear. 
The process of researching this thesis flagged up a number of areas in which future 
researchers could add value to understanding how opinion polling is influencing sub-
245 
 
 
 
Saharan African politics more broadly. This thesis has restricted itself to a study of 
elites and their interactions with polls, but there is potential for research into the 
influence of polling and elite performance. Data in this area remains scarce, but it 
would be fascinating to see whether the presence of opinion polling contributed to 
more responsive governance at the constituency level. There is also potential, as the 
data becomes more readily available, for investigations into opinion polling and its 
influence on voter behaviour in sub-Saharan Africa. It would instructive to know 
whether the same concerns that dog opinion polling in Western democracies are also 
replicable in the context of more transitional democracies. There is still much to learn 
about opinion polling in sub-Saharan Africa to be sure. 
At the outset of this research I asked to what extent is public opinion polling 
influencing the dynamics of electoral politics in sub-Saharan Africa and what explains 
the variation in that influence across countries? I can conclude that public opinion 
polling is having a significant influence on elite perceptions of electoral politics in the 
four cases reviewed, even if it has yet to make a clear impact on the structure of 
politics during elections. Nevertheless, I contend that through these perceptions 
opinion polling can and does influence elite political behaviour and their decision-
making on the electoral strategies they employ. In doing so, opinion polling can 
contribute to either positive or negative changes in the quality of elections by 
intensifying the perceptions of elites as to the level of competition they face for 
victory.  
Image is important in African politics. Parties represent themselves with pictures and 
colours to differentiate themselves for uneducated voters. In this context what people 
perceive may be more important than what they know. Opinion polls, whether openly 
embraced or publicly shunned, are now an indelible part of that heady mix that African 
elites recognise as the power of perceptions. 
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Appendix 1. Charting Mentions of ‘Opinion Poll’ over Time 
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Appendix 2. List of Key Interviewees 
Abeeku Essuman-Johnson – Academic, Ghana  
Arthur Okwemba – Journalist, Kenya 
Bell Ahua – Pollster NOI Polls, Nigeria 
Ben Ephson – Journalist, Editor of Daily Dispatch, Ghana 
Daniel Kalinaki – Journalist, Uganda 
David Somers – Pollster, Ipsos Nigeria 
Deus Kibamba – Civil society practitioner, TCIB  
Ebere Uneze – CSEA Nigeria 
Franklin Oduro – Academic and civil society practitioner, CDD Ghana 
Elvis Kwashie – Journalist, Uganda 
Frederick Ssemwanga – Civil society practitioner, Uganda 
Nkoyo Toyo – Member of Parliament, Nigeria 
James Kakande – Pollster, Synovate Uganda 
Jill Kyatucheire – WFD, Uganda 
Joseph Asunka – Academic, UC Berkeley  
Karen Rothmyer – Journalist, Kenya 
Kwamchetsi Makokha – Journalist, Kenya 
Kwendo Opanga – Journalist and Editor, Kenya 
Maggie Ireri – Pollster, Synovate, Kenya 
Murithi Mutiga – Journalist, Kenya 
Ndubisi Anyanwu – Ministry of Finance, Nigeria 
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Oge Modie – Pollster, NOI Polls, Nigeria 
Olawale Olaleye – Journalist, Nigeria 
Olawale Rasheed – Journalist, Nigeria 
Patrick Wakida – Pollster, Research International, Uganda 
Paul Kagwanja – Academic and campaign advisor, Kenya 
Paul Nwabuiku – Journalist and government advisor, Nigeria 
Peter Mwesige – Journalist, Uganda 
Philip Okullo – Pollster, Synovate, Ghana 
Philip Osafo-Kwaaku – Academic and government advisor, Nigeria 
Robert Sentamu – Pollster, Wilsken Agencies, Uganda 
Simon Osborn – NDI, Uganda 
Titus Lee – Civil society practitioner, Kenya and Uganda 
Tom Wolf – Pollster, Synovate, Kenya 
Victor Rateng – Pollster, Synovate Kenya 
Willie Mensah – Pollster, Synovate, Ghana 
Zakaria Yakubu – Civil society practitioner, Ghana 
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